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| Abstract ii 
  
Abstract 
This thesis is predominantly focused upon the relevance of deliberative democracy and 
agonistic pluralism in helping us to understand and analyse the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014, as it played out on Twitter.  In doing so, it advances theoretical political 
communication research into social media platforms, which often focuses upon the 
possibilities of deliberative democracy, whilst agonistic pluralism tends to be used in 
opposition to deliberative theory.  Aspects of liberalism and communitarianism are also used 
in the empirical study as an aid to this comparison, by applying a model taken from Deen G. 
Freelon (2010). Uniquely, in addition to activist groups, journalists and MSPs are focused upon 
as key stakeholders in the democratic communication process. The thesis is qualitative, with 
a critical theory research philosophy which focuses upon pluralism as a theory which 
contextualises power relations in the democratic process, underpins the vital role of media 
plurality in liberal democracies, and is a forerunner of agonistic theory.  Methodologically, the 
empirical study combines an 18 month period of Twitter observation with intensive interviews 
(conducted with individuals from the three aforementioned stakeholder groups) in line with 
accepted norms of critical theory research.  The empirical study makes an original contribution 
to knowledge  by presenting  rich descriptions of exemplars of three different strands of 
political communication taken from Freelon’s model, which could be operationalised by 
quantitative scholars in future studies. The empirical results suggest that whilst deliberation 
was negligible during the campaign, there are a number of coding schemes that when tailored 
to the appropriate platform are capable of capturing online deliberation. However, the process 
of recognising certain requisite components of deliberative exchanges is particularly 
challenging from remote settings. Agonistic pluralism was found to be somewhat 
representative of the online debate, though lacking regarding essential components of Chantal 
Mouffe’s version of the theory in the areas of agonistic respect and conflictual consensus.  The 
study, therefore, concludes that a new strand of agonistic pluralism would complement existing 
models of political communication, and core components of such a model are discussed.  The 
thesis has a secondary focus which asks how pluralist group theory aids our understanding of 
Twitter-based activism during the referendum campaign.  In this regard, the study concludes 
that pluralist group theory is indeed still relevant in the modern day, whilst social media 
platforms such as Twitter are perhaps redefining traditional notions of political interest groups.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview of chapter 1 
This chapter begins by briefly discussing the relevance of democratic theory, as the empirical 
testing of democratic theory in a contemporary political campaign is the central focus of this 
thesis.  The current issues facing democracy in the United Kingdom that are relevant to the 
study are then introduced, followed by a background to the Scottish independence referendum 
of 2014, which is the arena in which the empirical study is situated.  The research problem is 
then outlined and the aims, objectives, and research questions are presented.  Finally, the 
structure of the thesis is detailed through the presentation of an overview of its constituent 
chapters. 
 
1.2 Background to the study 
Theories of democracy help to explain the evolution of the political decision-making system 
that is the predominant form of government throughout the developed world.  As democracy 
evolves, new theories emerge and established theories change, it is, therefore, important that 
theories are rigorously empirically tested in order to establish their relevance in the subject 
field.  This study predominantly focuses upon two such theories, namely, deliberative 
democracy and agonistic pluralism, as witnessed on Twitter during the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014.  Democratic academic theory does not only help to explain events, but 
can also be used to identify and facilitate approaches which can perhaps improve upon the 
contemporary position.  It is, therefore, important to clarify the democratic issues and 
challenges that are particularly relevant to this study. 
 
There are a number of issues present in UK democracy which lead scholars and practitioners 
to search for improvements. Participation has been a long-standing issue and survey data 
shows that there is a prevalent feeling amongst the general public that the UK political system 
requires improvement (Hansard Society 2016). Additionally, an (arguably healthy) distrust in 
politicians has always been present to some degree (ibid.). However, this has become 
increasingly heightened in recent times. Historically, however, UK citizens have displayed a 
reasonable level of trust in traditional media sources (Committee on Standards in Public Life 
2014), such as the written press and broadcast media, to at the very least, expose the wrong-
doings of their elected representatives.  
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This trust has helped maintain a working relationship between the state and its citizens. In 
recent times, however, events such as the Milly Dowler phone hacking scandal led to public 
outrage regarding the civic standards displayed by the media. Around the same time, the level 
of distrust in both the media and politicians was exacerbated by the exposure of an unhealthy 
relationship between MPs and billionaire media moguls (Wright and Morris 2011). These 
events have damaged an already precarious relationship between citizens and the state and 
also between citizens and the traditional media.  This study addresses these issues and 
others, and considers the role that social media already has had, and may have in the future, 
in addressing them. 
 
Prior to the scandals which dogged the media in the first decade of the 21st century, the 
traditional media in the UK had been subject to growing criticisms, mainly based upon its 
composition and ownership. The decision not to refer the takeover of The Times and The 
Sunday Times newspapers in 1981 to the monopolies and mergers commission, by the then 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, is seen as pivotal in negatively impacting upon the print 
media landscape in the UK. The takeover meant that Rupert Murdoch acquired 37% of the 
British printed press (Doyle 2002). The printed press in the UK had for many years faced 
allegations of being particularly right wing in its editorial leanings, and this compounded those 
assertions even further. The Murdoch takeover was the embodiment of the burgeoning neo-
liberal ideology which was to become the prevalent democratic model for decades to come. 
The reality was that those who sought journalism which challenged neo-liberal ideals were left 
significantly restricted in their available choices. 
 
Concerns about citizen engagement with the media, and available places for citizens to access 
it, and also the influence that ownership, and particularly concentrated ownership, has upon 
media output are the basis of the concept of media pluralism. Concerns around media 
pluralism exist across advanced democracies; displayed, for example, in the way that the 
European Union has a specific monitor in place, headed by the European Commission, to 
assess the plurality of media across member states. Media pluralism is grounded in the belief 
that exposure to multiple points of view on any given subject, where a range of conflicting 
views are presented, allows for individuals to make informed democratic choices.  Social 
media can perhaps be seen as being an extension of media plurality and this thesis explores 
the empirical reality of, and/or potential for, social media platforms such as Twitter to enable 
a more pluralistic media through greater plurality of content and also as a platform for political 
deliberation.  
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1.3 Background to the Scottish independence referendum 2014 
The Act of Union, which was passed in 1707, formalised the political union of the formerly 
separate states of Scotland and England. Over two hundred years later, the Scottish National 
Party was formed in 1934 with a central purpose of realising a dissolution of the Act of the 
Union and achieving political independence for Scotland. The increasing absence of 
Conservative Party held seats in Scotland, during the government of Margaret Thatcher from 
1979 to 1990, helped to establish a mandate for a devolved system of government in Scotland.  
 
The Scotland Act was passed in 1998, and the Scottish Parliament was opened in 1999, 
whereby certain powers were devolved to the Scottish Parliament, including health; education 
and training; most aspects of civil and criminal law; housing; and social work; whilst the 
majority were retained at Westminster (Carrell 2013b). As, constitutionally, it was not in the 
gift of the Scottish Government to hold an independence referendum without the agreement 
of the UK Government, the critical event in the eventual establishment of a Scottish 
independence referendum was the SNP’s success in the 2011 Scottish election.  The result 
of which gave them a majority at Holyrood and heaped political pressure upon Westminster, 
as the election was based upon a manifesto which included a commitment to seek 
independence by such a referendum (politics.co.uk. n.d.).   
 
A consultation paper on the subject of the referendum was published on the 10th January 
2012. Although the Edinburgh Agreement, which set out the terms for a referendum, was not 
signed by then Prime Minister David Cameron and First Minister Alex Salmond until the 15th 
October 2012, Yes Scotland was launched on the 25th May 2012 closely followed by Better 
Together on the 26th June 2012 (www.parliament.uk 2016). The date of the referendum was 
negotiated between Holyrood and Westminster and decided upon as the 18th September 
2014. 
 
As was perhaps to be expected with such a crucial issue at stake, there was conflict and 
dispute from the very beginnings of the campaign. This was manifested in the manner in which 
the question to be asked at the ballot box was the first matter of contention. Yes Scotland 
proposed that the question should be ‘do you agree that Scotland should be an independent 
country?’ Unsurprisingly, the electoral commission found this to be a leading question which 
would favour independence and later settled upon the question ‘should Scotland be an 
independent country?’  
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Other high-profile events included the decision to allow the minimum age for voting to be 
reduced to 16, which Unionists alleged was a cynical ploy on the behalf of the independence 
campaign to capture the votes of a demographic which appeared to favour independence 
(Oborne 2017). The debate itself hinged upon some key questions of uncertainty in an 
independent Scotland, in (with some irony in hindsight) the form of Scotland’s future place in 
the European Union and the choice of currency for an independent Scotland. There were high 
profile leaders’ debates between First Minister Alex Salmond and Better Together leader 
Alistair Darling, which tended to focus upon questions of the economic prospects of an 
independent Scotland. Again, membership of the EU and the currency of an independent 
Scotland were also prominent in these televised events which were broadcast throughout the 
UK (Hope 2014).  
 
On September 7th 2014, a YouGov poll, for the first time placed Yes Scotland in the lead 
(Osley 2014). This was a quite remarkable turnaround of polls in 2013, which saw Scottish 
independence approval ratings as low as the mid 20 percentile. The YouGov poll was 
prompted by what some suggested was a panic at Westminster, and on the 16th September, 
The Daily Record carried a front-page story of the now infamous Vow (Clegg 2014), signed 
by the major party leaders at Westminster –David Cameron, Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband - 
with promises of guaranteed further devolved powers, including health spending and 
(unspecified) enhanced revenue-raising powers following a vote in favour of the preservation 
of the Act of Union. On the 18th September 2014, 55% of votes to 45% were cast in favour of 
the preservation of Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom. 
 
1.4 Outline of the research problem 
As already noted, the technological advancement of the internet and the rise of social media 
has raised hopes of a more inclusive democracy, with hopes resting on increased participation 
with a more level political playing field. In line with these hopes, academic works in the subject 
area have often focused upon activism as a stark representation of participation, such as the 
Arab spring (Howard and Hussain 2011; Khondker 2011; Stepanova 2011), and also empirical 
studies such as Carroll and Hackett (2006) which explores the role of media activism and 
social movement theory. Other empirical studies have focused upon the broader notions of 
the democratising effect of the internet such as Groshek (2009) as well as more specifically, 
the equalizing potential of social media (see Xenos, Vromen and Loader 2014; Loader and 
Mercea 2011) and the role of Twitter use by politicians such as Jackson and Lilleker (2011). 
However, such empirical studies are rare. The majority of the aforementioned empirical 
studies are quantitative, using comparative, multi-national approaches. There is therefore a 
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gap to be filled by an empirical study such as the current one, which makes a contribution to 
knowledge in being qualitative, focused specifically upon the United Kingdom and going 
beyond purely concentrating upon activism and participation.  
 
Theoretically, this research also fills a gap by focusing upon the relevance of agonistic 
pluralism in contemporary democratic theory, as opposed to limiting itself to the possibilities 
of deliberative democracy in relation to the internet and social media (see Baek, Wojcieszak 
and Delli Carpini 2012; Wright 2012; Goldberg 2010; Dahlberg 2007; Wright and Street 2007; 
Tambini 1999). This study also contributes to knowledge in the field by focusing upon multiple 
stakeholder groups in the democratic process. It also will focus upon activism in line with the 
majority of those studies already mentioned. It too, however, seeks a broader understanding 
of the impact of social media upon the mainstream media and governmental processes. This 
is achieved by additionally considering the impact of Twitter in relation to the role of journalists 
and elected politicians. 
 
The aim of the thesis is as follows: 
 
 
Table 1 Study aims 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aim of the study
• To provide an analysis of the relevance of deliberative 
democracy, agonistic pluralism, and pluralist group theory in 
explaining Twitter activity during the campaign that preceded the 
Scottish independence referendum 2014.
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With this in mind, the objectives are: 
 
 
Table 2 Study objectives 
 
With the aim of achieving these objectives the specific research questions are as follows: 
 
 
Table 3 Research questions 
 
In terms of the focus of existing works upon political communication and the public sphere, as 
mentioned, the prevalent focus has been upon the possibilities afforded by social media upon 
the promotion and institutionalisation of deliberative democracy (Halpern and Gibbs 2013; 
Dahlgren 2009; Habermas 2006). Deliberative democracy is seen by many as having the 
capacity to improve the democratic process with relation to more effective decision making, 
Objective 1
• To offer an enhanced understanding of the impact of Twitter 
upon established models of political communication 
incorporating both deliberative democracy and agonistic 
pluralism.
Objective 2
• To further the understanding by taking concepts and issues 
raised and exploring them with multiple stakeholder groups -
activists, journalists and MSPs.
Objective 3
• To evaluate the impact of Twitter upon pluralist group theory in 
the age of new media.
Primary Research Question
• How could you tell if the #indyref were characterised by 
deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?
Supplementary Research Question
• How does pluralist group theory aid our understanding of Twitter 
based activism during the Scottish independence referendum 
2014?
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particularly in limiting the levels of under-representation and exclusion which are present in 
the current system. Agonistic pluralism, however, is a theory which was born out of frustration 
with the focus of early theories of deliberative democracy which focused upon consensus in 
the democratic decision making process.  
 
Instead, theories of agonism (Honig 2013; Mouffe 2005; Connolly 2005) accept that politics 
consists of ineradicable pluralism, and therefore seeks to manage the antagonism which is 
present in the democratic process. Agonism has largely been overlooked with regard to 
empirical studies. In light of this, this study answers the calls of, for example, Karppinen, Moe 
and Svensson (2008) who appeal for a joint approach regarding deliberation and agonism, 
suggesting that this could have positive implications for research in the subject field, in terms  
of reflecting upon ideals of democratic public communication.   
 
Pluralism and its relationship to democracy is a central feature of the study. Theories of 
political pluralism and particularly those from the era of classical pluralism, as seen through 
the works of, for example, Dahl, Truman, and Lindblom, are considered important as they 
attempt to shed light on where power lies within the democratic process. This is particularly 
relevant in terms of the role of interest groups. Pluralism, therefore, aids the study in assessing 
the role of the competing groups within the campaign which preceded the Scottish 
independence referendum of 2014. It is important not only in terms of narrow considerations 
of activist groups, but also in terms of the interplay between such groups and the traditional 
media, as well as The State in its many different organisational forms. Dahl’s seminal work in 
this area Who Governs? Democracy and power in an American city (first written in 1961 
updated 2005) is particularly relevant in this regard and is explored in detail during the thesis.  
 
In order to fully represent the manner in which pluralism has evolved as a theory, works such 
as those of American author William James - A Pluralistic Universe (1908) are explored, as 
these provide the philosophical origins which underpin later pluralist works. The school of 
thought which came to be classified as the English pluralists are also considered as these 
have specific relevance to both group and state personality which is a particular area of 
interest within the study. Other subsequent areas of pluralist thought are also considered, such 
as value and elite pluralism, which help to explain contemporary considerations of pluralism 
and its relationship to the democratic process. 
 
Political pluralism also underpins the concept of media pluralism which is again central to the 
thesis. Media plurality is overwhelmingly accepted as a central feature of a healthy democracy 
and, as already mentioned, requires a diversity of available viewpoints and media sources as 
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well as an engaged citizenry, the theory being that citizens can only make informed political 
choices if these criteria are satisfied. Social media can be considered as an extension of media 
plurality of source, and also as a tool for engagement. With this in mind, the key debates within 
the study include media ownership and arguments around the state’s role in both traditional 
and new media as regards plurality. The democratic benefits and challenges of social media 
in terms of regulation, or rather a lack of regulation, are also discussed in detail. With regard 
to important media/media pluralism texts, the works of authors such as Murthy (2013); 
Margaretten and Gaber (2012); Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez (2011); Chadwick and 
Howard (2010); Sunstein (2009); Hindman (2008) and Fuchs (2007) and the concepts they 
bring forward are also focused upon.  
 
Deliberative democracy is seen by many (see Mansbridge 2010; Habermas 2006, 2005; 
Dryzek 2005; Cohen 1997; Benhabib 1996) as having a key role in addressing some of the 
long-standing issues within our democratic system. Plurality voting or first past the post 
continues to be the preferred electoral system for UK general elections, although Scottish 
elections now have systems of proportional representation. Whilst the simplicity of first past 
the post is its strength, the winner takes all system is synonymous with the exclusion of the 
preferences of the voters on the losing side. The deliberative process, however, is suggested 
as having the capacity to limit such exclusion (Habermas 2005).  There is, however, a 
significant paucity of empirical work into the possibilities of online deliberation. With this in 
mind, the thesis concentrates upon the presence and quality of online deliberation during the 
Scottish independence referendum campaign and asks what the evidence means for the 
prospects of future deliberation online. Additionally, the study addresses the question of the 
possibilities of deliberation, with regard to the most emotive contemporary political questions 
such as those of sovereignty - as was the issue in Scotland in 2014.  
 
Agonistic pluralism (see Mouffe 2014, 2013, 2005; Honig 2013, 2007; Connolly 2005, 2001) 
as a theory grew from dissatisfaction with consensus-based theories of classical pluralism and 
deliberative democracy. Both of those theories have moved on from earlier consensus-based 
versions (see for example Dryzek and Niemeyer 2006). However, proponents of agonistic 
theory suggest these theories are limited and that agonism offers a more realistic alternative 
which is accepting of conflict within the political system. This thesis focuses upon the agonism 
of Mouffe (2005) in what is a controversial theory for some, particularly in the theoretical 
grounding of some of its normative components. Mouffe’s agonism posits that antagonism is 
the starting point for political decision making and that this should be accepted and understood 
as having a positive role in the democratic process, as it allows, for example, vehemently held 
positions to be aired in a manner which prevents those antagonisms being transformed into 
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physical aggression. The focus for Mouffe is to foster an (hypothetical) environment where 
antagonisms can be converted into agonisms through arenas of conflictual consensus, which 
sees adversaries agreeing on the ethical principles which are the basis of their association 
(for example liberty and equality) but disagreeing on the interpretation of those principles. 
 
The study therefore deconstructs Mouffe’s normative components of agonism and assesses 
their presence and relevance to the Scottish independence referendum campaign. 
Additionally, it specifically focuses on two of the most contested components of Mouffe’s 
theory of agonism: namely, the requirement for the legitimacy of political opponents’ value 
preferences to be accepted and respected, and the possibilities or otherwise of the concept of 
conflictual consensus in the democratic process. 
 
1.5 Overview of the thesis  
The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 focuses upon democracy and presents theoretical definitions of a functioning 
democracy and also five standards of an ideal democracy as identified by Dahl (2000). These 
definitions are the benchmark for judgements made about democracy throughout the thesis. 
The chapter then goes on to identify the issues facing contemporary democracy in the UK, 
including public opinion regarding the performance of the mainstream media taken from 
survey data. These statistics form the basis of assumptions regarding current issues facing 
the democratic process in the United Kingdom. Following this, theories of both deliberative 
democracy and agonistic pluralism are presented as these theories are used in combination 
in the empirical study in analysing the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. 
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 concentrates upon theoretical pluralism as it is essential to the core theories of both 
agonistic and media pluralism upon which the study is based. The chapter begins by focusing 
upon the work of William James, whose philosophical notions of pluralism underpin many of 
the subsequent branches of pluralist theory. Then, pluralism is contrasted with monism, as a 
rejection of monism was a key driver of the works of early pluralist authors. One of the main 
criticisms of pluralism has been its rejection as mere relativism. Therefore, relativism is then 
discussed alongside pragmatism, as pragmatic judgements within the decision-making 
process are argued by James and others as elevating pluralist theory from these allegations 
of relativism. Value pluralism is then introduced and discussed, as value pluralism supports 
modern considerations of pluralism and is probably the most evident pluralist theory within 
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contemporary society. Pluralist group theory from earlier works by Parker-Follett through to its 
most notable proponent Dahl are then focused upon, as group theory is essential to 
considerations of the democratic process. Finally, more recent pluralist thought is presented 
in order to clarify the contemporary position.  
 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 is focused upon media pluralism, as social media is considered to be an extension 
of media plurality within the study. The chapter begins by offering five key functions of the 
media taken from Kuhn (2007) and these provide a benchmark to judge the performance of 
social media against throughout the thesis. The principled notion and market theories of media 
pluralism are then defined. The events which led to the Levenson Inquiry are then presented 
as these provide an important background to present day concerns regarding the performance 
of the mainstream media in the United Kingdom. Public service broadcasting and the BBC are 
then discussed as these are considered to be essential components of the media in the UK, 
which ought to ensure a trusted, balanced media provider in contrast with dominant 
commercial media enterprises. The concept of social media is then introduced and discussed, 
including a focus upon Twitter and its use during recent votes and elections, particularly in the 
USA and the UK, as this is the foundation of the empirical study. 
 
Chapter 5  
Chapter 5 is concerned with the methodology of the project and provides detailed discussion 
around the reason for the methodologies which were chosen, following consideration of the 
available options. The choice of critical theory research philosophy approach and a qualitative 
methodology, as opposed to a quantitative one, are justified, incorporating the unique situation 
of the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. The research questions are detailed and 
the social media research paradigm is discussed. The progression from initial desk-based 
Twitter research through to the identification of relevant activist groups, journalists, and MSPs, 
to the choice of methods regarding the interview process, structure, and data analysis are 
explained. Freelon’s three models of online democratic communication are then presented 
and explained in detail, as these models underpin the method of coding, data analysis, and 
the manner in which the subsequent results chapters are structured and presented. Finally, 
ethical considerations and methodological limitations are offered. 
 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 is the first results chapter. These results relate to the first research question focusing 
upon the presence, or otherwise, of tangible deliberative and agonistic theory in the study. A 
table summary of the partial modification and overall application of the empirical units of 
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analysis from Freelon’s model are first presented. The results are then structured into the three 
strands of Freelon’s model, namely, liberal individualist, communitarian, and deliberative. 
Each unit of analysis from Freelon’s model is presented in turn in order to discuss the evidence 
from the data collection. Sub themes are categorised within each unit of analysis which 
maintains a sequential flow and ensures that the theory which is pertinent to the study is 
rigorously analysed. At the end of each of the three strands the evidence is discussed in 
relation to deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism before proceeding to the next. A 
critique of Freelon’s model is presented and conclusions to the primary research question are 
drawn. 
 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 relates to the supplementary research question which is focused upon pluralist 
group theory in the modern technological era. In order again to maintain a focus upon the 
evidence provided in relation to academic theory, Dahl and Lindblom’s five effects of 
social/interest groups (1976) are used as a benchmark where appropriate.  Theme 7.7 stands 
separately to Dahl and Lindblom’s model, taking the opportunity to assess the impact of social 
media upon the relationship between the state and its citizens as relating to the work of the 
English pluralists as detailed in Chapter 3. Conclusions to the supplementary research 
questions are drawn by relating the evidence provided to Dahl’s seminal work regarding group 
theory titled, Who Governs? (2005).  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the original 
contribution to knowledge made by the study along with suggestions for future research based 
upon its findings.  
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2 Democracy 
2.1 Overview of chapter 2 
The central question of this study is focused upon the presence of deliberative democracy and 
agonistic pluralism on Twitter during the Scottish independence referendum 2014.  Those who 
herald the democratic benefits of social media platforms such as Twitter, together with those 
who wish to promote deliberative democracy, do so in the hope of addressing systemic issues 
within our democracy.  In the light of this, it is important to first provide the basic standards for 
democracy as defined by Dahl (2000), and then provide evidence as to why the democratic 
process in the United Kingdom requires improvement.  Liberalism as a key component of 
liberal democracy, which is the accepted form of contemporary UK politics, is then explained. 
Following this, deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism are then introduced, and 
reasons are given as to why these models are used in combination within the empirical study.  
 
Although the general benefits and criticisms of each theory are first discussed, it is not the 
intention at this stage to pass judgement as to the specific merits of either theory in opposition 
to each other as is endemic in academic literature. Instead, it is argued in line with Karppinen, 
Moe and Svensson (2008) that the two theories can have positive implications when used 
together within political communication research. The two theories, it is then argued, in their 
later incarnations are nuanced rather than staunchly oppositional. Both theories are later 
considered as to their relevance to normative assessments of the Scottish independence 
referendum. 
 
2.2 Contemporary democracy in the United Kingdom  
Many different theoretical concepts of democracy have been developed since its origins in 
ancient Athens and as Dahl suggests: 
 
The twenty-five centuries during which democracy has been discussed, debated, 
supported, attacked, ignored, established, practised, destroyed and then sometimes 
re-established, have not, it seems, produced agreement on some of the most 
fundamental questions about democracy (Dahl 2000 p.3). 
 
Whilst this is certainly the case, Dahl himself goes on to identify three essentials for 
‘functioning democracy’: 
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 National Parliaments 
 Elected representatives 
 Local government (ibid. p.7) 
 
Dahl then goes on to identify five standards for ideal democracy with what is identified hereon 
in as the democratic process: 
 Effective participation 
 Voting equality 
 Enlightened understanding 
 Control of agenda 
 Inclusion of adults (ibid. p.38) 
 
Effective participation, in Dahl’s view, relates to the negative consequences of sections of 
society failing to participate in a democracy. If individuals and groups do not participate they 
will not have their preferences registered at the ballot box, a further potential negative 
consequence being that political parties in a representative democracy will focus on catering 
to those who do participate particularly at the ballot box, as catering for those who do not, will 
in all likelihood not largely impact upon the election result. This situation has been alleged to 
be the case in the UK, with parties, for example, focusing upon the desires of older people in 
preference to young adults who tend to vote in much smaller numbers. 
 
Equality in voting refers to having a system whereby all votes count equally, as opposed to 
being weighted, perhaps based upon land ownership (ibid.). The UK does then have voting 
equality. Enlightened understanding is the aim of having an electorate who are equally 
qualified to make democratic decisions. In terms of our contemporary democracy, whereby 
we may largely presume a certain standard of education within admittedly wide parameters, 
we can apply enlightened understanding to the availability and access to relevant, balanced 
information, which allows citizens to make reasoned democratic choices. The control of the 
agenda in Dahl’s model relates to the way that citizens ought to decide which matters are on 
the political agenda, whilst inclusion of adults relates to the manner in which adults should be 
treated as equals in the political system. 
 
The partial purpose of this project is to make sense of how the democratic communication 
process played out on Twitter during the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and how 
the process was aligned to, or deviated from, contemporary academic theory. The UK does 
have Dahl’s three essentials and to some extent the five ideal standards as stated. The four 
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pertinent elements of the democratic process within the study are effective participation, 
enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion of adults. The empirical reality 
is assessed against the concepts of deliberative democracy, pluralism, and agonism, 
insomuch as the extent to which they are competing or inter-related explanatory democratic 
theories. These have been chosen as they are representative of explanations derived from 
preliminary findings within the empirical study. It is then argued as to whether or not they are 
desirable, and if social media enhanced the process in relation to our democratic norms as 
opposed to a traditional offline campaign. 
 
There are many reasons to suggest that these are problematic times for UK democracy, 
including matters of participation, legitimacy of politicians, parties, and of course constitutional 
change and the future of the Union. Politics has become a pejorative term ubiquitously loaded 
with negative connotations. Hay succinctly sums up the contemporary attitude toward politics: 
 
Politics is synonymous with sleaze, corruption and duplicity, greed, self-interest and 
self-importance, interference, inefficiency and intransigence. It is, at best, a necessary 
evil, at worst an entirely malevolent force that needs to be kept in check (Hay 2007 
p.155).  
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The following graphic illustrates the enormous level of distrust the UK public has in its 
politicians: 
 
Figure 1 Screenshot from Ipsos Mori (2016) 
 
We can see then, that the public has overwhelming trust at one end of the scale, in doctors 
and nurses to tell the truth with approximately 90% supporting that statement in 2016. At the 
other end of the scale only 15% of people surveyed trusted politicians, with only a slight 
improvement of 20% regarding trust in government ministers. There have also been other 
scandals subsequent to the expenses scandal (Bell 2010) which continue to bring the integrity 
of politicians into question. These include the cash for influence scandal of 2010 (BBC 2010) 
as exposed by the Channel 4 TV programme Dispatches; the Falkirk scandal of 2013 (Cook 
2013) whereby the influence of the Unite trade union over parliamentary candidate selection 
led to MP Eric Joyce proposing to step down from his position in 2015; and closer to the time 
of writing, the resignation of MP Malcolm Rifkind as he and MP Jack Straw (BBC 2015a) 
became embroiled in a further Dispatches scandal regarding cash for access. This concerned 
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the manner in which lobbyists gain access to MPs, and the question of MPs having second 
jobs in addition to their parliamentary duties.  
 
This was a subject which again came to prominence in 2017 regarding former Chancellor of 
the Exchequer George Osborne’s decision to take on the role of Editor of the Evening 
Standard newspaper, whilst still serving as the Conservative member for Tatton, for which he 
received an annual salary in excess of £75,000 from the public purse. The decision to combine 
the role of MP, to which constituents would quite rightly expect full commitment, with the 
onerous task of editing a daily newspaper was in itself controversial. This was exacerbated by 
the fact that Mr Osborne was also a speaker at the Washington Speakers’ Bureau, chairman 
of the Northern Powerhouse Partnership, advisor to the American fund management firm 
Blackrock (for which he was believed to be paid a salary of £650,000 per annum) and also 
Fellow at the American think tank the McCain Institute (Goodall 2017).  
 
Hay elaborates and questions whether the electorate are correct to perceive politics in this 
way and why this has become the case. He goes on to discuss why in the modern day, politics 
seems incapable of providing solutions to collective problems and questions if this is down to 
the issues at hand, or the capabilities and calibre of the political actors involved. Regardless 
of the reasons for such distrust and disaffection the consequences in terms of participation 
are perhaps inevitable. 
 
The issue of declining participation is commonplace in political literature and relates to the 
considerable decline in voter turnout in UK elections, as represented in the following graphic: 
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Figure 2 Screenshot from ukpolitical.info (2015) 
 
The figure above shows participation in terms of voter turnout since World War II in UK general 
elections. In more recent times the turnout in 2001 was 59.4%, in 2005 it was 61.4% and in 
2010 it was 65.1%, rising slightly to 66.1% in 2015. It can be argued that falling turnout is in 
part due to a general satisfaction with living standards and that people will vote when they are 
genuinely discontented with government. There is more evidence however, that there has 
been a general malaise in attitudes to politics in the UK due to distrust of politicians coupled 
with the perception of a lack of genuine alternatives between the major political parties, as 
they have fought for the centre ground, which generally decides election results (Bromley, 
Curtice and Seyd 2004). Such voter apathy in terms of politicians and the proliferation of centre 
ground parties and policy, has been associated with the increase in support for right wing 
parties such as UKIP. Similarly, there has been a move to the left in the Labour Party whose 
party members elected Jeremy Corbyn, a less than prominent back bench MP given 
bookmaker odds of 100/1 at the beginning of the leadership contest. It can be claimed that the 
presence of a centre-left, or perhaps simply left-wing Labour Party, if Corbyn achieves his 
personal political positions, redresses the balance of popular representation within UK politics. 
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However, the historical stagnant levels of citizen participation in the most basic democratic 
process of voting in general elections, is still of concern in terms of general democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
The following graphic starkly demonstrates the level of disinterest in politics displayed by 
citizens of the United Kingdom: 
 
Interest in Politics 
UK Citizen Interest in Politics 
 
 
Figure 3 Screenshot from Hansard Society (2016) 
 
The highest level of those that class themselves as ‘very interested in politics’, as taken from 
the audit, stands at 16% in 2011 whilst in 2013, 26% of those questioned classed themselves 
as ‘not interested at all’. 
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The next graphic demonstrates the feelings towards how well people think our system of 
government works: 
 
Satisfaction with Present System of Governing Britain 
 
 
Figure 4 Screenshot from Hansard Society (2016) 
 
Whilst it is perhaps unsurprising that no more than 3% of participants have ever believed that 
the system could not be improved, more revealingly, since 2004 the lowest combined total of 
those classifying the system as ‘could be improved quite a lot’ and ‘needs a great deal of 
improvement’ has never been fewer than 60% of total respondents. 
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Simplistically put, we have evidence of a democracy that suffers from low levels of participation 
in general elections; with an electorate consisting of roughly 50% of people with little or no 
political interest; where politicians are overwhelmingly seen as untrustworthy and the system 
is seen by at least 60% of people as in need of significant improvement. 
 
With this in mind, it is rather of an understatement to suggest that we require a determined 
effort to find ways to enhance our democracy to fit with Dahl’s ideals as stated earlier.  
 
Support for Changes to Encourage People to Participate in Future Elections 
 
Figure 5 Screenshot from the Audit of Political Engagement (2015) 
 
The above graphic from the Audit of Political Engagement 2015, details the popularity of 
suggestions aimed at increasing the propensity for UK voters to participate in future elections. 
The overwhelming favourite suggestion is that of online voting, at approaching twice that of 
any other category. Whilst this study is not specifically concerned with online voting, the 
graphic displays the potential for the internet to mobilise UK citizens to participate in politics 
more generally. 
 
There is, however, a glaring caveat that flies in the face of political disaffection and 
participation as regards the Scottish independence referendum: the fact that it was almost 
entirely contradictory to the aforementioned evidence. The turnout was a record for any UK 
public vote at 84.59% (Electoral Commission 2015) and this was preceded by a campaign that 
was universally credited as vibrant, supported by a level of engagement beyond even the most 
optimistic expectation. Later chapters will of course, address the reasons for this and how it 
manifested itself both on and offline. The specific question will be as to whether, and how, 
Twitter impacted on those successes of engagement and participation. 
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Declining participation and distrust of politicians are concerning for UK democracy while being 
neither new nor the central feature of this study. What is less well known and is of significant 
relevance to this study is the decline of public confidence in the traditional media. An example 
of this trend, regarding the capacity of the traditional media to uncover the type of wrongdoings 
as documented previously, is represented in the graphic below: 
 
Public Confidence in the Traditional Media 
 
Figure 6 Screenshot from the Standards in Public Life Survey (2014) 
 
This graphic illustrates the manner in which confidence in authorities to uncover wrongdoing 
in public office generally remained consistent in the 10 years of the survey, with a more rapid 
decline between 2012 and 2014. There has however, been an exponential increase in a lack 
of confidence in the traditional media to uncover such wrongdoings in their commonly 
accepted role as ‘public watchdog’ (Fuchs 2011) on behalf of the people. A more detailed 
summary of the broader issues of public confidence in the traditional media, particularly in 
tandem with the distrust of politicians as already detailed, and why this is a major issue for UK 
democracy is presented in chapter four of the thesis. 
 
Within the independence referendum, this distrust was exacerbated among the supporters of 
the Yes Scotland campaign by a perceived bias and unhealthy closeness of the media and 
particularly the BBC, to the status quo and the opposing Better Together campaign. Whether 
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there was any foundation for this argument and what this meant for the role of social media is 
a main topic within the study. The importance of the media for a fully functioning democracy 
(as detailed in chapter 4) and the implications of the kind of trend in the table above, provide 
reason for this study (and others like it) to examine the role of Twitter and other social media 
platforms in supplementing or supplanting the traditional media in areas of political 
communications. 
 
2.3 Liberal democracy 
Firstly, however, it is important to present the relevant strands of liberal democratic theory 
which are appropriate to the project and explain why these have been chosen. Classic liberal 
theory as espoused by English writers John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Jeremy Bentham, 
amongst many others, is underpinned by certain common values such as the rights of the 
individual. Building on the works of, Kekes (1997); Gray (1995); Galston (1995); Rawls (1993); 
Larmore (1990); Walzer (1990); Shklar (1989) and Waldron (1987); Thorsen and Lie state 
that: 
 
It usually describes a disposition towards individual liberty and democracy which might 
be present in a person’s political point of view, or ingrained in the political culture of a 
country, rather than a well-defined and clearly demarcated set of political beliefs 
(Thorsen and Lie 2006 p.7). 
 
Classical liberal theory aids our understanding of liberal democracy, the ubiquitous form of 
contemporary western government.  
 
The term liberalism is complicated by the difference in meanings of the term on either side of 
the Atlantic. Liberalism in America is often used by the right wing as a derogatory term, with 
connotations of socialism and the support of the welfare state. In the UK, the term is more 
associated with historical theory, or as a term referring to progressive politics, and further 
complications arise when the term liberalism is used in a financial or economic context. Free 
markets - meaning an economic trading system composed of markets which wherever 
possible are free from state intervention - are key components of the liberal democratic 
system. Additionally, free market economic liberalism is synonymous with principles based 
upon the individual rather than the state or collectives, in the belief that such individualism is 
more desirable as individuals are autonomous and self-reliant (Allik and Realo 2004 p.31), 
with this likely to result in broader economic prosperity which in turn finances public services. 
Support for liberalism in recent times has been largely without challenge: 
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Liberalism has dominated normative political thought as well as practical politics in the 
West for the past sixty years, up to the point in which it has become a shared 
inheritance among political theorists, professional politicians, and nearly all significant 
political movements in its native countries (Thorson and Lie 2006 p.3).  
 
Such was the dominant belief in liberalism at the end of the last century that Fukuyama (2006) 
notoriously proclaimed the ‘end of history’ (a position he subsequently revoked) insofar as 
humans had completed their socio-cultural evolution and need look no further for alternative 
democratic theories. It is important to note, however, that the blame attributed to neo-liberalism 
for the financial crisis of 2008 (see Foster and Magdoff 2009), and the resulting world-wide 
recession, resulted in more serious questioning of economic liberalism and the free market. 
The popularity of liberal democracy, however, largely remains intact.  
 
Liberal democracy is also fundamentally associated with certain democratic rights, which are 
generally not present in nondemocratic systems of government. At the beginning of this 
chapter, five components of an ideal democracy as expressed by Dahl (2000) were detailed. 
When discussing this vision of an ideal democracy Dahl makes the point that for the system 
to work, citizens within the system require a formal guarantee of their role within that process. 
Therefore, for example, effective participation requires the right to vote and the right to free 
speech whilst ideals such as voting equality require the right for individual citizens’ votes to 
count equally in comparison to others. Other generally accepted democratic rights within a 
liberal democracy include the right to life and personal security, equality before the law, and 
freedom of association.  
 
The term liberal democracy is ubiquitously used as a descriptor for the prevalent modern day 
political systems in the majority of developed nation states. The pairing of the two words within 
that descriptor is, however, somewhat at odds with itself. Liberalism, as discussed, relates to 
the individual and the private: however, democracy relates to the public and the collective. To 
clarify, we can take the term to mean, ‘the extent to which a political system allows political 
liberties and democratic rule’ (Bollen 1993 p.2008) implying that the individual can maintain 
liberty under an umbrella of collective, democratic government. Others such as Schumpeter 
place more emphasis upon the democratic rule component, stating democracy is, ‘that 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which the individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter 1950 
p.269 in Bollen 1993 p.1209). Schumpeter’s definition stresses that individual liberty is 
maintained by the right to choose representatives through the ballot box, empowering said 
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representatives to campaign for political outcomes and make political decisions on their behalf. 
The prevalence and longevity of liberal democracy suggests that regardless of academic 
issues with the term itself, it is still the dominant form of government across the majority of 
developed nation states. 
 
2.4 Deliberative democracy 
To state that the UK is an established liberal democracy in no way suggests that it is perfect 
and should not or could not be improved. As detailed, the UK has a democracy suffering from 
low levels of participation in elections; where over half the electorate have little or no political 
interest; where the respect for politicians is at an all-time low and the majority of the electorate 
have significant reservations as to the efficacy of the current system of government. One other 
important flaw in the current system is that even with higher levels of turnout in elections, the 
result is often under-representation due to the arrangement used in those elections. 
 
The first past the post electoral system has been discarded in favour of proportional 
representation systems in many elections within the UK. It is, though, still the electoral system 
for UK general elections and also for some English local elections. First past the post, whilst 
intuitively fair inevitably results in under-representation and potential exclusion of up to 49% 
of voters on any one ballot box decision.  
 
One potential solution to under-representation would be the further institution of proportional 
representation systems, which are already used in the devolved UK assemblies in Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, as well as local government elections in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland. One of the usual effects of proportional representation elections is that they tend to 
produce results where no one party has an outright majority. These elections usually result in 
coalition governments or minority governments which both require a level of cooperation and 
consensus which are anathema to first past the post. It should be noted, however, that this 
has not always been the outcome, demonstrated by the SNP having an outright majority in 
the parliament of 2011-2016 and only just falling short of another majority in the election of 
2016.  
 
The UK held a referendum in 2011 whereby the vote went against adopting the alternative 
vote or ‘AV’ system, meaning the first past the post system remains in place today. However, 
the recent movement away from the historic two-party order of Conservative and Labour 
dominated parliaments (in terms of votes cast), with a dramatic increase for minority parties 
such as the SNP and UKIP during the 2015 general election, has led to further calls to revisit 
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the notion of proportional representation. The inequalities of the current system were laid bare 
in 2015 when a total UKIP vote of 3,881,099 (BBC 2015b) quite preposterously, returned the 
party only one seat in parliament. The fact that a referendum on the subject was held as 
recently as 2011 would, however, suggest that any re-visitation of the subject is highly unlikely 
(regardless of how appropriate) in the foreseeable future.  
 
The absence of a foreseeable move to PR, particularly in the light of the requirement for the 
two main UK parties of Conservative and Labour to push for a system which would almost 
inevitably result in a significant loss of political power, is just one example of the manner in 
which our current political system fails to take into account the views of those who lose a ballot 
box decision. Deliberative democracy, which is intended to reach democratic decisions 
through strength of argument via a reciprocal process of rational exchanges, is for many a 
way to address this issue. Proponents of the deliberative model of democracy, such as John 
Rawls, Joshua Cohen, John Dryzek, Jurgen Habermas and Seyla Benhabib, are generally 
driven by the notion that deliberation is a better, reciprocal method of decision making than 
the ruthlessness of the ballot box alone. In this regard it stands contrary to liberal theory which 
sees politics as an aggregation of self-interest without any genuine presence of the common 
good (Dewey 1963), a position which is highlighted by the theory of the majority generally 
attributed to John Adams (1794). 
 
The discourse theory of deliberation as proposed by Habermas and others, it is claimed, 
produces an increased legitimacy in political decision making through citizen participation and 
public reasoning. Joseph Bessette (1980) is credited with first using the term deliberative 
democracy, whilst Dryzek (2005) states that it is the dominant approach in democratic theory. 
The main idea behind the initial deliberative model of democracy is that it has ‘a truth tracking 
potential’ (Habermas 2006 p.411). What Habermas, one of the most recognised proponents 
of the model, is suggesting, is that the process of deliberation can bring about consensus 
which in some manner implies that the correct decision or the truth will be the end product. In 
coming to a decision (based upon a binary question of yes or no) following a period of public 
consideration prior to a democratic vote, the resulting decision will therefore be legitimate. 
Habermas states that there is empirical evidence from small scale studies where the process 
of deliberation has resulted in decisions being taken contrary to rational choice theory (Neblo 
2005; Habermas 2005; Conover and Searing 2005; Steiner 2004). Rational choice theory 
works from the premise that individuals take decisions based upon their own personal 
preference, as opposed to a wider common good. In such instances then, the individual has 
changed their mind contrary to personal choice through consideration, following discourse with 
those of an opposing viewpoint.  
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Computer mediated communications of the kind that are central to this project pose problems 
for deliberative theory in terms of: 
 
The lack of face-to-face interaction between the participants in a shared practice of 
collective decision making and the lack of reciprocity between the roles of speakers 
and addressees in an egalitarian exchange of opinions (Habermas 2005 p.415).  
 
Reciprocity is a vital component of deliberative theory (Elstub and McLaverty 2014) whereby 
arguing in terms that others can accept through giving of reasons, encompasses the process 
of exchange for mutual benefit of the parties involved. Fehr, Fischbacher and Gachter (2002) 
argue that voluntary cooperation is for many as natural as the propensity for self-interest in 
terms of human bargaining. Here, Habermas seems to be suggesting that the physical 
exclusion of online communication between participants prevents the social relationships 
which help to drive the will to reach equitable agreement on any given issue. Habermas also 
states that the role of the media in selecting and shaping messages is detrimental to the 
process of deliberation. The possibility of online deliberation has received much academic 
attention in recent times (Baek, Wojcieszak and Delli Carpini 2012; Wright 2012; Goldberg 
2010; Dahlberg 2007; Wright and Street 2007; Tambini 1999). The possibility of deliberation 
and the broader subject of online communication and its role in decision making in the 
independence referendum is a central question of the project. 
 
Second generation deliberative theory such as that of Bohman (1997) and Gutmann and 
Thompson (1998) developed the position of Rawls and Habermas whereby: 
 
First generation deliberative democrats…debated the normative justifications of 
deliberative democracy, interpretations and necessary components of the theory, but 
failed to take account of the sheer complexity of contemporary societies (Elstub 2010 
p.291).  
 
Such complexity, as Elstub puts it, includes the impact of cultural pluralism in reinforcing 
particular values and the manner in which social inequality will in all likelihood preclude certain 
sections of society from the deliberative process. The challenges of such exclusion were to 
be taken into account and guarded against if deliberation was to be seen as effective and 
inclusive. The acceptance of such developments in deliberative theory from its first 
incarnations, bring it much closer to the agonistic pluralism of Chantal Mouffe (which is 
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discussed later in this chapter) in the notion that consensus is idealistic and unrealistic in a 
consistent normative sense.  
 
The third generation deliberative theorists (Parkinson 2006; O’Flynn 2006; Baber and Bartlett 
2005 amongst others) were more concerned with the practical institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy than its normative premise. The suggested mechanisms for 
deliberative democracy include citizen juries, consensus conferences, planning cells, 
deliberative polls and citizen’s assemblies. Held surmises that:  
 
Whilst the concept of deliberative democracy now spans a wide range of positions, its 
main advocates use it to distinguish a political approach focused on improving the 
quality of democracy. At issue is enhancing the nature and form of political 
participation, not just increasing it for its own sake (Held 2006 p.232). 
  
More recent developments in the theory, such as that of Jane Mansbridge (2010), explicitly 
accept the benefits of deliberation without the previously central, arguably unrealistic, 
requirement for consensus. Mansbridge accepts the role of liberal self-interest alongside the 
common good, and holds that deliberation is valid and worthy in enhancing the democratic 
process when the participants are, ‘constrained by the deliberative democratic ideals of mutual 
respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justification, the search of fairness, and the absence of 
coercive power’ (ibid. p.94). Mansbridge makes the important distinction, which separates 
deliberation from other discourse theories such as agonism, in requiring the setting for 
deliberation to specifically be well natured rather than coercive and antagonistic. 
 
The arguments around the internet and more specifically social media participation in the 
modern day, are not as to whether the internet and social media have at least the potential to 
enhance the democratic process, notwithstanding narrower arguments on deliberation, but 
rather to what extent this potential is being fulfilled and at what costs (Sunstein 2009; Hindman 
2008). The reality however, of establishing the necessary climate for deliberation, particularly 
online, is questionable. Dryzek (2005) suggests the difficulty lies in the different settings for 
deliberation and whether they are hot or cold, suggesting that cold settings such as 
deliberative opinion polls involving non-partisan participants, regularly achieve persuasion and 
do indeed see participants change position through deliberation.  
 
As far as the Scottish independence referendum is concerned, we can apply Dryzek’s criteria 
for hot deliberation where he states, ‘deliberation tied to sovereign authority in divided 
societies is about as hot a setting as one can imagine’ (Dryzek 2005 p.229). We ought, 
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however, to make the distinction that whilst the independence referendum was highly emotive 
and of great significance to the participants, it would be entirely inappropriate to categorise it 
with the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Rwanda on which Dryzek bases his arguments. Dryzek 
specifically points to identity-based arguments as being the most unlikely to easily change 
opinions (identity was suggested to be a key driver in position taking in the referendum and is 
discussed at length in later chapters). He goes on to clarify the need for a period of reflection, 
physically removed from the hot setting, if they are to save face by ‘not admitting it for the 
present’ (ibid. p.239).  As far as online deliberation is concerned, it could be argued that the 
removal of face to face deliberation, whilst likely encouraging incivility and preventing 
Habermasian egalitarian social relationships, also allows for participants to reflect from a 
distance and take the opposing position, whilst saving face away from a physical deliberative 
forum. 
 
The challenge it would seem, then, is to create an online environment whereby the type of 
passionate discourse that is ultimately strived for remains within the boundaries which allow 
for it to be deemed as a satisfactory element of, or even an improvement in, the democratic 
communication process. 
 
2.5 Agonistic pluralism 
Deliberative democracy is a much-debated concept championed by many but contested by 
others, some in support of agonism, often referred to as agonistic pluralism. Agonistic 
pluralism is seen by a number of contemporary democratic theorists (for example see Honig 
2013; Mouffe 2005; Connolly 2005) to be a more genuine normative representation of the 
democratic process than deliberative theory. Whilst there are variations in the detail of 
agonistic theory dependent upon the author of the work, Mouffe, writing with Laclau in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics (2001), and 
individually with Agonistics Thinking the World Politically (2013) and also On the Political 
(2005). The latter is probably the most recognisable proponent of the theory, and it is Mouffe’s 
model of agonism that will be used as a basis for the arguments presented in this study. 
 
It would, however, be helpful to detail the normative facets of agonistic theory and explain how 
Mouffe’s agonism differs to other contemporary agonists, namely Bonnie Honig and her 
inspiration Hannah Arendt, and also William Connolly. The term agonism is derived from the 
Greek word agon, meaning contest, and is generally perceived as relating to competition, 
struggle and particularly in the political sense, conflict, and more specifically conflict between 
individuals and groups, in democratic society. Agonism developed as a theory largely in 
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response to deliberative democratic models and represents the notion of ineradicable 
pluralism whereby opposing, legitimate value preferences negate the possibility of consensus 
without exclusion. Other established norms of agonism include conflict as not just being 
inevitable in contemporary politics, but also productive and desirable. 
 
Hegemonic and counter hegemonic practices are vital to Mouffe’s agonism. Cultural 
hegemony, in Mouffe’s eyes, relates to the power struggle that goes beyond the Marxist class 
struggle and is evident in, ‘every type of social order’ (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006). The 
unending hegemonic pursuit as one prevailing view in a binary argument is replaced by 
another, for Mouffe, dictates that consensus without exclusion is unachievable. In other words 
it embodies ‘the impossibility of a fully inclusive rational consensus’ (Andreas 2000 in Schaap 
2007 p11). The afore-mentioned agonists would agree that passion is endemic in politics and 
that identity is a key driver of participation in the democratic process. Finally, the notion of the 
antagonistic we/they or friend/enemy relationship (Mouffe 2005) (as attributable to Nazi 
sympathiser Carl Schmitt) is accepted to differing degrees as being another important 
component of the political, though adapted in a manner which is compatible with democratic 
pluralism, something far removed from Schmitt’s original version of the theory.   
 
The specific differences attributed to politics and the political are the central premise in the 
relationship between the other key components of conflict, hegemony, passion and 
antagonism, in Mouffe’s version of agonistic pluralism. Politics for Mouffe is procedural and 
mechanistic, embodying political practices and institutions, whilst the political embodies the 
social, and that social is driven by antagonism. It is, however, an antagonism, it is important 
to note, in the form of an adversarial encounter without force as opposed to an enemy conflict 
in the commonly accepted sense of the phrase. Mouffe explains that: 
 
I have suggested distinguishing between the political, which is linked to the dimension 
of antagonism present in human societies – an antagonism that can emerge within a 
large variety of social relations – and politics, whose aims are establishing an order 
and organising human coexistence [through political practices and institutions] under 
conditions that are marked by The political and thus always conflictual (Mouffe 2014 
p150). 
 
Mouffe attempts to clarify what is an abstract theory which is open to contestation, by 
separating political science, which Mouffe sees as empirical enquiry and political theory which 
is ‘the domain of philosophers, who enquire not about facts of politics but the essence of the 
political’ (Mouffe 2005 p.8). The differing interpretation of the political is one of the ways that 
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Mouffe’s agonism differs from Arendt (although Arendt never specifically used the term the 
political) whom Mouffe sees as identifying it with liberty and common action rather than conflict 
and antagonism (ibid.). In this respect, Mouffe sees Arendt’s agonism as communitarian and 
incorporating the ability to see things from multiple perspectives in a Kantian expression of 
‘enlarged thought’ (Mouffe 2014 p.152) whereby the individual has the ability to see issues in 
a way that others holding different viewpoints to themselves do, ultimately resulting with 
consensus in the public sphere. This nuanced difference of Arendt’s definition of the political 
brings it closer to the first generation of deliberative democratic theory. 
 
Mouffe, in her own words in By Way of a Postscript (2014), distances herself from the 
Arendtian work of Bonnie Honig, whose concept of agonism in her eyes is built upon, 
‘preventing the closure of the questioning process’ (ibid. p.152) but fails to articulate the 
counter hegemonic struggle (as detailed on the previous page) which Mouffe sees as ever 
present. William Connolly is also seen by Mouffe as having, in her eyes, fundamental 
differences when it comes to their respective theories of agonism. Mouffe states that Connolly 
is influenced by Frederick Nietzsche rather than Arendt, and she agrees with Connolly’s belief 
in the requirement of agonistic respect, which is an important aspect of both of their visions of 
agonism. This requires each individual to acknowledge the other in any confrontation, as 
having a legitimate role in the democratic process (an assertion that is somewhat controversial 
for reasons we come to shortly). 
 
For Mouffe though, not all antagonisms can be transformed into agonism (in the manner which 
Arendt believes so) through agonistic respect which is partly delivered by the afore-mentioned 
‘enlarged thought’. This limits the agonistic respect that Connolly (Mouffe suggests) deems to 
be perpetual:  
 
Must all positions be considered legitimate and must they be granted a place inside 
the agonistic public sphere? Or must certain claims be excluded because they 
undermine the conflictual consensus that constitutes the symbolic framework in which 
opponents recognise themselves as legitimate adversaries (ibid. p.153).  
 
The crucial moment when the notion of agonistic respect becomes limited for Mouffe, is at the 
point where a democratic decision is required to be made, and this is when, for her, the 
persistent hegemonic struggle is situated. For example, decision time within the independence 
referendum was at the ballot box on the 18th September 2014, the result of which would see 
one side prevail and the result would see the exclusion of the losing side. The implication is 
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that the space for conflictual consensus is then closed (at least temporarily) contrary to 
Connolly’s theory, and the antagonism of the losing position remains.  
 
Conflict and the impossibility of (rational) consensus along with the fundamental unending 
existence of the other are absolutely central to Mouffe’s agonism. The point of the impossibility 
of consensus without exclusion is predicated by the assertion that all things political cannot 
be decided from a strictly rational point of view, and this leads to the irreducibility of pluralism. 
This is a point that Mouffe reiterates again and again as her works develop and is explicit in 
her most recent book, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (2013). Mouffe believes that 
the task for democracy is to create spaces which allow for ‘conflictual consensus’ (ibid.) which 
sees adversaries agreeing on the ethical principles which are the basis of their association, 
for example liberty and equality, (ibid.) but disagreeing on the interpretation of the said 
principles to exist and be played out. Mouffe refers to conflictual consensus in the setting of 
the European Union whereby the starting position is a belief in the Union but contestation as 
to elements of, for example, its constitution.  The question at hand in terms of this project, is 
whether the independence referendum fits with these assertions and whether the internet and 
more specifically social media platforms such as Twitter, are a place for them to be played out 
and whether these do, or can, contribute to enhancing the democratic communication process 
in the UK.  
 
There are a number of writers who choose to dispute the arguments put forward by Mouffe, 
and in doing so generally defend deliberative democracy (see Erman 2009; Karppinen, Moe 
and Svensson 2008; Dryzek 2005; Brady 2004). Knops (2007) and Dryzek (2005) deliver 
pointed arguments whereby they suggest that the main flaw in Mouffe’s agonism is the 
unanswered question of where the agonistic respect between adversaries, which is the 
starting point of the journey to agonism, comes from, if not from some kind of intrinsic notion 
of the common good. Erman stands very much in opposition to Mouffe in the area of conflict 
and the universalism of the them and us argument, instead declaring that such conflict is the 
basis of deliberative theory rather than a reason to dismiss it. Brady (2004) and Karppinen, 
Moe and Svensson (2008) put forward positive cases for the possibilities of a combined 
theoretical argument whereby the deliberative and the agonistic, ought not to be seen as 
inherently incompatible but recognised as ‘ways in which political contestation can support the 
achievement of consensus’ (Brady 2004 p.351).  
 
Karppinen, Moe and Svensson (2008) interpret the deliberative/agonistic argument from the 
same field as this study, in the area of democratic public communication. This author again 
suggest that the differences between the two are nuanced rather than inherently oppositional, 
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suggesting ‘that the public sphere is best understood as an arena of articulating expressions 
of both solidarity and difference, and in a general sense, this understanding is shared by both 
Mouffe and Habermas’ (ibid. p.8). Similarly, Honig (1993), correctly points out the perpetual 
presence of settlement and unsettlement in politics. Karppinen goes on to state ‘that an 
openness to potential combinations of the two approaches might have positive implications 
for media and communication research’ (ibid. p.11). These two approaches have been used 
in combination, as suggested by Karppinen, in evaluating the role of Twitter in the 
independence referendum because, in line with the fact of settlement and unsettlement as just 
stated, eliminating either from the discussion seems inappropriate and counterproductive in 
explaining the realities of online political debate.  
 
2.6 Conclusions to chapter 2  
In this chapter the core components of democratic theory have been illustrated and 
explanations have been given as to how these relate to the broader project. Politics has 
become a dirty word in the UK driven by distrust of politicians and disaffection with the political 
process partly in the wake of numerous high-profile scandals. This, coupled with a perceived 
lack of alternative choice as the main parties until very recently have all converged on the 
centre ground, has resulted in falling levels of participation in Westminster elections. A major 
issue with democracy in this study is the manner in which trust in the traditional media in 
general, driven by a lack of public faith in their overall will to expose political wrongdoings, and 
a perceived unhealthy closeness to the state, has perhaps been a factor in the important 
development in political communication in the form of social media. In combination, two core 
models of democratic theory, namely deliberation and agonism, provide us with a theoretical 
framework to analyse the impact that social media platforms such as Twitter have had upon 
that democratic process during the campaign preceding the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014. 
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3 Pluralism  
3.1 Overview of chapter 3 
Literature on political pluralism is extremely diverse and the most learned scholars of the 
subject disagree as to how we define pluralism, why pluralism matters, and what pluralism can 
add to contemporary political debate. Within this chapter, political pluralism is discussed, as 
pluralism helps explain where power lies within the democratic process and is the basis of 
later theories of media pluralism. This will provide a foundation for evaluating how the theories 
reflect, if at all, the debate which surrounded the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. 
The term ‘pluralism’ has been attributed to the works of a multitude of political theorists and 
has evolved into a theory which is accused of being vague and complex. With this in mind, the 
main debates which surround the definition of the term in its various forms are discussed.  
 
Historically pluralism has been sub-divided into categories such as philosophical pluralism, 
classical pluralism, elite pluralism and neo-classical pluralism. These categorisations are far 
from distinct and much of the literature overlaps into different schools of pluralist thought. For 
the purposes of this study, pluralism is thematically explored in the areas of: pluralism as a 
theory of truth and opposition to monism; pluralism and the defence of allegations of pluralism 
as mere relativism incorporating pragmatism and fallibilism; value pluralism and also pluralist 
group theory and the personality of the state. In doing so, the works of prominent pluralists 
such as William James, Mary Parker Follet, Charles Pierce and John Dewey, in the early 
twentieth century and classical pluralists such as Robert Dahl, Charles Lindblom, and David 
Truman in the 1960’s are discussed; as well as more recent pluralist thinkers such as David 
Marsh and William Connolly, and also a critic of pluralism - Gregor McLennan - in the modern 
day.  
 
3.2 Pluralism and monism 
Pluralism is multi-faceted and from the perspective of early philosophical pluralists can be 
contextualised as a theory of power, influence, and truth. The term pluralism is used as a prefix 
for a plethora of theory regarding a wide range of subjects such as religion, culture, values, 
politics and media amongst many others and generally presupposes, an acceptance of and a 
commitment to, diversity and toleration of difference. Many of the key components of 
philosophical pluralism as a theory of truth which stands in opposition to monism can be found 
in the work of William James, and particularly his series of lectures presented to audiences in 
both Oxford and Harvard in James’ native America, titled A Pluralistic Universe (1908).  
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The work is largely a response to the works of German philosophers of the time such as 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who take the position of holism, incorporating theories of rationalism 
and absolutism, whereby ‘the full truth about anything involves more than that thing. In the end 
nothing less than the whole of everything can be the truth of anything at all’ (James 1908 
p.22). Hegel’s holism is founded upon the premise that theory should ultimately reveal 
complete worldviews and that reductionism - the breakdown of the entity into its constitutive 
parts, alters the entity so that it ceases to have meaning from its original form. This is not 
sufficient for James’ pluralist philosophy where relations and sense experience are vital to 
explaining his version of truth: 
 
Nothing real is absolutely simple, that every smallest bit of experience is a multim in 
parvo [much in little] plurally related, that each relation is one aspect, character, or 
function, way of its being taken, or way of its taking something else; and that bit of 
reality when actively engaged in one of the relations is not by that very fact engaged 
in all other relations simultaneously (ibid. p.69).  
 
Pluralism then stands squarely in opposition to monism, whereby all relations are engaged 
simultaneously. They are all part of the whole and nothing factually can be absent from 
anything else. It is this notion of the each and its possibilities and relations outside of the all, 
which is central to James’ pluralism. For James, there is not one all-encompassing singular 
truth of anything: instead there are a multiplicity of valid positions and relations that are all 
perhaps interpreted differently from the experience in which the individual encounters them. 
The enduring part of James’ theory is a commitment to multiplicity and rejection of the 
exclusion of other possibilities which is an inevitable consequence of monism. The celebration 
of toleration of differing points of view politically, and the resulting democracy which 
encourages difference and defends minority opinion, is what modern day pluralism has 
become synonymous with. The pervasiveness of the pursuit and celebration of pluralistic 
democracy which is endemic in the present day, can then be traced to the early pluralist 
thinkers such as James.  
 
William Connolly, a modern day philosophical pluralist, is heavily influenced by James and 
provides a useful synopsis of what James’ pluralism stands for, by summarising what he 
stands opposed to:  
James knows roughly what he opposes: (a) the variant of mechanistic materialism 
which posits a unified world knowable through fixed laws unconnected to any power 
above nature; (b) monistic rationalism or absolutism, which postulates a rational whole 
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in which we are set, providing us with transcendent obligations to pursue; (c) traditional 
Christian dualism, which projects an omnipotent, commanding God presiding over both 
nature and humanity (Connolly 2005 p.69). 
 
It is important to note, however, that James’ rejection of monism, absolutism, and religious 
dualism only applies when these theories are presented in rejection of all other theories, 
without such a caveat James’ pluralism would be as guilty of the monistic restrictions to 
philosophy, as to the ones which he stands opposed to. For James, the existence of such 
theories are perfectly valid when we accept that others are entitled to reject such a position in 
preference to other, perhaps conflicting theories. 
 
3.3 Pluralism, relativism and pragmatism 
It is with such a commitment to the validity of multiple perspectives and rejection of singular 
truths that brings critics to suggest that pluralism is merely relativism. To qualify such an 
assertion, we must first explain the basics of relativist theory. Relativism can be traced back 
to ancient Athens and Protagoras 490-421 B.C. and forward to post-modern cultural relativists 
such as Foucault, Kuhn and Peter Winch. Relativism can be sub categorised into the areas of 
moral, descriptive, normative and meta-ethical relativism. These sub-categories are all 
versions of a theory built upon the foundation that no single viewpoint or value can be held as 
an absolute truth, therefore all opinions are relative.  
 
These sub-categories range from normative relativism at one end of the spectrum, whereby 
we should tolerate the thoughts and actions of others, even if they are contrary to our own 
cultural or moral standards, to descriptive relativism, whereby it is acknowledged that different 
courses of action will be held as appropriate for different individuals and cultures regardless, 
when presented with the same foundational facts (Rorty 1982). The key difference between 
relativism and pluralism lies in the propensity for toleration of different value positioning. To 
take relativism to extremes, whereby it becomes nihilistic, is to in essence suggest there is no 
right and wrong in terms of moral positions. Normative relativists, then, may be inclined to 
accept the extreme positions of others as just and acceptable, whereby pluralism will not, for 
reasons discussed shortly with the aid of pragmatism theory.  
However, as Connolly states, ‘pluralists are not relativists…our image of culture encourages 
us to embrace certain things in this particular place, to be indifferent to some, to be wary of 
others, and to fight militantly against the continuation of yet others’ (Connolly 2005 p.42). Berlin 
qualifies the pluralist position further when he states, ‘value pluralists are not relativists. On 
the contrary, they insist that there is a world of objective values. They also insist, however, 
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that there is no perfect whole or ultimate solution in all the different values that might be 
reconciled’ (Berlin 2013 p.13 in Cinalli and O’Flynn 2014 p.83). 
 
Pluralism then, when taken at face value, even with the kind of qualifications of both Connolly 
and Berlin, with its toleration and celebration of multiplicity of value positions, is still 
understandably mistaken for relativism. The answer for some to the pluralist/relativist dilemma 
lies with the theory of pragmatism. Pragmatism is a philosophical movement of the late 19th 
Century from the United States of America in which James was a main theorist as were 
Charles Pierce and John Dewey. Pierce is often credited as the founder of pragmatism, 
‘pragmatism is sometimes said to have originated in 1878, when Pierce published the article, 
How to Make Our Ideas Clear’ (Titus 1994 p.290).  
 
James’ radical empiricism in his own admission (James 1908) is essentially the same theory 
as pragmatism. Dewey preferred to use the term instrumentalism rather than pragmatism, and 
in the same vein as James, focused upon the importance of experience in documenting fact 
rather than imagined hypothesis whereby, ‘experience is not a veil that shuts man off from 
nature, it is the only means of penetrating further into the secrets of nature’ (Titus 1994 p.295). 
Dewey’s passion for the necessity of inquiry as a normative democratic duty, gives further 
reason for the ongoing re-visitation and challenge of existing theory, ‘inasmuch as democracy 
is concerned with the interests of the governed, it is also concerned with inquiry, which helps 
us to form and revise interests’ (Festenstein 2001 p.742.)  
 
The following explanation of the Pragmatic Method is taken from lectures delivered by James 
himself to the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1906 and 1907: 
 
The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that 
otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?-fated or free?-material or 
spiritual?-here are notions either of which may or may not hold good in the world; and 
disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to 
try to interpret each notion by tracing its practical consequences. What difference 
would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If 
no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically 
the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought to be 
able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or the other’s 
being right (James 1908). 
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If we take James’ metaphysical disputes and substitute them with the practical consequence 
of actions or in political terms of for example, policy formulation, we can further see they are 
no longer merely relative when they produce different, manifest outcomes. If we take the 
empirical study of this project, the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 as an example, 
we can more clearly see how pragmatism qualifies the pluralist position. In what was a binary 
argument fuelled by different, entirely legitimate political motivations of unionism and 
nationalism/separatism, the final result would have practical consequences in areas of 
certainly sovereign identity, and perhaps, financial well-being. The pluralist, then, accepts the 
rights and motivations of both value positions and then encourages debate (perhaps through 
social media) into the practical consequences of the outcomes of either choice.  
 
Bertrand Russell was one of the critics of the pragmatist ideology. Russell points to the 
ironically practical difficulty in the way that we just do not know what the usefulness of belief 
will be ahead of time, using the example of Columbus’ exploration of the Americas in 1492. 
‘We can’t just look this up in a book; we have to determine its effect on us (or as James puts 
it, its cash value). But how can we know this ahead of time?’ (Groothuis 2013 p.1). Russell 
also points to the problem of knowing what effect beliefs have produced after the fact; the 
meaning of truth simply being its ability to produce desirable states of affairs, whilst stating 
that pragmatism fails to deal with the fact that a belief may work and not be true and that there 
are a myriad of ‘useless truths’ (ibid. p.2).  
 
Susan Haack also cites Russell’s criticism of pragmatists, finding ‘their stress on the 
experiential cash value of truths to be distasteful [saying that] pragmatism was an engineer’s 
philosophy’ (Haack 1976 p.247). Kadlec further articulated the feeling of vulgarity in 
pragmatism’s rejection of anything foundational, in preference for only the empirical, stating 
that, ‘pragmatism as a philosophy reflects with an almost disarming candour the spirit of the 
prevailing business culture [and can be taken as] a thin philosophy of bourgeois liberalism’ 
(Kadlec 2006 p.529).  Such arguments centred particularly on pragmatism and the discovery 
of truth per se, have credibility, however, pragmatism as a method for attributing cash value 
as James would put it, and attributing reason to potential outcomes, helps overcome 
allegations of pluralism as mere relativism. 
 
The concept of fallibilism and its relation to academic enquiry is an important part of pragmatist 
theory. Fallibilism is a concept that can be applied to multiple disciplines: 
 
Fallibilism is the thesis that humans can have reliable knowledge, but never absolutely 
certain knowledge. All knowledge is a product of human reasoning and human 
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observation, and, since neither of these methods is infallible, all knowledge produced 
by these methods may be proven wrong in the future (Cooke 2003 p158).  
 
Such a perspective on the fallibility of people and theory, may seem unquestionable to the 
modern-day scholar as it has been the basis of enquiry for many years. Such a perspective, 
however, is at odds with classical, foundational philosophy and its search for the absolute and 
the unquestionable. The theory of fallibilism then, encourages us to revisit and question our 
own work and theory as well as that of others. It gives important impetus for pluralism in such 
matters whilst respecting the rights of those to continue to seek absolute theory, which by its 
very definition encourages us to stop thinking and stop questioning existing theory. 
 
3.4 Value pluralism 
The celebration of difference and acceptance of multiple truths which we can trace back to 
James’ theory, developed into what we can class as value pluralism, and it is value pluralism 
that is perhaps the core tenet of pluralism that is evident, valued, and pursued in the modern 
day: 
 
It has become commonplace to claim that a ‘value-pluralist’ movement has emerged 
in modern political theory. This ‘movement’ owes a clear debt to Berlin’s work. The 
prominent members of this so-called movement usually include, among others, 
Bernard Williams, Stuart Hampshire, Joseph Raz, Steven Lukes, Thomas Nagel, 
Charles Taylor, Charles Larmore and John Gray. Despite the differences between 
them, it is clear that one thing they do have in common is a belief in the recognition of 
the plurality of values, both as a fact and as a theory about the modern world, and this 
presents political thinking with a distinct set of new problems (Lassman 2011 p.7). 
 
Value pluralism accepts that people will hold different values and that monistic rationality 
cannot solve dilemmas of moral uncertainty. Whilst this project is more concerned, certainly 
empirically, with procedural pluralism and the democratic communication process, value 
pluralism is an important aspect of the broader pluralist philosophy and the two should be 
considered as complimentary aspects of the overall theory. 
 
Isiah Berlin, as noted by Lassman (ibid.) is probably the most recognised value pluralist as 
postulated in his prominent essay Two Concepts of Liberty (1958). Berlin’s work centres upon 
the concepts of positive and negative liberty:  
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Negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. One has negative 
liberty to the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense. Positive 
liberty is the possibility of acting — or the fact of acting — in such a way as to take 
control of one's life and realize one's fundamental purposes (Carter 2003).  
 
Berlin rejects that rationality is capable of successfully answering moral questions and sees 
conflict (in line with Mouffe’s agonism in the previous chapter) as an ever-present part of the 
human condition. Critics such as Moore (2009) argue that value pluralism defeats itself and 
makes liberalism contentious, because of the ranking of moral decisions: 
 
My main contention is that all three of these otherwise quite different efforts to find 
some normative consequences in value pluralism rest on the same illegitimate move: 
all of them implicitly violate the premise of value pluralism by assuming that some value 
or combination of values can be treated as supremely important and therefore capable 
of rank-ordering value systems (Moore 2009 p245).  
 
Rawls’ take on this problem in Political Liberalism (2005a), which was a follow up to his 
seminal work titled Theory of Justice (2005b) which advanced theories of social contract in 
keeping with the works of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, as he develops the concept of 
reasonable pluralism. Reasonable pluralism allows Rawls to extract certain values out of the 
deliberative such as moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines and suggests that 
fundamental disagreement on those values is natural and appropriate, again however, the 
criticisms of such an approach are driven by the question of where and how the ranking of 
different moral positions stem from. 
 
Considering the different strands of pluralist theory as discussed, when pluralism is spoken of 
by contemporary politicians and political commentators, it would be reasonable to suggest that 
they most often do so, not in the way of James’ philosophical pursuit of truth; or indeed Dahl’s 
procedural pluralism which originally sought to explain where power was truly situated in the 
democratic process in the USA; nor Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism but predominantly in the 
name of value pluralism and its commitment to diversity and inclusion (Connolly 2005; Galston 
1999; McLennan 1995).  
 
3.5 Pluralist group theory 
Grouping or forming associations to achieve political goals is as old as democracy itself. 
Groups have formed in pursuit of various political aims, including; for democracy as the state 
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system of government itself; for the rights of different sections of society to vote; in support of 
and opposition to issues and policies; to rally support against political systems; and for the 
institution or removal of political representatives. The normative assumption of physical 
strength in numbers was perhaps a precursor for accepting the majority opinion as being 
politically legitimate, and this became a basic utilitarian principle of democracy. Dahl and 
Lindblom identify five political effects of interest groups as detailed below:  
 
 More effective than individuals 
 Facilitate healthy political competition 
 Group bargaining process creates a barrier to extremism 
 Overlapping memberships of social groups discourages unilateral thought and action 
 Extensive networks help to ensure the spread of information and communication 
channels (Dahl and Lindblom 1976 p.304-305)  
These effects are hypothesised by Dahl and Lindblom in relation to group leadership and in 
the results chapters of the thesis these effects are considered in detail and are then applied 
to the effects of Twitter as evidenced within the empirical study. This is done to ascertain the 
relevance or otherwise of pluralist group theory in the modern day digital age of social media. 
Theories around the influence and characteristics of groups upon the political process are a 
central theme within pluralist literature and have been written about by the vast majority of 
recognised pluralist thinkers, including Dahl (2005); Dahl and Lindblom (1976); Truman 
(1951); Parker-Follett (1918) and also the English pluralists - Cole, Barker, Maitland, Figgis 
and Laski as told by Runciman (1997). The work of these authors, in respect of groups within 
politics, is commonly classified as procedural pluralism and is distinct from, although still 
related to, the philosophical pluralism of James and Connolly.  
Mary Parker-Follett, writing at around the same time as James in 1918, advanced James’ work 
by focussing upon the role of the group within society - ‘The group process contains the secret 
of collective life, it is the key to democracy, it is the master lesson for each individual to learn, 
it is our chief hope for the political, the social, the international life of the future’ (Parker–Follett 
p.97 1918). Parker Follet details how all members of groups must be participants and not lazy 
or quiet and how the group process is not about dominant characters taking centre stage, but 
rather that the personality of the group will organically emerge and take precedent. Parker-
Follett’s group personality (and later, state personality theorised by the English pluralists) 
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explores the manner in which political groups take on a personality which itself is perhaps 
distinct from the individual members of the group. 
 
In Pluralism and the Personality of the State (1997) Runciman provides a detailed analysis of 
what is perceived to be the ‘golden age’ of English pluralism in the 1920s with the works of 
Maitland, Laski, Cole, Barker and Figgis. Runciman again focuses upon association and the 
group theory of power:  
 
The question of how men form themselves into associations lies at the heart of western 
political thought. An association is a group of human beings possessed of a distinct, 
formal identity based on the relation subsisting between its members, and it may fairly 
be said that it is around such groups that our political understanding has been 
constructed (Runciman 1997 p.1).  
 
The English pluralists’ works were largely a result of theories proposed by the German scholar 
Otto Von Gierke in Das Deutche Gennossenschaftsrecht (1873, cited in Runciman 1997). 
According to Runciman (1997), Von Gierke seeks to explain the personality of the state 
through the concept of societas: ‘an association of individuals, each of whom conditions his 
actions to accord with the terms of the joint agreement’ and universitas - ‘an association of 
individuals considered collectively to form a single entity itself capable of action’ (ibid. p.13, 
p.14). It is the suggestion of the group personality as a single entity which is the key proposition 
here. Runciman goes on to say that ‘the modern English term which best approximates to Von 
Gierke’s vision of the state is pluralism, which is suggestive of a diversity founded on coalitions 
of individuals rather than individuals themselves’ (ibid. p.63).  
 
Maitland suggested that sovereign permission was required to acknowledge the group in 
question. Figgis spoke of communitas communitariam seeing society as self-formed, self-
governing associations with the state retaining coercive power though very much in the 
background. Barker identified the discredited State whereby he sought, ‘some sustainable 
alternatives to the theories of group personality that had been set out by Von Gierke, Maitland 
and Figgis. Barker was consistently resistant to the idea that some thing is created when a 
group of individuals come together, and sought instead to construct a formula that would 
convey an oneness without any transcendent one’ (ibid. p.152). With this in mind, the role of 
the State was intentionally restricted and seen as largely pertaining to law and order.  
 
Cole is synonymous with the term Guild Socialism whereby, like Figgis, he did not believe that 
the state should be perceived as subordinating other groups and believed in natural multiple 
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associations. ‘In conflicting social obligations, Cole defines his terms as follows: The State 
means government and non-government; and community means all social life, whether 
organised or not’ (ibid. p.172). Laski (1916) talked similarly about The Personality of 
Associations which was important because, ‘it contains the earliest use by an English political 
theorist of the term ‘pluralistic’ to describe what has previously been called polyarchic or 
federalistic political structures’ (ibid. p.187).  
 
Although the afore mentioned English pluralist authors differed amongst other things in areas 
of group personality, sovereignty, and state personality, the importance of the group as a 
reference for how we view our democracy was a common theme that persisted with later 
generations of pluralist thinkers. Group theory and its origins is important to this project as it 
addresses the second research question which asks: how does pluralist group theory aid our 
understanding of Twitter based activism during the Scottish independence referendum 2014?   
In doing so, the theories described here are applied to group and state personality and the 
author asks if they are still relevant. Also, it may be asked if they advanced or detracted from 
the role of groups and the collective conception of the State, in relation to the contemporary 
manifestation of groups in the age of computer mediated communications. 
 
3.6 Classical pluralism 
David Truman, Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom are considered as the leading classical 
American pluralists of the 1950s and 1960s. Although their works are situated in American 
democracy with its federalist political system, the general principles of the work based around 
what can be also be described as procedural pluralism (Lassman 2011) are transferable to 
the United Kingdom and other liberal democracies. The works of Truman, Dahl, and Lindblom 
are described by McLennan as advancing pluralism to being ‘essentially the study of the 
formation and intermediation of political interest groups as a precondition of competitive liberal 
democracy’ (McLennan 1995 p.34). In The Governmental Process (Truman 1951) the author 
is highly critical of the aforementioned English pluralists, stating that a lack of understanding 
of the cleavages that lead to political conflict and how broader representation will likely not 
eradicate conflict between or within competing groups. Truman, typically of the time, writes of 
his belief in the influence of interest groups upon the American political process and more 
specifically the relations between interest groups and the institutions of government. 
 
Robert Dahl is perhaps the best-known pluralist writer and is identified as leading the 
movement known as classical pluralism. According to McLennan, he was regarded by many 
as, ‘the doyen of conventional political pluralist theory’ (McLennan 1995 p.4). Classical 
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pluralism, when situated in the climate of The Cold War, ‘can be seen as a reaction to and a 
rejection of the monistic, imposing, communist USSR’ (ibid. p.43). It is no coincidence that, in 
line with McLennan’s quote, pluralism has flourished in western liberal democracies outside 
of times of major armed conflict as was the case with the English pluralists, pre-WW1 and the 
American classical pluralists, post-WW2. The appetite for pluralism, understandably, 
historically diminishes considerably during times of conflict which require centralised 
governments focused on meeting the demands of military operations. The classical pluralists 
had the ideal moment in history to appeal to those happy to stand in opposition to the absolute 
communist doctrine and to sell to the world the (often overegged) vision of a minimalist state 
focused upon the rights, liberties and freedoms of the individual, which is central to pluralist 
philosophy.  
 
Dahl’s most influential work in the subject area is titled, Who Governs? Democracy and Power 
in an American City (2005). Dahl advances philosophical pluralist theory seeing pluralism as 
the overarching construct to explain who holds power in post-World War II America. Again, 
‘group theory’ (particularly interest groups), and the manner in which groups with differing 
views, opinions, and values, compete to influence the state, are central to Dahlian philosophy. 
Dahl argues that his empirical observations of local government in the town of New Haven 
Connecticut, show how the state has the role of arbiter between vying interest groups to whom 
it is responsive, none of whom has any inbuilt advantage over the others. McLennan, in line 
with pluralist authors already mentioned, summarises the importance of group theory to 
pluralist philosophy by stating ‘the central sociological agency for pluralists is the interest group 
and balanced interaction between these units of political motivation constitutes the foundation 
of advanced democracy’ (McLennan 1989 p.20). If we accept McLennan’s importance of 
interest groups in modern day advanced democracy, we have good reason to examine the 
impact of social media on the pre-existing group theory which was largely based in times 
before its existence.  Therefore, this is the premise of the supplementary research question of 
the empirical study which is presented later in the thesis. 
 
3.7 Contemporary pluralism  
Classical pluralism with Dahl at its centre came in for much academic criticism on numerous 
different basic assumptions.  
 
Back then, pluralism was being attacked for its narrow notion of interest, the limited 
understanding of political action, the exclusion of various interest groups, the dismissal 
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of the political power and the economic resources of elites, and its flawed concept of 
tolerance, among other things (Schlosberg 1998 p.584).  
 
Against a barrage of criticisms of conventional pluralism, the concept was developed by later 
authors who agreed with the shortcomings of earlier work (even Dahl himself acknowledged 
these shortcomings eventually) and developed theories still very much based upon the politics 
of difference but with an acknowledgement of the disproportionate power of business and the 
self-interest of government. As Wenman states, ‘commentators now refer variously to 
reformed pluralism, to neo pluralism, and to elite pluralism’ (Wenman 2003 p.58). 
 
Post-modern pluralists such as David Marsh (1995) advanced pluralist theory by 
acknowledging the disparity of power between groups on the basis of wealth, a theory which 
became known as, ‘elite pluralism’. Neo-pluralists argued that government and the state are 
far from impartial and have their own political agenda, rather than acting as a mediating umpire 
to a balanced environment of interest groups. Schlosberg sees William Connolly (previously 
mentioned as motivated by the theories of William James) as, ‘one of the earliest critics of the 
limits and bias of pluralism, having returned to reclaim the meaning of pluralism- a more critical 
pluralism, he argues and its focus on difference and multiplicity’ (Schlosberg 1998 p.584).  
 
Neo pluralists, such as Connolly, are more concerned with value pluralism than the classical 
pluralists focus upon procedural pluralism. Connolly does, however, see that the role of 
government would ideally be as an impartial arbiter but that the reality is that politics and 
economics are intrinsically linked, with business groups having greater access to political 
power. Connolly provides us with his own definition of neo pluralism, an abstract pluralism, 
whereby:  
 
The philosophy of pluralism does encounter paradox; it has not been demonstrated to 
be true; and it does feel implausible to many. But it is not unique in these respects. 
Therefore, it can be advanced as a possibility to consider; it can be articulated in ways 
that tap into currents of experience heretofore ignored or discredited; and its 
presentation can profit from creative stretching and amendments in the established 
terms of discourse (Connolly 2005 p.75). 
 
The neo-pluralists concept of elite pluralism sees contemporary governments as being 
inextricably linked to the pervasive business interests which Dahl suggested they should 
arbitrate between. The suggestion that big business has a disproportionate level of influence 
between competing groups in the present day is something that few would argue with. Such 
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a disproportionate level of political influence, based upon financial power, is in itself entirely 
undemocratic. Returning again to Dahl’s five standards for ideal democracy, the emphasis is 
upon equality within the democratic process whereby all persons are seen as equal. If this is 
not the case, we do not have an ideal democracy. In the following chapter this concept is 
further explored by focusing upon the paradox of a democracy whereby the media is at certain 
levels owned by corporations who are in turn empowered to pursue their own political 
interests. 
 
This does not, however, mean that pluralist group theory in a broader context is not relevant 
in the modern day. The types of groups are largely similar to those on which the English 
pluralists wrote, and they form for the same political reasons of gaining voice and influence in 
the political arena and continue to require the information which feeds and allows them to 
grow. Where they (sometimes, but certainly not yet always) gain that information from is 
changing, driven by technological developments of the internet and the growth of social media.  
A social media which some believe has the potential to redress the balance of power which is 
currently still firmly placed in the hands of a small group of social elites.  
 
3.8 Conclusions to Chapter 3 
We have then, a distinct body of work regarding pluralist theory which was grounded with the 
early philosophical American pluralists. The mantle was then taken up by the English pluralists 
with a focus upon the personality of the state and latterly focus on a more detailed approach 
to explaining the procedural element of group politics by Dahl and the classical pluralists. In 
terms of the democratic process, Dahl’s classical pluralism in particular asked us to perceive 
democracy as a form of rationalistic government which largely reflected Dahl’s ideal 
democracy. Political participation, for instance, was seen as being a simple process whereby 
interest groups found their place in the political spectrum with some ease and were able to 
effectively find voice and be heard. Whilst subsequent pluralist models accepted the 
inequalities in the democratic process, they still embodied an arena whereby the plurality of 
positions seamlessly existed through an inherent presence of the common good. Earlier 
notions of deliberative democracy went further still. Habermasian conceptions of a unitary 
public sphere were a premise of the possibilities of consensus in the decision-making process, 
though later proponents accepted the idealised nature of consensus, whilst affirming the 
inherent benefits of deliberation in terms of mitigating political exclusion. 
 
It was a rejection of such an idealistic notion of pluralist democracy which was at the heart of 
agonistic pluralism as described in chapter 2. Agonism instead asks us to accept and to a 
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certain degree welcome, a more fractious political environment consisting of passionate, 
antagonistic political actors driven largely by identity in a persistent hegemonic struggle. 
Mouffe’s agonism in particular seeks to convert such antagonisms into agonism whereby the 
irreducibility of pluralism and the subsequent persistence of exclusion in the decision making 
process is inevitable. In Mouffe’s theory, the transformation of antagonism into more 
acceptable and productive agonism, is dependent upon an arena of conflictual consensus 
where the legitimacy of the position of opponents is accepted. The empirical study assesses 
the presence and practical democratic implications of agonistic pluralism and deliberative 
democracy, and also pluralist group theory, through a lens of the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014.
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4 Media Pluralism 
4.1 Overview of Chapter 4 
In the previous chapter the principles and key arguments of political pluralist theory, as found 
in a comprehensive body of academic literature, were presented as a theory which 
contextualises power relations within democracies, and also as a theory which underpins the 
vital role of media plurality in democratic societies. In this chapter, whilst still referring to 
academic literature, the importance of media pluralism is clarified, and contemporary features 
and challenges regarding media pluralism are focused upon with a specific emphasis upon 
the internet and social media. Media pluralism suffers in a similar manner to political pluralism 
in a lack of clarity in the term itself. However, media pluralism is generally not contested as to 
its constitutive norms in the way that political or agonistic pluralism is. Media pluralism 
generally relates to two overlapping definitions and these will be discussed alongside the 
general role of the media in a democracy, before setting out their importance to this study.  
The events that led to the Levenson Inquiry are detailed as these coincide historically with the 
rise in distrust of UK mainstream media as discussed in chapter two, and also the increase in 
social media use which is the basis of the empirical study. Public service broadcasting and 
the BBC are essential elements of media plurality in the United Kingdom. These are therefore 
presented with a particular emphasis upon the main theoretical democratic purposes of the 
BBC, as a prelude to criticisms which it faced during the Scottish independence referendum, 
as is documented in the empirical study.  Social media is then focused upon, including a brief 
history and explanation of Twitter, as this is the chosen platform on which the empirical study 
is situated. 
 
4.2 Media in a democracy 
The following definition of the five key roles of the media in a democracy is used as a 
benchmark throughout this study: 
 The role of information provider. 
 A part of the agenda setting process. 
 The role of public watchdog. 
 A driver of political mobilization. 
 A means of regime legitimation (Kuhn 2007 p21). 
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The role of information provider is self-explanatory and is the core task of any media outlet. 
The electorate can only make informed democratic decisions based upon consumption of 
relevant information. The agenda setting process relates to the practice of individuals and 
groups in society competing to get their respective issues and points of view into the public 
domain, a process in which the media have a key role to play. The role of public watchdog 
(see also Fuchs 2011) refers to the task bestowed upon the media to be the guardian of public 
interest and to expose issues and events which the elite classes may wish to keep to 
themselves. As a driver of political mobilisation, the media, through highlighting issues and 
campaigns, has the power to influence the public to participate in political action, for example 
to join a political party or interest group.  A means of regime legitimation sees the media as 
having the power to socialise citizens with respect to accepted norms and values of society in 
general.  If these do not tally with the government of the day’s actions and aims, this can lead 
to political cynicism and may result in disengagement and voter apathy (ibid. p21-29).  
 
The two generally accepted overarching components of media pluralism are the principled 
notion of media pluralism, and the market theory of plurality of media source and ownership, 
the media regulator Ofcom provide a useful definition encompassing the two components as 
stated. Media pluralism is then concerned with: 
 
 Ensuring there is a diversity of viewpoints available and consumed across 
and within media enterprises. 
 [As well as] preventing any one media owner or voice having too much 
influence over public opinion and the political agenda (Ofcom 2015 p.4). 
 
Ensuring that diverse points of view are consumed in our democracy first of all requires there 
to be multiple accessible view points on offer, and this largely depends on limitations of 
ownership as expressed in the second part of the definition. Secondly, citizens must be 
motivated to engage with the multiple points of view which ought to be available to them. The 
second part of the definition relates to the free market theory of media pluralism and the 
ownership of media sources. Who owns our media is vital democratically and this is protected 
by legislation in a unique way in comparison to other marketplace commodities and services. 
The dangers of concentrated ownership of media sources relate to undue influence and the 
impact this may have on political decision making (Doyle 2002; Tunstall and Palmer 1991). 
Simply put, concentrated ownership, the likes of which has been regularly levelled at, for 
example the Rupert Murdoch empire, gives them the power to amongst other things, (at least 
potentially) set the political agenda although empirical evidence to support those claims is 
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mixed (see for example, Larcinese, Puglisi and Sneyder 2011; Picard and Van Weezel 2008). 
Whatever the empirical reality is regarding the level of power gleaned from such media 
owners, concentrated ownership and the powers which it potentially affords has infamously 
led to accusations of unhealthy (in terms of democratic standards) relations between media 
moguls and policymakers, including Cabinet Ministers and other MPs.  
 
4.3 UK Media pluralism as headline news 
2011 saw the subject of media plurality within the UK become headline news for a prolonged 
period in the wake of the Milly Dowler phone hacking scandal, a consequence of which was 
the closure of the United Kingdom’s best-selling Sunday newspaper, The News of the World. 
There was what could be accurately described as public outrage following the later proven 
allegations of phone hacking by News of the World employees. The most notable of these was 
the mobile phone of murdered schoolgirl Milly Dowler. As the scandal progressed, the question 
of the relationship between UK politicians and media owners mostly involving News 
Corporation owner Rupert Murdoch, fell into the media spotlight. 
 
The volume of meetings between former Prime Minister David Cameron and Mr Murdoch’s 
executives were revealed by The Independent newspaper in 2014:  
 
The scale of private links between David Cameron and News International was 
exposed for the first time last night, with the Prime Minister shown to have met Rupert 
Murdoch's executives on no fewer than 26 occasions in just over a year since he 
entered Downing Street (Wright and Morris 2011). 
 
The former Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Tony Blair was also notable in his close 
friendship to Mr Murdoch and is Godfather to one of Mr Murdoch’s children. Tony Blair 
infamously addressed NewsCorp’s annual conference in 1995 and The Sun newspaper (part 
of NewsCorp) subsequently backed The Labour Party in the 1997 general election where it 
won a landslide victory.  Mr Murdoch’s close relationships with UK politicians was not only a 
recent occurrence, as he was also found to be having numerous personal meetings with 
former Prime Minister Lady Thatcher, as far back as 1981. Whilst such meetings are not in 
themselves scandalous, the meetings with Thatcher were important because they preceded 
what can be seen as a pivotal moment in the history of UK media ownership with his 
acquisition of The Times and Sunday Times newspapers:  
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This direct personal lobbying was critical, as the government had the power to block 
his acquisition by referring the bid to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
because Murdoch already owned The Sun and The News of the World. The 
government's subsequent refusal to do so paved the way for the creation of what is 
easily the largest newspaper group in Britain. Its market share was about 28% at the 
time, but its financial strength has helped it grow to the point where it accounts for 
about 37% of all newspaper copies sold (Travis, 2012).  
 
The restriction of ownership of media outlets is the starting point for ensuring media plurality 
and the manner in which Mr Murdoch was allowed to take over The Times and The Sunday 
Times, crucially in light of the fact that there was no referral to the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, brought the deal into question. Being a newspaper owner allows, if chosen, 
overall editorial control which in turn raises the issue of having the power to impact upon the 
setting of the political agenda. Therefore, the position which Mr Murdoch acquired by owning 
37% of newspaper news consumption, can only be seen as pluralistically troublesome when 
benchmarked against a commitment to multiplicity and diversity of media source and outlets. 
 
The performance of the UK media in the face of largely unrestricted ownership with a majority 
of printed media having centre-right wing political leanings is discussed by left wing writer 
Owen Jones in The Establishment and how they get away with it (2014). Whilst it is undeniable 
that Jones seeks to support his own political position in a non-academic text, the claims made 
with supporting evidence from named journalists and MPs are hugely concerning for anyone 
who seeks to have generally unfettered media organisations. Ownership and almost total 
confinement to an imposed journalistic narrative is explored in detail. Jones quotes journalists 
who state that they understood that their career progression was contingent on sacrificing their 
journalistic principles and, quoting Angela Eagle MP, follow a media course which is, 
‘ideologically driven by its owners who have particular views that you or I probably wouldn’t 
agree with a lot of the time’ (Jones 2014 p.90). More specifically, Jones quotes Benedict 
Brogan, former deputy editor of The Telegraph on the subject of owner influence and the 
commercial nature of newspapers: 
 
They are private combines, they are commercial operations, which are there in the 
hope of perhaps making money and selling their wares. I think it would be utter 
madness if you were to stand up and say the guy who owns the train set has no say 
over the train set. It would be defying the truth about newspapers throughout the ages. 
What is the point of owning a newspaper if you can’t take an interest in what the 
newspaper is up to? (ibid. p.98). 
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Whilst agreeing with the premise of the arguments above regarding the influences upon the 
printed media, we ought to acknowledge that the overall media landscape in the UK is partially 
corrected by a broadcast media which is arguably more balanced in nature. The BBC (which 
is discussed in a following section) has a key role in this regard as the main public service 
broadcaster and faced stern criticism for its performance during the Scottish independence 
referendum. Additionally, all television broadcasters are regulated by Ofcom which in relation 
to media output requires that ‘all news in any part of the service should be presented with due 
accuracy and impartiality’ (Ofcom 2005). Nevertheless, the evidence regarding print media 
ownership and the points presented by Jones (2004) suggest that we cannot classify UK 
newspapers as serving a plurality of political views.  
 
If we remind ourselves of Dahl’s ideal conditions for democracy and the specific indicator of 
citizens having the control of the political agenda, we can see why this is troubling in 
democratic terms. Social media, largely unhindered by issues of ownership and with content 
output which is practically impossible to control, is heralded by some as the answer to media 
plurality concerns in the UK and abroad. This thesis, in later chapters, highlights and explores 
examples of Twitter activism and agenda setting during the Scottish independence 
referendum campaign of 2014. 
  
Returning, though, to Rupert Murdoch, Mr Murdoch’s personal evidence given to a House of 
Lords Communications Committee in 2007 brought the nature of ownership and editorial 
influence firmly into question, regarding a man who owns 37% of UK newspapers. At this 
hearing, journalist Chris Heard stated, ‘When it comes to The Sun and the old News of the 
World, he saw himself as a traditional proprietor who exercised editorial control over both 
[newspapers]’ (ibid. p.98).  Heard then goes on to suggest less specific influence over The 
Times and The Sunday Times whilst stating that he would however, often telephone the 
editors to ask what they were doing on certain issues. In light of this it would seem fanciful to 
suggest that the editors would reply in any way other than one which supported Mr Murdoch’s 
own personal position. 
 
4.4 The Leveson Enquiry 
The culmination of the phone hacking scandal was a judicial review led by The Right 
Honourable Lord Justice Leveson into the culture, practice and ethics of the press which was 
published in November 2012. The four modules of the enquiry were: 
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 Module 1: The relationship between the press and the public and looks at phone-
hacking and other potentially illegal behaviour.  
 Module 2: The relationships between the press and police and the extent to which 
that has operated in the public interest.  
 Module 3: The relationship between press and politicians.  
 Module 4: Recommendations for a more effective policy and regulation that supports 
the integrity and freedom of the press while encouraging the highest ethical 
standards. (Leveson Enquiry 2012) 
 
The relationship between the press and the public, police, and politicians was in the public 
spotlight from 2011 onwards. It is then probably no coincidence that this was the same time 
as the exponential decrease in trust of the media as demonstrated in the chart below which 
was discussed in chapter 2. The decline in public confidence in the traditional media to 
uncover wrongdoings of those in public office is exacerbated when coupled with the wholesale 
distrust of those that are holding the positions in public office (as previously discussed). A 
media which is seen in the manner it was previously as a tenacious public watchdog helps to 
negate the impact of the still wholly undesirable, though perhaps now inevitable, distrust of 
political elites. More worryingly, such distrust then leads to the media being seen as another 
component of the established political elite it was previously entrusted to hold accountable to 
public opinion: 
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Public Confidence in Traditional Media 
 
Figure 7 Screenshot from the Survey of Political Attitudes towards Conduct in Public Life (2014) 
 
Lord Leveson’s enquiry was wide ranging as illustrated by the four modules detailed 
previously. A central issue in relation to the empirical research of this project relates to the 
utilisation of social media in response to the apparent distrust of the mainstream press, as 
they are perceived as another component of the establishment. The text below, which is taken 
directly from the final report of the Leveson enquiry adds further weight to that theory: 
 
Taken as a whole, the evidence clearly demonstrates that, over the last 30-35 years 
and probably much longer, the political parties of UK national Government and of UK 
official Opposition, have had or developed too close a relationship with the press in a 
way which has not been in the public interest. In part, this has simply been a matter of 
spending a disproportionate amount of time, attention and resource on this relationship 
in comparison to, and at the expense of, other legitimate claims in relation to the 
conduct of public affairs. In part, it has been a matter of going too far in trying to control 
the supply of news and information to the public in return for the hope of favourable 
treatment by sections of the press, to a degree and by means beyond what might be 
considered to be the fair and reasonable (albeit partisan) conduct of public debate 
(Leveson 2012 sec.117 p.26). 
 
The key phrase here refers to control the supply of news, which, whilst perhaps an 
understandable endeavour for politicians and political parties and probably an inevitable 
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consequence of the pervasive 24 hour media age we live in, is a prospect which must be 
resolutely guarded against for democracy to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the general 
public. 
4.5 Public service broadcasting 
One of the ways of attempting to ensure the principled notion of media pluralism is to have a 
public service broadcaster which is mandated to adhere to standardised, pluralistic goals. The 
BBC is that institution in the UK and its role in the Scottish independence referendum was 
controversial for some, and is therefore prominent within the empirical study. 
 
The BBC’s place in the UK as the public-sector broadcaster is constituted by royal charter 
which is reviewed around every ten years or so. The six public purposes of the BBC are set 
out below: 
 
 Sustaining citizenship and civil society - The BBC provides high-quality news, 
current affairs and factual programming to engage its viewers, listeners and users in 
important current and political issues. 
 Promoting education and learning - The support of formal education in schools 
and colleges and informal knowledge and skills building. 
 Stimulating creativity and cultural excellence - Encouraging interest, engagement 
and participation in cultural, creative and sporting activities across the UK. 
 Representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities - BBC viewers, 
listeners and users can rely on the BBC to reflect the many communities that exist in 
the UK. 
 Bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK - The BBC will build a 
global understanding of international issues and broaden UK audiences' experience 
of different cultures. 
 Delivering to the public the benefit of emerging communications technologies 
and services - Assisting UK residents to get the best out of emerging media 
technologies now and in the future. (Secretary of State for Culture Media and Sport, 
2006) 
 
All six purposes are aligned with pluralism as is generally considered in the empirical study, 
however, that of the BBC representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities was the 
most debated during and following the independence campaign. The BBC undertook a public 
consultation from 16th July to 8th October 2015 ahead of its next charter review which was 
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being undertaken at the time of writing in 2016. Following the consultation, the BBC published 
details of the public perception of its performance relating to nations regions and communities: 
 
 The priority to represent the different nations, regions and communities to the rest of 
the UK (priority 1) is one where audiences see a clear need for improvement, 
particularly in Northern Ireland, Scotland and the North of England. 
 The provision of a range of output to meet the different needs of the nations, regions 
and communities (priority 2) is also identified by licence fee payers as an area where 
the BBC could improve its performance. 
 Although licence fee payers do not rate the priority to reflect different religious and 
other beliefs on the UK (priority 5) as highly important, they do see a fairly wide 
performance gap. 
 The Trust research on the priority to provide output in indigenous minority languages 
(priority 6) indicates that there are concerns with the levels of indigenous language 
provision in Northern Ireland in particular, where support for an increase is very 
strong among those with any knowledge of, interest in or identification with either 
Irish or Ulster Scots (BBC 2016). 
 
The value of the BBC in terms of helping maintain a pluralistic democracy relies heavily upon 
the trust that the public attribute to it, and this trust has been questioned in similar ways as to 
other sections of the mainstream media in recent years. It would seem, however, that distrust 
in the BBC as a public service broadcaster is far more damaging than distrust in the rest of 
the media. The majority of the general population fully understands (certainly post-Leveson if 
not pre-Leveson) that in the commercial world we live in, following the already detailed rise in 
media empires which places political power in the hands of the few, that caution must be taken 
when considering the editorial impact on journalistic output. If, however, the same distrust is 
attributed to the BBC, when trust and balance are its fundamental reason for existence, then 
the purpose of the BBC in its entirety is brought into question. In line with other establishments 
which embody the United Kingdom, as the BBC certainly does, the BBC became a particular 
target (with some justified reason) for independence supporting nationalists. Empirical data 
from the study addressing this issue is presented in the results chapters of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 4 – Media Pluralism 65 
 
4.6 Media pluralism – the internet and social media 
This section sets out in detail the key components of internet communications and their impact 
on the democratic process. The main theoretical proposition which is a starting point for the 
empirical study, states that:  
 
The internet is redistributing political influence, it is broadcasting the public sphere, 
increasing political participation, involving citizens in political activities that were closed 
to them, and challenging the monopoly of elites (Hindman 2008 p.6).  
 
Hindman’s hypothesis is used to guide the evaluation of social media upon the democratic 
process. Here, and throughout the study, the thesis focuses predominantly upon Twitter as it 
was the chosen platform used in the empirical study, for reasons which are detailed in the 
methodology chapter.  
. 
The development and proliferation of social media has fundamentally altered the way that 
people communicate (Fuchs 2007). Social media in a narrow definition encompasses 
computer-mediated technology which allows users to connect and share information. 
Connectivity is the prevalent buzz word which encapsulates the manner in which users are 
brought together via computers and mobile technology. The following graphic summarises 
digital statistics relating to the UK in 2016: 
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UK Digital Statistics Indicators 
 
Figure 8 Screenshot from We are Social (2016) 
 
This graphic shows that from a total UK population of 64.91 million, there are 59.47 million 
internet users and 38 million active social media accounts in the UK. The following graphic 
shows that the 38 million active UK social media users, represents 59% of the UK population: 
UK Social Media Use 
 
Figure 9 Screenshot from We are Social (2016) 
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Twitter is one of the most commonly recognised social media platforms, it was founded on 
March 26th 2006 by Jack Dorsey and approximate to the time of writing Twitter boasted 500 
million registered users (Lunden 2012). Twitter users are posed a simple question by the 
application - what’s happening? During the data collection period of the empirical study users 
were limited to 140 characters per posting or tweet (this has now been increased to 280 
characters) with the enforced brevity of the posts being a key difference to other social 
networking sites. The main difference between Twitter and other social media platforms is 
real-time posting, which is visible to anyone on the site if they opt to follow that account or 
access it as an occasional visitor, as opposed to limiting visibility of posts to an accepted 
network of friends. This important distinction allows the emphasis of Twitter as social media 
rather than a social network, ‘Twitter has similarities to both blogs and chat rooms, but its 
emphasis on accessible dialogic communication in the public domain is unique’ (Murthy 2013 
p.9). This transforms Twitter from being a message board for friends to a real-time news 
service for those who choose to use it in that way. 
 
Hash tags, the inclusion of subject titles accompanied by the symbol #, encourage users to 
read and/or participate in distinct conversation topics with people outside of their personal 
network. For example, #indyref will take you to all posts that have included that particular hash 
tag within their tweets. Multiple hash tags were commonplace during the independence 
referendum campaign such as #indyref, #SNP, and #YesScotland. Clicking on each will take 
you to the most recent information posted within each one of those streams. 
 
Retweets allow people to forward messages of interest so as to encourage all those in their 
personal network to read that message. Retweets are important because, similarly to the use 
of hash tags, they often result in a snowball effect which can bring the specific topic to the 
attention of large sections of the audience, or in Twitter parlance to become a trending topic.  
Murthy (2013 p46) states that, ‘Kwak et al (2010p.6) note that once a tweet is retweeted, 
regardless of the number of followers the original Twitterer has) it reaches an audience (mean) 
size of 1000’.  According to Murthy, the attribution of the author of original tweet is often 
consciously/subconsciously lost and attributed to the retweeter. Empirical analysis, particularly 
of many politicians’ accounts, shows them to have an extremely high proportion of retweets 
versus tweets with some only ever retweeting. This reduces the impact of those accounts to 
information dissemination as opposed dialogic communication. 
 
The ability to include media such as photographs and video links within a tweet often makes 
posts more appealing to explore and is increasingly used to bypass the 140 character limit per 
post. For example: 
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Figure 10 Screenshot from Twitter (2017) 
 
The above graphic is exactly what the user will see while scrolling through their newsfeed 
without any requirement to click through to an article. However, of more significance to the 
independence debate is the use of links by tweeters to link back to an external website or blog, 
whether that be their own or that of another person or organisation. Initially blogs were simply 
a list of links to other websites before people began to publish their own thoughts within that 
particular blog (Bradshaw 2005). The role of Twitter as a conduit to external blogs and 
websites is part of the empirical research and is discussed in the results chapters. 
 
It was in the early 1990s that the internet first came to prominence as a tool with significant 
potential to impact upon broad conceptions of democracy and more specifically upon the 
electoral process. In America, the 1992 presidential election campaign has been credited as, 
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‘the first internet election’ (Chadwick and Howard 2010 p.151) with the internet entering UK 
public consciousness 2 years later, though this was largely restricted to societal elites (Ward 
& Vedel 2006) and with less apparent commitment than their American counter parts (Gibson 
& Ward 2000).  It was the later presidential contest in 1996 which was subsequently 
documented as being ‘the first to attract millions of citizens looking [online] for information on 
candidates and results’ (Lusoli 2005 p. 155).   
 
This significant leap in the capability of communication technology led to various predictions 
regarding the expected impact of the internet upon the electoral process, some of which have 
become reality whilst some have not.  Chadwick and Howard (2010) summarising Morris 
(1999) details many of these predictions which were focused upon the electoral process in the 
USA.  At that time there was a belief that the internet would lead toward a more direct 
democracy whereby decisions would be made via online referendums and the role of the 
media in the decision- making process would significantly decrease.  This move toward a more 
direct democracy was predicted to moderate the prevailing role of finance during election 
campaigns with a democratically invigorated youth playing a central role in online political 
campaigning (ibid.).  Advertising was predicted to diminish as internet users could control their 
exposure to media messages while political campaigns would be waged via endlessly 
repeated 30 second messages.  Online voting was forecast to replace traditional voting and 
the role of political parties was projected to wither (ibid.).  Additional, more fanciful predictions 
included the prospect of campaigning being focused upon virtual conversations between 
electoral candidates and voters.  More prophetically, there were claims that the traditional print 
media would be significantly less powerful as newspapers became freely available to all via 
the internet and that campaign messages would be tailored and targeted to specific voting 
groups, allied to a process where online analytics would allow campaign managers to more 
quickly decipher which tactics were working during a campaign (ibid.). The role of targeted 
emails at crucial points in the electoral process was also foreseen. 
 
Predictions such as these generally see the internet as a positive force upon the democratic 
process and are indicative of academic theories which are classified as equalising the 
suggested current disparity regarding where power lies in the electoral/democratic process 
(as relates to the Hindman quote at the beginning of this chapter, see also Fuchs 2010). This 
applies particularly from the perspective of the potential for minor parties as they are able to 
compete with the more established (and far wealthier) major traditional parties.  The basis of 
this can also be taken as an increase in plurality as power is moved away from the established 
media, and therefore also the traditional parties which they have historically tended to support.  
This concept is more commonly referred to as levelling the political playing field.  Conversely, 
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there is an established school of thought which holds that such suggestions are overly 
optimistic and that the established players in the political spectrum will normalise the role of 
the internet upon the democratic process, by establishing a level of control of the medium 
which will result in politics as usual (the normalisation hypothesis being self-attributed to 
Margolis, Resnick and Wolfe 1999).  A similar conceptual framework as the 
equalising/normalising debate is that of mobilisation versus reinforcement (Nam 2012; 
Cantijoch 2009) whereby, more specifically, the internet is seen as enabling and encouraging 
the mobilisation of previously marginalised sections of society within the democratic process 
or, conversely, that the status quo will again endure through a reinforcement process 
equivalent to that of normalisation as already mentioned (Lusoli 2005).  
 
From a United States perspective, the first examples of political campaigns exploiting ICTs 
can be traced to Al Gore’s unsuccessful campaign in 2003 (Benbunan Fich and Arbaugh 2006 
in Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011).  More notably, Democratic Party candidate Howard 
Dean revolutionised electioneering practices when he introduced the 
DemocracForAmerica.com blog which is credited as the first blog of its kind dedicated to a 
presidential candidate (Chadwick 2006 in Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011). It was 
however, the successful Obama campaign of 2008 which saw ICTs being credited as perhaps 
having the potential to decide election campaigns through cost-effective methods of mass-
mobilisation, though importantly only when coupled with a credible candidate, backed by 
coherent policy proposals in a campaign combined with traditional electioneering methods 
(ibid.).   
 
From a UK perspective, the predicted progress toward a more level playing field has been far 
from linear. Jackson (2007, citing Gibson 1998 and Auty and Nicholas 1998) states that the 
1997 general election saw smaller parties exploiting the internet to a far greater extent than 
the major parties. However, that position changed in the 2001 election, ‘with more traffic being 
guided to larger party websites’ (ibid. p.252).  By 2005 the position had seemingly reversed 
again with smaller parties stating that the playing field had indeed been levelled, largely 
through their use of publicly available e-newsletters (Jackson 2006). In summary, Jackson 
(2007) suggests that although minor parties felt that there was a move toward equalisation, in 
reality it was the major parties which were dominating internet use during UK elections at that 
time.  In another UK study, also situated in the 2005 general election, Norris and Curtice (2008) 
went further than looking at the use of ICTs by political parties and focused upon the question 
of who was accessing and using the information which by now was becoming increasingly 
available online.  Their findings supported the normalisation side of the argument in that it was 
mainly the already politically aware who were accessing online political information, an 
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argument which was also supported by Chadwick and Howard (2010). However, Norris and 
Curtice (2008) also suggested that broader public awareness was eventually being enhanced 
through a two-step flow of information whereby the already politically aware, were particularly 
likely to further share the information they had retrieved online during subsequent discussions 
with their fellow citizens.  
 
More recent studies, such as Gibson and McAllister (2015), suggest that to be locked in a 
binary argument around equalisation and normalisation is to miss the point, and instead advise 
that the toing and froing of the argument ought to be ‘better understood as distinct phases that 
map on to technological developments within the medium itself’ (ibid. p.541).  It should 
however also be noted that the same study was, ‘generally supportive of a linear trend toward 
normalisation rather than a cyclical move from major party dominance to equalisation’ (ibid. 
p.543). 
 
Whilst this thesis may help to cast some light on the equalisation versus normalisation debate 
during the Scottish independence referendum 2014, it seeks more specifically to focus upon 
the use of micro-blogging in the form of Twitter during the campaign which preceded the 
referendum, in order to present and discuss exemplars relating to existing conceptual models 
of political communication (see Freelon 2010).   
 
Jackson and Lilleker (2011) explicitly focus upon the use of Twitter by MPs in a UK study 
conducted in 2009. They find that impression management - what is effectively an exercise in 
public relations and self-promotion - is a significant driver for MPs’ use of Twitter with the 
servicing of constituency related issues very much a secondary consideration.  They do 
however find merit in Twitter use by MPs in term of bridging the gap between themselves and 
those whom they represent, stating that Twitter use ‘can encourage greater trust and interest 
and build upon an impression of the MP that surpasses pejorative media narratives’ [such as 
those discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis] (ibid. p.101).  In a study conducted around 
the same time, Margaretten and Gaber (2012) specifically focus upon the Twitter use of 
Scottish MPs with the aim of analysing whether authentic Twitter dialogue between MPs and 
the public can improve the levels of distrust which currently exist between them.  Their findings 
were particularly positive in this respect, providing that the content of the communications 
between the two groups was meaningful, in a way which surpassed established norms of one- 
way political broadcasting, which otherwise simply results in the old politics being conducted 
at a faster pace on a different medium.  Baxter and Marcella (2013) summarise a series of 
investigations into e-campaigning and e-politics with specific reference to election 
campaigning. Again, however, the conflicting findings of relatively comparative studies is 
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present in that whilst they find that there has been a steady progression in the adoption of 
various methods of online technology, by both individual candidates and political parties, they 
find that this has generally been restricted to one-way political broadcasting as opposed to 
reciprocal communications. In this respect, the authors find that they ‘would argue that these 
patterns of information exchange are unlikely to have encouraged an already apathetic and 
cynical electorate to participate more fully in the democratic process’ (ibid. p.85).  Additionally, 
they emphasise their hesitance in linking ‘direct associations between politicians’ online efforts 
and their electoral success or failure’ (ibid. p.85).  
 
Proponents of the democratizing effect of social media and Twitter often point to widely 
publicised events such as the, ‘Arab spring uprisings’ of 2011 as being proof positive of the 
ability of Twitter to mobilise citizens.  Others, however, suggest that the effect of social media 
in that event has been hugely overestimated. The headlines at the time spoke of a Twitter 
revolution which seems to suggest that the absence of social media would have meant the 
uprisings which took place within Egypt and other countries simply would not have happened 
(Howard and Hussain 2011. Khondker 2011. Stepanova 2011).  However, In 2009 Egypt had 
12000 registered twitter accounts which was equal to 0.00014% of the Egyptian population 
(Murthy. 2013). This individual statistic contextualises the volume of Twitter traffic within the 
country as being miniscule at the time of the uprising. We ought to, however, acknowledge 
that lack of volume does not necessarily negate the potential political power of even one single 
tweet.  The argument here is whether Twitter actually mobilises citizens or not.  
 
Social media can provide access to elites and this new-found voice can be used to hold 
political elites to account. (Holt, Shehata and Stromback 2013 p.19) found that the propagation 
of information by younger social media users ‘can function as a leveller in terms of motivating 
political participation’, in a study focused upon a Swedish political campaign in 2010. Similarly, 
meta-analysis of 36 studies into social media use and participation, Boulianne (2015 p.524-
538), found positive results in terms of increasing participation although noting only a minimal 
impact upon election campaigns.  
 
To be more specific, in terms of how the political power dynamic is allegedly being redressed 
by social media, the suggestion is that alternative views from that of the mainstream media 
are being presented in a number of ways. Blogs are taken as having a key role in this regard. 
The world’s top political blog in terms of followers, according to recent figures is 
ThinkProgress, a project of the Centre for American Progress (CAP) which has 1,761,340 
Facebook fans and 666,620 Twitter followers (Feedspot 2017). From a UK perspective 
regarding blogs which could be classed as non-partisan and independent of traditional media 
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organisations, Politics.co.uk is number 19 on the list with 7,182 Facebook fans and 34,745 
Twitter followers (ibid.). Alternatively, for example, social media platforms such Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube are places where information which is free from the constraints of 
corporate ownership and influence can be found, and these are the focus of the empirical 
study.  
 
In terms of the role of social media in high profile world events, such as the Arab spring, Rosen 
(2011) summarises the counter argument by stating ‘Internet schminternet. Revolutions 
happen when they happen. Whatever means are lying around will get used’ (Murthy. 2013 
p99). Rather than being a causal factor then, Twitter is perhaps better seen as an enabler with 
power to report and disseminate information in real time from those at the heart of these events 
whether they are participants, citizen reporters, or mainstream media reporters. In addition to 
those who believe the impact of social media and the internet upon democracy is overstated, 
there are others that believe social media is in some ways impacting negatively upon 
democracy.  
 
Central to these criticisms is the notion of ideological fragmentation/homophily, often 
associated with Cass Sunstein and Republic.com 2.0 (2009). Sunstein focuses upon the 
manner in which internet communication can be self–filtered (and then further filtered by 
platforms themselves) to restrict users to only encounter the content that interests them, in 
what he encapsulates as the daily me. This is seen as a threat to democracy in that individuals 
who are not exposed to a multiplicity of content and views, will not be able to make rational 
political choices based upon an assessment of competing options. If this were indeed to be 
the case, it would likely have a tumultuous knock on effect over time. The abundance of 
options available to citizens in relation to media content is not the issue here, and there is no 
suggestion that social media is fundamentally bad for our democracy. Indeed, a proliferation 
of media sources is exactly the hope for media pluralists, the self-limitation and/or the limitation 
by intermediaries being the issue in point. 
 
Sunstein also discusses the concept of echo chambers in his work - echo chamber being a 
term that is particularly prominent contemporarily - with regard to social media. The term itself 
is an extension of ideological fragmentation, with the assertion being that online inhabitants of 
blogs and social media platforms, consist of communities which are merely reinforcing their 
own narrow viewpoints. Twitter is particularly associated with the term echo chamber, with a 
more specific assertion that, in political terms, Twitter generally consists of those at the elite 
end of the socio-political spectrum consisting of politicians, journalists and those of an already 
heavily politicised disposition. This means that if true, such platforms are hardly democratic.  
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The term echo chamber is generally accompanied by the allegation that those communities 
not only restrict themselves to homogenous points of view, but that they are also unaware that 
they inhabit a niche market place of views. The suggestion is also that they attribute 
disproportionate credence to the impact of social media generally, whereby the overwhelming 
majority of society are engaged in broader traditional media, such as television, radio, and the 
printed press, and it is these platforms that have genuine, opinion forming capabilities and 
influence. In terms of recent academic research into the concept of echo chambers, the results 
are mixed.  Gilbert, Bergstrom and Karahalios (2009) suggest that the overwhelming amount 
of agreement found in comments sections to blogs suggests a level of homophily. Flaxman, 
Goel, and Rao (2016), meanwhile, find in a study of 50,000 internet users’ browsing histories, 
that users tend to seek out mainstream news outlets and are actually more at risk of being 
exposed to arguments contrary to their own political position, while Garrett (2009) finds that 
people are only marginally less likely to seek out news stories that align with their political 
preferences. Garret concludes that ‘worry that the internet will lead to an increasingly 
fragmented society appears to have been overstated’ (Garrett 2009 p.281). Ideological 
fragmentation/homophily is a central theme in the empirical study and challenges these 
different hypotheses specifically regarding Twitter use during the Scottish independence 
referendum campaign. 
 
There are a number of other reasons, other than allegations of ideological fragmentation, to 
argue that Twitter is not wholly democratic. What should be acknowledged firstly, though, is 
that Twitter is a business just as Facebook and other social media platforms are. Though they 
may have had democratic origins, they are certainly not principled attempts to build genuine 
social networks or foster the spread of knowledge or democratic debate, in a not-for-profit 
benevolent way such as Wikipedia almost uniquely is. As with many such sites, once Twitter 
established itself in the market place it began to introduce methods to make it profitable. This 
began by promoted tweets (essentially adverts) appearing at the beginning of certain search 
pages. These advertisements are understandably costly to the firm promoting them as Twitter 
is one of the most popular websites globally and is essentially an incredibly valuable database, 
in which its billion plus users have wilfully signed over some of their most personal information.  
 
Further to this, Twitter charges search engines like Google and Yahoo for access to its 
content. This combination makes Twitter a significant sized company which was floated for 
$14.2 billion in 2013. Although this does not automatically mean Twitter should be seen as 
dispossessing democratic benefits, the business model it is now resigned to fostering means 
we ought to increase user scepticism as to its content and output. The manner in which Twitter 
is moving was highlighted in 2016 when an algorithm, similar to the one used by Facebook, 
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which ranks posts in an order different to the previous real-time posting (which was the reason 
so many academic researchers use Twitter in preference to Facebook) in favour of popular 
tweets, was introduced. Originally there was a way of opting out of this feature but at the time 
of writing this was no longer the case.  
 
There are other reasons why Twitter may be seen as not wholly democratic. The internet 
generally has been seen by certain countries which prefer to have control over the information 
citizens can access, as being a major threat to the way in which it governs. In 2012, Twitter 
applied new technology that could ‘selectively block tweets on a country by country basis’ 
(BBC 2012). The site sought to justify this by stating that, ‘its international growth meant 
entering countries that have different ideas about the contours of freedom of expression, citing 
France or Germany which ban pro-Nazi content as examples’ (ibid.). Understandably, this was 
seen by some, such as Reporters Without Borders as censorship and an affront to free speech 
(ibid.). Whilst concerns that the internet and social media specifically have become merely 
another tool to be controlled by government, in ways such as these, are worrying, the political 
and technical difficulties in controlling internet communications suggest that such concerns 
ought to be restricted to the most extreme, none democratic regimes, such as North Korea, 
and to some extent China.  
 
4.7 Conclusions to Chapter 4 
Media pluralism is overwhelmingly accepted as a vital component in modern liberal 
democracies. However, the power wielded by multinational media corporations has been 
shown to curry disproportionate amounts of favour with successive UK governments. These 
have been highlighted to the public at large in the wake of the events which led to the Levenson 
Inquiry. The printed press, however, continue to face justified criticism in not providing genuine 
plurality of content when contrasted with the political preferences of many UK citizens. In terms 
of broadcast media, institutions such as the BBC ought to safeguard media plurality within the 
UK. However, the performance of the BBC, for some, is not to the requisite standard. The 
possibilities afforded by social media platforms such as Twitter, which can largely overcome 
issues of media ownership and certainly theoretically overcome practical issues of plurality of 
available content, is for many a partial answer to the issues regarding media performance and 
its subsequent impact upon UK democracy. This assertion, in line with Hindman (2008) is the 
key theory which provides the back drop to which the empirical study considers the role of 
deliberation and agonistic pluralism during the 2014 referendum campaign.  
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5 Methodology 
5.1 Overview of chapter 5 
This chapter details the choice of research methodology for the project. It explains the 
evolution of the methodology from the beginnings of the project through to the final 
methodological selections. It begins by discussing the critical theory research philosophy and 
the choice of a qualitative study. Prominent academic works in the field of social media 
research are then presented. The methods of literature search are described and the activist 
groups which are focused upon during the study are provided. Data collection methods, the 
interview process, and the methods of coding and data analysis are also explained. Finally, 
the ethical considerations within the thesis are given and the research limitations are noted. 
 
5.2 Research philosophy  
The research philosophy sets out the researcher’s position on the methodological approach 
of the study. Epistemologically, this study is situated in critical theory in terms of sociocultural 
assumptions and critique.  This is driven by the assertion that the impact of social media upon 
democracy is normatively situated in its potential to extricate political communication from the 
neo-liberal capitalist constructs in which it is situated.  Neoliberalism is generally conceived as 
relating to ‘the repudiation of Keynesian welfare state economics and the ascendance of the 
Chicago School of political economy—Von Hayek, Friedman, and others’ (Brown 2009 p.37).  
Alternatively, in the context of political communication, neoliberalism represents the 
deregulation and free-market commodification of the distribution of political messages in the 
media (see Freedman 2008; Harvey 2007), having detrimental effects upon the requirement 
for open information flows if citizens are to make genuinely informed political choices.  In this 
regard this thesis is aligned with other authors who discuss social media from a critical theory 
perspective (see Fuchs 2017, 2011, 2010, 2007; Rohle 2005).  Critical theory is rooted in the 
works of Karl Marx (at least in Marx’s critique of capitalism and analysis of social relations) 
and is synonymous with the Frankfurt School of thought, originating in Germany with thinkers 
located at, or with links to The Institute of Social Research, Frankfurt, in the early 1930s. The 
main philosophers and social theorists of the Frankfurt School are Max Horkheimer, Theodor 
Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal and Erich Fromm.  
 
More recently, social scientists outside the Frankfurt School such as Bourdieu, Althusser and 
Foucault are strongly associated with critical theory (Horkheimer 1982). The Frankfurt school 
itself was ‘concerned with developing a revolutionary philosophical variant of Western 
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Marxism, opposed to capitalism in the west and Stalinism in the east’ (Horkheimer 1982 p.2). 
It should be noted however, that later iterations of critical theory have branched out from its 
Marxist beginnings, and as Edgar and Sedgwick (2007) state, critical theory has commonly 
been associated with thinkers linked to structuralism, post-structuralism and postmodernism. 
This broad conception of critical theory means that clear definitions of the theory are difficult 
to pinpoint.  
 
Critical theory has though, been expressed as: 
 
A foundational perspective from which analysis of social action, politics, science and 
other human endeavours can proceed. Research drawing from critical theory has 
critique (assessment of the current state and the requirement to reach a desired state) 
at its centre (Given 2008 p.179). 
 
Given (ibid.), goes on to state that critical theory can be broken down into three phases. The 
first was the Frankfurt School as mentioned, and the second encompasses the early works of 
Jurgen Habermas and The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1992 - first 
published in German in 1969) in which Habermas’ analysis of the public sphere ‘was firmly 
historical in that he drew his analysis from the manifestation of public political and social 
behaviour’ (Given p.179). When considering the third movement, synonymous with the 
already mentioned French postmodernist authors such as Foucault, authors are more focused 
upon human actors and their historical development, drawn from political economy, sociology, 
cultural theory, philosophy and anthropology (Crotty 1998; Best and Kellner 1993; Kellner 
1990). Whilst the German and French approaches, and indeed contemporary critical theorists 
such as Nancy Fraser who cannot be classified as fitting neatly into either approach, differ in 
their critique of societal oppression, they are, however, unified in their expression of its 
existence.  
 
A key extension of critical theory in relation to this study is the manner in which: 
 
Adorno and Horkheimer developed a Marxist sociological approach to media studies. 
They saw the media as a cultural industry that maintained power relations and served 
to lessen the ‘resistance standards’ of cultural aesthetics by popularising certain types 
of culture (Horkheimer 1982 p.3). 
 
The certain types of culture are those that support the position of the prevailing hegemony 
through the broadcast of programming and printing of stories tailored to reinforce the 
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predominant position.  This may not only be in a positive sense, whereby, in the case of 
Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom for instance, there may be a multiplicity of reinforcing 
messages, but also in a negative sense regarding Scottish independence, whereby positive 
cultural/political/economic possibilities are perhaps notable by their absence.  This argument 
is an often-repeated allegation in relation to the broadcast media, particularly in the form of 
the BBC and also the majority of the UK printed press throughout the Scottish independence 
referendum campaign of 2014 (see, for example, Robertson 2014; Walker 2013). 
 
This perception of the implicit motivation and effect of the media as put forward by Adorno and 
Horkheimer (ibid.) is one which still resonates today. The role of capitalism in the mass media, 
particularly regarding newspaper ownership and its subsequent impact upon output, is of 
concern on a global scale (Downing 2011 in Wasko, Murdoch and Sousa 2011; Thomas and 
Nain 2004; Doyle 2002). Subsequently, the possibilities for new/alternative media (Fuchs 
2010) to counter the prevailing hegemony are the focus of many debates regarding media 
plurality.  A pertinent example of the application to, and appropriateness of, critical theory as 
the epistemological grounding of the study lies in the equalisation versus normalisation debate 
as discussed in the previous chapter. Whilst there has often been debate as to the reality or 
otherwise of sufficient plurality in the British media, this concern has grown exponentially since 
the refusal of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to refer the takeover of The Times and 
The Sunday Times in 1981 to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, a takeover which, as 
discussed in earlier chapters, was preceded by secret meetings between the two which were 
always denied but later exposed (Travis 2012).  
 
That corporate takeover was arguably a typical embodiment of establishment collusion, 
evidenced by the meetings between Thatcher and Murdoch, the result of the takeover being, 
by design or by default, significant restriction of the plurality of UK media output in their 
ideological favour.  Over three decades later, the equalisation versus normalisation debate is 
another that is entrenched in the media plurality debate, asking whether there is now a 
technological capability, in the form of the internet and social media, to disrupt the domination 
of the establishment upon media output which serves to perpetuate the hegemonic position.  
In this respect the study of social media’s influence on media plurality seems an obvious and 
appropriate choice to be studied from a critical theory perspective.  As Kellner states, ‘critical 
theory insists that one needs a theory of society grounded in a theory of capitalism to make 
sense of socio-historical processes and developments because the dynamics of capitalism 
play such a constitutive role in social life’ (Kellner (1990 p.22).  This study comes from a 
theoretical perspective of society being disadvantaged in terms of making informed political 
choices, as a consequence of the impact that neo-liberalism has had upon political 
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communication output.  In terms that are increasingly relevant to this empirical study, Kellner 
goes on to state that historically, critical theorists ‘analysed the new relationships between the 
state and the economy, the role of new technologies and mass communication as new modes 
of social control’ (ibid. p.26) only later to conclude that there has been a surprising failure in 
recent times for works situated in critical theory (the works of Fuchs - 2017; 2011; 2010; 2007 
and others as notable exceptions) to theorise developments in the media, socialisation 
practices, and new cultural developments.  Kellner finds this surprising, given previous 
contributions from scholars linked to critical theory.  This study responds to Kellner’s call for 
scholars to provide ‘theoretical analyses of developments within the capitalist economy and of 
changes in class stratification, the labour process, new technologies, the media and politics’ 
(ibid. p.31).  
 
In practice, critical theory seeks to provide the big picture, ‘that positivist schools which root 
their theories in isolated facts fail to provide’ (ibid. p.13).  Horkheimer (1982) sets out three 
explicit conditions that critical theories must therefore meet: 
 
 They must be explanatory: explain what is wrong with the current social reality. 
 They must be practical: identify the actors to change it. 
 They must be normative: provide both clear norms for criticism and achievable 
practical goals for social transformation (ibid.). 
 
Horkheimer also states that critical theories must fulfil these set criteria at the same time in 
order for it to be genuinely transformative. In terms of this study, the current social reality which 
requires confrontation is that while having a positive commitment to democracy, the present 
system has significant failings. With this in mind, the study undertakes an immanent critique 
of liberal democracy whereby liberal democracy is currently failing to live up to its expectations 
by failing to achieve its own ends. To be more specific - the ontological assumption is that we 
have a media (particularly a printed media) which fails to provide a plurality of political views 
due to the capitalist structures which dominate it. The actors to change this position are social 
media users, who may, in the correct circumstances, have the capacity to correct the issue of 
media plurality. In terms of being normative - this is the specific premise of the empirical study, 
to discuss the ways in which social media was achieving practical consequences during the 
Scottish independence referendum 2014 through the conceptual framework of Freelon (2010).  
This involves a focus upon the impact of social media upon the normative premise of 
deliberative democracy, agonistic pluralism, and also Dahl’s 5 democratic ideals (2000) and 
Kuhn’s 5 functions of the media (2007).  
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With reference to the first two of these three criteria put forward by Horkheimer, Given (2008) 
firstly states that the explanation of the reality is best gathered through a process of 
observation. Secondly, Given states that observation alone is not sufficient for a critical theory 
approach and that the observation should be supplemented with interviews, stating that, ‘the 
meaning of perceptions can be comprehended by researchers only by inquiring of the 
individuals’ (ibid. p.181). With this in mind, the methodological approach of the empirical study 
is to sequentially employ both methods (see subsequent research design and interview 
process subsections) to analyse the extent to which the Scottish independence referendum of 
2014 was characterised by elements of deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism, and 
also the role of pluralist group theory in aiding understanding of Twitter based activism during 
the campaign.  
 
The critical theory paradigm is, of course, not immune to criticism (see Edgar and Sedgewick 
2007; Kellner 1993; Norris 1992 amongst others). Freundlieb (2000) suggests a number of 
basic weaknesses in the theory, stating the most serious to be the dismissal of metaphysical 
philosophy in preference for only the empirical. Developing the first point, he goes on to state 
that limiting all philosophical assumptions to analysis of language is in itself limiting. The focus 
upon sociologism in critical theory, for Freundlieb, is also troubling in that, ‘it is by no means 
clear or obvious that the most pressing pathologies of contemporary western societies have 
social causes’ (ibid.). Edgar and Sedgewick (2007) meanwhile, refer to Christopher Norris, 
who was an early advocate of the theory in the 1980s. They state that Norris’ work, Uncritical 
Theory (1992) focuses in part upon the antirealism of critical theorists such as Baudrillard, 
suggesting that deconstruction in the name of critical theory had, ‘over stepped the boundaries 
of reason and ethical responsibility’ (Edgar and Sedgewick 2007 p.94).  The prevailing view 
of the Frankfurt School and those that were influenced by their view of technology as an 
instrument that should only be seen as negative force of domination, is challenged by 
Feenberg (1991). Feenberg finds both the Frankfurt school and Habermas’ later 
instrumentalist view of technology to be overly pessimistic and asserts that technological 
advancement can be a positive force for social transformation if its design, use, and practices 
are tailored accordingly.  
 
The strength of critical theory, however, is that it gives strong criteria for judging the workings 
of democracy by holding liberal democracy to its principles and showing how the principles 
are not fully achieved, and this can sequentially provide criteria for considering what might or 
should be done to remedy the situation. It is for this reason that critical theory has been chosen 
as a guiding philosophy for this project, in its aims to assess the contemporary socio-political 
implications of the internet and social media within the democratic process. 
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5.3 Qualitative research 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods were considered at the start of this project (Neuman 
and Robson 2014; Patton 2005; Berg 2004). In terms of quantitative research, there was some 
consideration of, for example, measuring traffic flows on Twitter in the run up to the 
independence referendum. It quickly became apparent, however, that a study which was 
attempting to explain online political communication behaviour over the duration of a political 
campaign culminating in a democratic vote, was overwhelmingly suited to a qualitative 
approach. As Miles and Huberman (1994) state: 
 
Qualitative data…are a source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations of 
processes in identifiable local contexts. With qualitative data one can preserve 
chronological flow, see precisely which events led to which consequences, and derive 
fruitful explanations…Words, especially organised into incidents or stories, have a 
concrete, vivid, meaningful flavour that often proves more convincing to a reader – 
another researcher, a policy maker, a practitioner – than pages of summarized 
numbers (Miles and Huberman 1994 p.1).  
 
The key determining factor, then, in deciding upon a qualitative design, was the desire to find 
explanations behind trends in political communication rather than simply produce and analyse 
numerical data.  As mentioned in the opening chapter and further detailed in section 4.6, the 
majority of studies in the specific subject area have taken a quantitative approach. There is 
therefore a comparative lack of qualitative research which subsequently means that there is 
therefore a lack of rich descriptions and explanations of processes as described in the 
previous quote taken from Miles and Huberman (ibid.). This study has been conceptualised 
as contributing towards this in a similar way to that of Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez (2011) 
in terms of its use in future quantitative studies. Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez’ (ibid.)  
prominent study focused upon the impact of web 2.0 and social media upon participation and 
civic engagement in the presidential election of 2008 which saw victory for Barack Obama in 
securing his first term of office.  Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez’ (2011) study was also 
qualitative and was conducted with an explicit intention of producing a conceptual framework 
that could aid understanding of events in the campaign.  They envisaged that the conceptual 
framework could then be utilised in later quantitative studies in the area.  Similarly, the core 
focus of this empirical study is to implement Freelon’s (2010) conceptual framework in 
assessing the modes and prevalence of identified classifications of political communication 
during the Scottish independence referendum 2014. The study then seeks to clarify if these 
modes are sufficient in their explanations or whether adapted/new models are required in this 
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regard.  This has again been done on the premise that the study can lay the foundations for 
future quantitative studies in different campaign settings.       
 
To be specific, the objectives are to assess the impact of social media upon three overlapping 
areas of democratic theory, namely, agonistic pluralism, deliberative democracy, and pluralist 
group theory. To guide this intention the project has two research questions: 
 
 
Table 4 Research questions 
 
 
 
The study is situated in the context of a particular narrative which was put forward by, though 
also personally disputed by, Hindman (2008): 
 
The internet is redistributing political influence, it is broadcasting the public sphere, 
increasing political participation, involving citizens in political activities that were closed 
to them, and challenging the monopoly of elites (Hindman 2008 p.6). 
 
5.4 Social media research paradigm 
At the beginning of the project in 2013, existing works regarding politics and social media 
could be divided into four distinct areas: those of elections, democracy, mobilisation and the 
burgeoning crossover and interdependency of traditional and new media. As regards Twitter 
and elections, the general questions posed concerned whether Twitter could be classed as 
an effective campaigning tool (Elmer 2013; Vergeer 2013; Larsson and Moe 2012). The 
debate around the democratising possibilities of the internet had received attention (Fuchs 
2017; Nilsson and Carlsson 2014; Sunstein 2009; Hindman 2008), whilst more recent works 
Primary Research Question
• How could you tell if the #indyref were characterised by 
deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism?
Supplementary Research Question
• How does pluralist group theory aid our understanding of Twitter 
based activism during the Scottish independence referendum 
2014?
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had focused upon the impact of internet 2.0 on political participation (Larsson 2013; Jackson 
and Lilleker 2009).  
 
Twitter as a fundamental tool in political activism was in the media spotlight from headlines 
relating to the Arab Spring uprisings and this received a generous amount of academic 
attention (Gleason 2013; Khondker 2011; Howard and Hussain 2011; Stepanova 2011). 
Whilst the subject of the impact of new media upon traditional media formats had been a 
prominent topic in academic literature in the fields of information technology, journalism, and 
media plurality (Bruns and Burgess 2012; Hong 2012; Kwak et al. 2010; Fuchs 2010; Ackland 
2009). Chapter 4 is devoted to media pluralism and a comprehensive discussion of the role of 
social media is also presented. 
 
5.5 Research design 
As defined by Jahoda et al. in Kumar, ‘a research design is the arrangement of conditions for 
collective analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose 
with economy in procedure’ (Kumar 2011 p.74). The challenge then is to identify the best 
method to fulfil the aims of the research given the limitations of the research project. Yin 
suggests that: 
 
The most important condition for differentiating among the various research methods 
is to classify the type of research questions being asked. In general, ‘what’ questions 
may either be exploratory or about prevalence. ‘How’ and ‘why’ questions are likely to 
favour the use of case studies, experiments or histories (Yin 2008 p.10) . 
 
This distinction led to the early choice of a mixed methods approach of observation, case 
studies, and interviews. Observation of Twitter was chosen as the best method to identify 
relevant themes and issues as the campaign unfolded particularly in a study such as this which 
is grounded in a critical theory research philosophy (Given 2008). This was particularly useful 
in staying true to qualitative methods whereby the project was led by the empirical data during 
the campaign. There were of course a number of prominent themes documented in existing 
literature which were expected to emerge but an approach which followed the debate, day by 
day, allowed for unexpected themes to be documented. Case studies were initially considered 
as a possible approach following the relatively significant event which became known as 
donorgate (see chapter 6). It was felt at the time that if a number of such events occurred, 
then a case study approach could provide a holistic method of exploring developments in the 
democratic process regarding social media activism. For reasons already mentioned, 
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interviews are methodologically vital within a study based upon critical theory in order to both 
foster reflective dialogue and triangulate events by exploring them in depth with relevant 
stakeholders (ibid.). 
 
As the Debate progressed, it became apparent that potential, significant events which would 
be suitable for use as case studies such as donorgate would be at best few and far between 
and at worst non-existent. As a result of this, a decision was made that the use of case studies 
should be dropped from the project. Instead it was decided that the issues that were being 
raised and identified through the observation of Twitter, in combination with an appropriate 
range of intensive interviews, would be suitable to deliver a robust analysis of proceedings. 
This choice of methods also reflected the preferred methodology in terms of a specific critical 
theory approach, as already noted with reference to Given (2008). As a result, the following 
choices were decided upon as a research design:  
 
 
 
Figure 11 Research design: Sequential triangulated multi-modal 
 
In practice, the research process was genuinely iterative in that not all the key data was 
identified through the observation of Twitter. Some issues and themes were first identified 
during the interview process, something that was only made possible by employing a semi-
structured approach which by design is employed to allow for themes to emerge in such a 
manner. A rigidly structured interview process would not have allowed for such events and 
would have been to the detriment of the quality and breadth of the data which was collected. 
When such themes emerged during interviews, these were triangulated through online 
research and catalogued with other relevant data. 
 
Qualitative, unobtrusive 
observation of Twitter
Findings
Qualitative offline 
interview
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5.6 Method for literature search 
The study covers four distinct subject areas and the literature search was also subdivided in 
this way: 
 
 Democracy 
 Political pluralism 
 Media pluralism 
 Social media 
 
Political pluralism (then subsequently agonistic pluralism and deliberative democracy) was 
identified very early in the study as being the key foundational theory emerging from the 
democratic literature.  Recognised early philosophical pluralist authors were focused upon to 
begin with. This approach focusing on the works of authors such as William James (1908) 
gave a grounding for the many sub theories of political pluralism. The establishment and 
maintenance of a clear line of thought that was relevant to the project was the major challenge 
of this section of the study. This was overcome by identifying key hypothesises such as by 
Dahl (2000) in relation to democracy, Kuhn (2007) in terms of the media in a democracy, and 
Hindman (2008) in relation to the role of social media in a democracy.  A similar pattern for 
the identification and retrieval of relevant literature in the fields of media pluralism and works 
in the emerging field of social media literature were also employed. Identification of key 
authors was the starting point, then once their key texts had been obtained, the reference lists 
again helped identify other relevant works. The literature review process dominated the first 
year of the project with certain articles and texts still being identified and used, though to a far 
lesser extent, through until the writing up stage of the study. 
 
The primary method for searching for democratic literature in the early part of the study 
involved the online library catalogue system at Robert Gordon University, in order to obtain 
detailed texts which could provide a comprehensive understanding of relevant political 
theories and concepts. The strategy in terms of searching the library database and subsequent 
other databases such as Sage Journals, was to begin with broad subject search terms such 
as ‘history of deliberative democracy’ and then to introduce searches encompassing the 
specific research topics such as ‘developments of deliberative democracy and social media’.  
For more targeted results, once the aims had been established, exact phrases were searched 
for, such as ‘examples of deliberation on Twitter’ and then Boolean searches were used to 
access more refined results such as ‘(deliberation OR deliberating) AND (Twitter OR Tweeting 
OR Tweets) and derivations thereof.  The research strategy when using databases such as 
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those already mentioned, was to conduct a general search across all disciplines and then 
refine these depending upon the results and the specific focus of the search in question.  For 
example, a general search of Sage Journals was then refined to specific subject areas of 
‘social sciences and humanities’ for articles based in political science or ‘communication and 
media studies’ for media-based approaches.  In addition to Sage Journals, Web of Science 
was also often used and, using the same process, Web of Science would offer different subject 
categories by which to refine the most frequently used being ‘political science’ and 
‘communication’.  A third database which was utilised in the same manner was Springer Link, 
which could be refined to ‘political science’ and, most usefully ‘political communication’. 
  
Journal databases provided the facility to set custom date ranges for results which was useful 
in identifying older texts for foundation theories and more recent articles for contemporary 
viewpoints. As already detailed in previous chapters, both democracy and broader notions of 
pluralism can be traced back over centuries rather than decades, and therefore substantial 
text books which document their individual iterations were easily accessible via RGU library 
searches.  However, the less mature subject area of deliberative democracy and media 
pluralism required a more targeted approach.  For example, searches for foundational theories 
of deliberative democracy were focused upon databases including Web of Science with date 
ranges from the 1980s to the turn of the century, whilst contemporary articles were searched 
for by restricting the date range to the year, or the months, preceding the date that the research 
was carried out.  As the issue of media plurality as a consequence of media de-regulation and 
commodification, driven by neo-liberalism, is the philosophical grounding of the study, for 
earlier works it was appropriate to search within a time-range between 1980 and 1995.  As 
the subject area is wide ranging, to be able to target specific literature, alternative search terms 
such as ‘the media and democracy’ were found to be more productive in terms of useful search 
results.  Again, contemporary articles were searched for by restricting the search terms to a 
relatively short period of time prior to the date of the research exercise, and widening the 
search if there was a paucity of material returned by the initial searches. 
 
As already noted, the volume and breadth of democratic literature meant that resources were 
plentiful, but the challenge was, once overarching principles had been established, to narrow 
the concept down into relevant elements of the theory. A key tool in doing this was to be led 
by the citations and bibliographies of the primary texts that were used. This citation chaining 
simplified the process for finding appropriate literature in the democratic sub-theories. These 
would either be books that could be sourced again from RGU library or, if they were not held 
there, these were occasionally obtained through the RGU inter-library loans system.  In 
addition to databases, Google Scholar also played a vital role in obtaining more targeted 
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relevant literature, particularly in searching for more recent material relating to deliberative 
democracy, agonistic pluralism, and material relating to the emergence of social media in a 
democratic context.  As the search for more targeted literature increased, Google Scholar was 
used to identify gaps from initial searches and was particularly useful in that the credibility of 
search results is immediately apparent through the presence of the number of citations being 
contained in the headline search results.  New Media & Society and Information, 
Communication & Society were particularly useful journals throughout the social media 
literature review. 
 
5.7 Data collection method –Twitter, blogs and other digital sources 
From the beginning of the study an initial seed list of Twitter accounts was ‘followed’ using a 
new Twitter account created in anticipation of the project. The accounts were deliberately 
chosen as was envisaged would be the case of a non-affiliated observer with an interest in 
the Scottish Independence referendum debate. The two official campaign accounts and those 
of First Minister Alex Salmond and the head of the Better Together campaign Alistair Darling 
were chosen, along with two activist accounts with a small number of followers from both sides 
(neither of these accounts developed into anything notable and latterly did not feature in the 
study) as well as a celebrity led group.  
 
As the observation progressed a snowballing sampling technique (Browne 2005) was 
employed, which meant more accounts were followed as would be the likely organic 
progression of anyone else following the debate on Twitter. The accounts included news 
organisations, journalists, bloggers, independent activist campaigns, affiliated activist 
campaigns, dedicated university observation accounts, newspaper and magazine accounts, 
social movements and government accounts. In total, by the time of the final vote around 100 
accounts had been followed (see appendix 1).  
 
Care was taken to ensure a balanced number of accounts from each side of the debate were 
focused upon in order to avoid any potential accusations of bias. There were of course many 
more accounts which could have been followed but the intention was to only follow a total 
number of accounts which could be realistically, rigorously analysed by a solo researcher. 
These accounts were monitored on a daily basis from early March 2013 until the end of 
December 2014.  
 
To aid the gathering of data, a service titled The Referendum Daily provided by 
pressdata.co.uk was subscribed to. The company, in return for a fee, provided a service of 
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delivering daily information via email to subscribers detailing activity on social media, the 
printed press, television, radio and blogs regarding the independence referendum: 
 
 
Figure 12 Screenshot from The Referendum daily (2014) 
 
Methods for online data handling were planned at the beginning of the data collection process. 
Approximately 210,000 Tweets were read during a collection period of 18 months, 193 of 
which (see table 5) were selected for further analysis based upon strict selection criteria 
themes, and topics to be discussed during the interview process in line with critical theory 
research philosophy (Given 2008), and these were then stored in digital folders.  Hard copies 
of the Tweets and articles linked to the tweets where appropriate, were printed off in hard copy 
format and catalogued by date in box files on a weekly basis. These were then used to identify 
issues which were relevant to the study. In the early days of the project, relevant to the study, 
meant they related to issues that had already been identified in the literature review process 
such as, for example, Tweets that related to trolling. Other Tweets deemed relevant were ones 
that linked to blogs or newspaper articles such as the role of identity in the referendum 
campaign. As time progressed there were also new topics which arose organically and had 
not necessarily been foreseen as likely to occur from existing literature. For example, the 
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perceived rebirth of the town hall meeting became apparent and itself became a topic of 
discussion between the members of online communities and then in the mainstream media 
and the BBC. 
 
The tweets and articles were catalogued with similar examples of identified issues and 
provided evidence which was later used in the results chapters of the thesis. Additionally, the 
catalogued Tweets in digital folders could be electronically identified using keyword searches 
and again used in the results sections of the thesis. The catalogued Tweets and articles also 
provided a basis for identifying the three key demographic groups, namely activists, MSPs, 
and journalists within the referendum debate.  
 
Following the identification of the three main stakeholder groups, the key activist groups 
participating in the online debate were identifiable. Once identified, shortlists of potential 
interviewees from the three groups were compiled and approached to participate in the study. 
The body of evidence from the catalogued Tweets and articles was also instrumental in 
identifying the subjects to be discussed during the interview process. Once key account 
holders had been identified, such as the official campaigns, their leaders and the key activist 
groups, the numbers of followers they had and also the number of accounts that they 
themselves followed, were also chronologically catalogued on a weekly basis. This was 
important to be able to identify the progression of interest in the respective accounts as the 
debate unfolded. 
 
5.8 Data collection method –traditional press 
Earlier in the project, an initial consideration to test the impact of social media upon the 
democratic process was to contrast the reporting of events on social media sites in comparison 
to the traditional press. This was at a stage when the methodological approach of the overall 
project was undecided and discourse analysis was being considered to ascertain if social 
media reporting was improving the democratic process or not, in terms of its lack of restriction 
as it operates free from the commercial interests of traditional news organisations. 
 
This approach was eventually decided against in favour of concentrating upon identifying 
specific issues, events, and topics for detailed analysis for example, issues of trolling and 
instances of significant mobilisation. The reason for this decision was primarily based upon 
the notion that these previously documented issues, alongside new ones, when interpreted 
through a unique setting of a Scottish independence referendum, would make a more 
important academic contribution than an approach restricted to discourse analysis. This still 
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required structured monitoring of the traditional press in combination with social media 
monitoring. Scottish newspapers such as The Herald and The Daily Record along with 
Scottish editions of The Daily Mail, The Sun, The Times, The Mirror, The Telegraph, the 
Guardian and The Independent were chosen to give a balanced spread of tabloids and 
broadsheets.  
 
Newspaper databases such as LexisNexis and International News Stand were to be used to 
search for articles to contrast with coverage of the same stories in blogs and Twitter (often 
highlighted by The Referendum Daily as detailed in the previous subsection), and latterly to 
identify issues as previously discussed. It was presumed that this would be a simple process 
of searching for articles via search terms such as ‘SNP independence white paper’, however, 
what soon became apparent was that accessing specific Scottish editions of UK titles was far 
from straight forward. In publication searches within International News Stand there are 
thousands of available titles ranging from The Bombay Times to The Hackney Gazette, 
however, when searching for example for The Scottish Daily Mail, there was no such title to 
be found, although Scotland specific titles such as The Daily Record were easily accessible. 
 
Assuming that there must be a simple answer to the problem, a meeting was arranged with 
the senior librarian for the RGU Business School. The librarian had a detailed understanding 
of both LexisNexis and International News Stand but had not come across this issue before. 
It was decided that it was not possible to access such titles and suggested that a different 
approach should be taken, and contact was made with The Scottish National Library and the 
British Library for suggestions of other ways of accessing titles digitally. Again, however, no 
solution to the problem was found and it became apparent that the only way to access this 
information was to plan visits to the Central Aberdeen Library and manually search historic 
copies of the chosen titles, a procedure which would be significantly onerous and would be 
likely to mean a revision of overall planned activity with the research design. Consequently, 
the only option was to use national titles via databases and Google searches which largely 
restricted content to digital UK editions. 
 
It is important to note that a decision was taken early in the project in keeping with the 
qualitative approach, to search for articles relating to specific targeted exemplars of content 
initially based upon both general occurrences and significant topics, which could be 
categorised as those which fulfilled Kuhn’s five functions of the media (2007) (as discussed 
earlier and also in the following subsection relating to interview structure and anonymity) and 
latterly the units of analysis contained in Freelon’s Model of Democratic Communication 
(2010) (see subsection 5.11).  The focus was to compile deliberative and agonistic 
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occurrences during the debate rather than compiling and analysing a random time-based 
sample.  Additionally, a broader range of literature in both the traditional and new media was 
collected detailing the major events and general story of the referendum which could then later 
be used to make a secondary search on Twitter to compare how the social media debate 
played out in comparison to traditional sources.  When Freelon’s Model of Democratic 
Communication (2010) was identified, the existing sample and additional sources were 
collected that fitted not only with deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism, but also 
liberal individualist and communitarian behaviour, in order to adequately test Freelon’s model 
against the reality of the independence referendum debate. 
 
In a similar method to that employed to collate the data collected from Twitter, relevant articles 
from the printed press were saved digitally and also printed out in hard copy and catalogued 
together with the Twitter data. The collection of Tweets, digital articles, and articles from the 
traditional press were then segmented into the units of analysis taken from Freelon (2010) 
(see data analysis section). This provided a valuable, chronological, timeline of events and 
issues as the debate progressed which was subsequently instrumental in the data analysis 
section of the study. Formalised data collection from both traditional press sources and Twitter 
began in November 2013 and ceased at the end of January 2015, however, certain reflective 
works beyond this date were also considered as part of the study.  The following table details 
the number of Tweets, digital articles, and traditional press articles chosen for further analysis, 
segmented by unit of analysis: 
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Unit of Analysis Tweets Blogs/digital 
articles 
Traditional 
press articles 
Total 
Monologue 16 11 15 42 
Personal revelation 9 6 4 19 
Personal showcase 14 3 0 17 
Flaming 38 28 16 82 
Ideological 
fragmentation 
10 7 4 21 
Mobilisation 28 17 7 52 
Community language 19 20 2 41 
Intra-ideological 
questioning/reciprocity 
18 11 3 32 
Rational-critical 
argument 
13 7 8 28 
Public issue focus - - - - 
Equality 23 26 4 53 
Discussion topic focus - - - - 
Inter-ideological 
questioning/reciprocity 
5 3 2 10 
Total 193 139 65  
 
Table 5 Data variables segmented by unit of analysis 
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5.9 Identification of research subject demographics  
The identification of activist groups which were having a meaningful impact upon the 
democratic process within the Scottish independence referendum debate, was a key factor in 
the development of the methodology within the study. The activist groups concerned were 
identified during the observation of Twitter in the early part of the project. The groups were 
chosen firstly based upon the fact that they were primarily or completely based online, in order 
to test the suggestion regarding the impact of the internet on the democratic process, put 
forward by Hindman (2008) and discussed earlier, as opposed to a secondary platform for 
existing offline organisations. Other factors taken into consideration were that they were 
grassroots in nature, meaning without explicit links to the official campaign. This was important 
to primarily test the assertion that the internet is redistributing political influence as opposed 
to again merely providing another media platform for existing social elites. The choice of 
groups was also based upon the quality and quantity of their online interactions as well as 
their number of Twitter followers.  Below, are brief synopses of the groups focused upon within 
the study, the figure in brackets is the number of Twitter followers at the date of the referendum 
vote in September 2014. 
 
 National Collective (19,100) – National Collective (who effectively ceased to exist post-
referendum) formed as a cause group in support of Scottish independence upon the 
announcement of the independence referendum. The group generally consisted of 
young people, many of whom were students with links to the arts and creative 
communities.  
 
 Women for Independence (17,100) – Women for Independence were also formed to 
support independence during the referendum campaign. The group continued to 
campaign post-referendum, mainly upon feminist issues (under the theme of 
Independence for Women). The group founders were experienced political activists 
and included Natalie McGarry who was elected as an SNP MSP but was forced to 
resign the party whip following an enquiry into WFI finances post-referendum. The 
group attracted an impressive number of followers, at the time of writing almost 23,000 
on Twitter, mainly composed of women who had little or no political experience prior 
to the referendum (in the words of one of their founder members expressed during an 
interview with myself). 
 
 Wings Over Scotland (23,300) – Wings was another group formed in contemplation of 
the independence referendum of 2014 and also continues to campaign post-
Chapter 5 – Methodology 94 
 
referendum. The group, which is the sole enterprise of the self-titled Rev Stuart 
Campbell has a numerically impressive Twitter following (43,000 at the time of writing) 
which is the largest of all the groups focused upon within the study. Wings is a 
controversial group and received both high praise for tireless campaigning and the 
success of some campaign publications, in particular The Wee Blue Book, which 
purported to provide truths around alleged misinformation and so-called scare stories 
labelled as project fear, so long as they were to the detriment of the Unionist argument 
and not the nationalist side. 
 
 Bella Caledonia (20,500) – Bella existed prior to the independence referendum, and 
as such had broader interests than the independence referendum itself, including 
ecology, community, social justice, innovation and media, international affairs and 
movements, and arts and culture. The group was started by Mike Small and Kevin 
Williams in 2007 (and latterly with external contributors) both of whom were 
experienced writers. During the independence referendum campaign, the group 
dedicated practically all of its time to supporting the independence cause and were 
notable as providing rational critical arguments in a way that the other groups perhaps 
did not. 
 
 Other notable groups – Radical Independence, Newsnet Scotland, and Common 
Weal. Whilst these groups made an important contribution to the Yes Scotland online 
movement, due to time limitations of the project, these were focused upon to a lesser 
extent than the other groups in question.  
 
Activists were obvious as a targeted choice of research subject demographic as they were a 
distinct body of individuals who were required to be focused upon to ascertain if, in line with 
Hindman’s assertion, the internet was redistributing political influence, increasing participation 
and involving citizens who were previously closed off from the political process. Similarly, 
groups had to be identified and focused upon in order to primarily answer the second research 
question regarding the relevance of pluralist group theory in the era of the internet and social 
media. Journalists could specifically offer a vital perspective on the impact of social media 
upon the traditional media and answer the many accusations which were laid at their door, 
including those detailed in the theory section of the thesis and from many proponents of new 
media whose viewpoints were encountered during the study.  
 
MSPs were able to give a first-hand perspective upon the impact that social media was having 
upon our democratic representatives, for example, to ascertain if the existing political elites 
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were being held to account by social media in a way that they previously were not. All three 
groups were then used to help answer more general questions of how they communicated 
online, which contributed to areas such as the primary research question around the 
propensity for social media as a space for deliberation or a more agonistic public sphere. 
Journalists and MSPs were shortlisted and then subsequently approached, based upon the 
level and quality of their Twitter output, as it was important to interview those who had a 
genuine commitment to using the platform during the referendum campaign.  
 
5.10 The Interview process 
Interviews with identified stakeholders form a key element of a critical theory research 
philosophy (Given 2008) which underpins the choice of research methods within the study. 
Interviewing as a construct for data collection has both advantages and disadvantages, as do 
all other methodologies (Brinkmann and Kvale 2014; Rowley 2012; King, Cassel and Symon 
1994). Advantages include the ability to analyse more complex situations in depth, while 
questions can be explained in more detail to ensure subject understanding, and information 
gained from the observation of Twitter could be supplemented with data provided by the 
interviewees. Disadvantages include quality of data being dependent upon the quality of the 
interaction, and quality being dependent upon the ability of an inexperienced interviewer, and 
also the possibility of complications presented by either interviewer/interviewee bias (Kumar 
2011). 
 
Thirteen interviews with the three distinct groups were carried out to enable triangulation of 
the data sourced online and to give the opportunity to examine, in some depth, the major 
issues identified firstly in theory, and secondly online, as is requisite in critical theory. The 
three groups were activist groups, professional journalists (both from the written press and 
television) and members of the Scottish Parliament.  In addition to this, a policy officer based 
at Holyrood with previous experience as a social media officer was interviewed as well as an 
aide to a former Party Leader who had campaigned during the independence referendum. 
The breakdown was as follows – six MSPs; two party workers; three journalists and two 
activists. The shortlisting criteria for the interview subjects was primarily based upon their 
presence on Twitter.  The prevalence and quality of their Twitter output was an important 
consideration in that those that seemed less than committed users of the platform were not 
considered.  For example, accounts were omitted from shortlisting if they only used Twitter as 
a one-way broadcasting medium in favour of those accounts where there was evidence of 
genuine interaction with other users.  Furthermore, if accountholders failed to follow more than 
100 other accounts they were also omitted from the shortlist, as this again suggested a failure 
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to seriously engage through the platform.  Further criteria included ensuring the inclusion of 
views from MSPs on both sides of the referendum debate and from different political parties. 
With representatives from the SNP, Labour, and Conservative parties all being included, this 
made a total of six in favour of Better Together and two in support of Yes Scotland. Similarly, 
a representation of journalists from both sides of the debate were shortlisted with the end 
result being two journalists who backed the Union and one in support of independence.   
 
The main challenge regarding the interviews was the difficulty in identifying activist groups in 
support of the Better Together campaign, not because they would not willingly participate but 
because they simply did not exist in the form in which they did on the Yes Scotland side of the 
debate. It also proved to be extremely difficult to gain access to activists from the Yes Scotland 
side and this was the main frustration during the data collection part of the project. Activists 
from Bella Caledonia and Women for Independence represented the two groups interviewed. 
Wings Over Scotland twice agreed to a telephone interview (all other interviews were done in 
person) as Wings is based in Bath, England, but these never saw fruition as Wings failed to 
reply to emails. It was subsequently offered that the interview be conducted in Bath, such was 
the perceived value of interviewing Wings, based upon the impact of the group during the 
online referendum debate, but again this failed to elicit a response. Many efforts were made 
to contact National Collective, but the group simply did not respond to these requests. Radical 
Independence were the third group to be approached for interview, but this again never came 
to fruition.  
 
The impact of the paucity of interviews from the activist population was overcome by utilising 
the manner in which the activist groups acted in an unrestricted manner on Twitter in 
comparison to MSPs and journalists. MSPs had to adhere to the restrictions which their 
positions in public office place upon them when using social media. Similarly, the journalists 
interviewed were constricted in their online activity by their professional employment 
obligations. The grassroots activist groups, however, and particularly the likes of Wings Over 
Scotland, lived their lives online in a way in which was not the case with MSPs and journalists. 
This often manifested itself as what was practically a running commentary of their lives, both 
personal and with regards to their activism. This provided a detailed picture of their thoughts 
and activities which revealed themselves in a way that was far removed from that of the other 
two populations. In this regard it was far more important to have fulfilled interviews with MSPs 
and journalists to be able to make qualitative judgements which positively contributed to the 
overall study.  
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5.10.1 Interview structure - anonymity 
The interviews were semi-structured (Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006; Drever 1995) and 
altered to gain the most from the interviewee dependent on the stakeholder group which they 
originated from (see appendix 2 for interview prompts/questions).  For example, when 
interviewing MSPs, it was appropriate to focus upon the manner in which the different parties 
on both sides of the debate used social media and the perceived impact this had upon their 
role in this campaign compared to previous offline campaigns.  More appropriate to the study 
when interviewing activist groups, was for example, to explore the manner in which their own 
group was formulated and evolved in line with pluralist group theory. There was, of course, 
some commonality in interview questions regarding matters which crossed over the different 
groupings, for example, accusations of online bullying during the campaign. As a starting point 
for compiling the semi-structured interviews, the following proposition (detailed in chapter 4) 
of the role of the media in a modern liberal democracy, was used to maintain a guiding focus 
true to the objectives of the project: 
 
 The role of information provider. 
 A part of the agenda setting process. 
 The role of public watchdog. 
 A driver of political mobilization. 
 A means of regime legitimation (Kuhn 2007 p.21) 
 
There was also a conscious effort made during the interviews to be conversational in terms of 
not rigidly restricting interview questioning to only the predetermined subject areas and 
questions. This allowed for different subjects to emerge and then be developed where it 
seemed appropriate in-line with qualitative interview theory.  Anonymity was granted to all 
participants therefore within the results chapters, activists are coded A1 – A2, journalists J1 – 
J3 and MSPs and party staff M1 – M8. Anonymity was something which seemed to have a 
major impact upon the willingness of the interviewees to be open and honest in their responses 
(particularly with MSPs and their staff). Without such expressed guarantees there seems little 
doubt that the quality of the data obtained would have been hugely impacted upon. All 
interviews were conducted in person in preference to telephone or video conferencing. The 
personal, face to face setting, intuitively gained a much quicker and stronger rapport with the 
interviewees which in turn led to productive interviews in which the participants appeared at 
greater ease and more willing to share detailed information. 
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Each interview was arranged with the individual in question on the basis of a 45-minute time 
slot. However, in practice many of the interviews ran for over an hour. Each interview was 
captured using an audio-recorder in order to allow the conversation to flow smoothly without 
the distraction of manual note taking and to also ensure no details were missed. Interviews 
which took place later in the process began to markedly decline in length and when combined 
with the multitude of data collected from Twitter observation, this was an indication that 
saturation point was being approached.  Saturation point is described as the point in qualitative 
research whereby ‘the evidence is so repetitive that there is no need to continue’ (Baker, 
Edwards and Doige 2012). This signalled that the interview part of the process was reaching 
a point where the interviews could stop, and the data could be prepared for analysis. 
 
5.11 Data analysis – (directed) content analysis 
 
Following examination of the numerous options for data analysis (Ritchie et al. 2013; De Vaus 
and de Vaus 2001; Miles and Huberman 1994; Patton 1990; Weber 1990) directed content 
analysis was chosen as the preferred method.  Content analysis, in both its basic form and as 
directed content analysis, fits well with a critical theory research philosophy in that ‘content 
analysis is a flexible research method for analysing texts and describing and interpreting the 
written artefacts of a society’ (White and Marsh 2006 in Beach et al. 2009 p.129). This is 
particularly appropriate to this study due to the proliferation of different ‘artefacts’ collected 
from Twitter, blogs, and other electronic sources and also the traditional press and 
transcriptions of the research interviews. Similarly, Weber (1990 p.5), in a way that again 
matches the types of data collected in this project, suggests that ‘social scientists who must 
make sense of historical documents, newspaper stories, political speeches, open-ended 
interviews…to name a few – will find the technique indispensable’.  Content analysis has also 
been described as having advantages in preference to other analytical approaches as ‘it 
allows a closeness to text which can alternate between specific categories and relationships’ 
(CSU 2018).  This again corresponds with this study in the way that it is focused explicitly 
upon the categorisation of data in relation to a number of different strands and models of 
political communication. Another attributed benefit of content analysis, which also tallies with 
the approach of this study, particularly concerning initial data collected from Twitter, is the 
manner in which content analysis is suggested to be particularly suited to unobtrusive research 
methods (ibid). 
 
Directed content analysis ‘is guided by a more structured process than in a conventional 
content analysis approach. Using existing theory or prior research, researchers begin by 
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identifying key concepts or variables as initial coding categories’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005 
p.1281). This is appropriate to this study as part of its central aim is to test existing 
strands/models of democratic communication against the data collected during the #indyref.  
The coding categories to the primary research question are discussed in detail in the following 
sections. This was initially done by formalising data categories in line with an abductive 
reasoning approach, whereby the pertinent themes were identified through analysis of the 
literature included in the theory section of the thesis and also from the research interviews. 
This approach can be classed as abductive as the themes identified did not guarantee any 
conclusions, as would be the case with a deductive reasoning approach. The research 
approach, for instance, took the form of broader categories of data relating to deliberation and 
agonism and data which could be appropriated to one or more of Kuhn’s five functions of the 
media (2007). These broader categories of data were then finally pared down at a later date 
into the sections and indicative units included in Freelon’s (2010) model of online democratic 
communication (these will be discussed in section 5.13).   
 
Nvivo software was used to collate and analyse data. Nvivo software is specifically designed 
for qualitative research and can be used to store, analyse, and model data collected across 
different mediums. Nvivo was also used in the transcription of all the interview recordings, and 
this was done by uploading interview recordings on to the database and then manually typing 
the recordings as the audio was played back.  Although this technique takes some time, it 
facilitates the researcher to become immersed in the data and also allowed specific highlights 
in the data to be appropriately tagged and easily re-engaged with at the appropriate time in 
the analysis process.  
 
Led by the literature review in the earlier parts of the study, it was decided that the empirical 
project should focus upon the consideration of both deliberative and agonistic theory during 
the independence referendum campaign. This was an organic process as it quickly became 
apparent that there was a paucity of any kind of genuine deliberation during proceedings on 
Twitter.  The more conflictual nature of overall proceedings resonated better with agonistic 
theory and particularly that of Chantal Mouffe in On the Political (2005). This was later 
confirmed during the data allocation process relating to Freelon’s (2010) model which was 
limited to three approaches, namely – liberal individualist, communitarian, and deliberative.  At 
this stage, all the existing data from Twitter, the traditional press, and the interviews was 
manually reallocated into groups relating to each of Freelon’s units of analysis (see section 
5.13).   Though the data fitted into these categories to one extent or another, the lack of an 
agonistic strand of the model seemed inappropriate.  Such a combined approach of 
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deliberation and agonism has been proposed by others in the field such as Karppinen, Moe 
and Svensson (2008) who suggest: 
 
Consensus and conflict are two co-existing impulses of political communication and 
political life in general…not disregarding differences [between consensus and 
agonism] we argue that an openness to potential combinations of the two approaches 
might have positive implications for media and communication research (Karppinen, 
Moe and Svensson 2008 p.11).  
 
In order to support this analytical strategy, it was important to produce a robust methodology, 
and as already touched upon, this was derived from the work of Deen G. Freelon in Analyzing 
online political discussion using three models of democratic communication (2010) (again, see 
the following section).   
  
The supplementary research question explores the relevance of pluralist group theory in 
relation to Twitter use during the Scottish independence referendum 2014. This question 
stands separate to the primary research question, as detailed earlier in this chapter, with 
regard to data analysis. Initially, the method of analysis for this question was to simply add 
another unit of analysis in addition to those in Freelon’s model and assess the data related to 
theoretical debates around group theory, particularly those identified in Dahl’s seminal work 
in the area – Who Governs? (2005). Further detailed analysis resulted in a more specific 
coding scheme taken from Dahl and Lindblom’s Politics Economics and Welfare (1976), where 
the authors identify five distinct political effects of social/interest groups: 
 
1. They are more effective than individuals  
2. They facilitate healthy political competition 
3. The group bargaining process creates a barrier to extremism 
4. Overlapping memberships of social groups discourages unilateral thought and action 
5. Extensive pluralist networks help to ensure the spread of information (Dahl and 
Lindblom (1976 p.302-305) 
 
This maintained a very specific focus on applying data to theoretical work in the subject field 
in the same way that the coding and analysis relating to the primary research question had 
with the use of Freelon’s (2010) model.  In addition to this, one further category was added to 
the process regarding group/state personality, as generally appropriated to the works of the 
English pluralists such as Laski, Cole, and Figgis (see chapter 3). This was through a desire 
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to assess if the phenomenon of social media had changed classical conceptions of the 
relationship between the state and its citizens.   
 
5.12 Data analysis - coding  
 
This section provides a critique of existing approaches to coding qualitative research data in 
the field of political communication with a particular focus upon studies which have sought to 
identify online deliberation, culminating with an explanation of the reasons that Freelon (2010) 
was ultimately chosen as the preferred model for the coding and analysis of the research data. 
 
A code, as pertaining to qualitative research has been defined as ‘most often a word or short 
phrase that symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence capturing, and/or evocative 
attribute for a portion of language based or visual data’ (Saldana 2009 p.3) Coding as a 
research process is the organising of data to be able to effectively conduct research analysis 
and evaluation, which if done effectively, ought to enhance the likelihood of producing robust 
results and conclusions.  As Strauss (1987 p.27 in Saldana 2009 p.1) states, ‘any researcher 
who wishes to become proficient at doing qualitative analysis must learn to code well and 
easily. The excellence of the research rests in large part on the excellence of the coding’.   The 
principal focus of this study is the question of how could you tell if the #indyref was 
characterised by deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. A methodological starting 
point in doing so is to focus upon existing academic literature which relates to the coding of 
social media with the purpose of recognising and evaluating, firstly, coding relating to 
deliberative democracy. 
 
There is a distinct body of coding literature which has developed as social media has 
increasingly become a recognised arena of political communication.  A number of these 
studies have focused upon coding online political communication for purposes other than 
identifying the presence of deliberative democracy, as is the focus of this study.  These studies 
do, however, provide insight into a selection of coding methods which can be considered as 
appropriate methodological designs for research projects focused more broadly upon online 
political dialogue.  Such studies are predominantly focused upon election campaigning and 
also the utilisation of social media platforms, such as Twitter, by elected politicians. 
 
A number of such studies have built upon Banwart’s (2002) Webstyle content analysis coding 
scheme, which was developed as a means of assessing gender difference of candidate self-
presentation to potential voters through online political advertising. This extensive scheme 
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includes 58 categories which consist of 212 variables (ibid. p.297-238).  Trammell et al. (2006) 
used an expanded version of the scheme to analyse political blog content, with Wang (2010) 
again applying the model in assessing online political discourse during Taiwan’s 2008 general 
election campaign.  Other approaches in assessing online dialogue include those at the other 
end of the spectrum in terms of the level of categorisation and analysis.  Grant, Moon and 
Busby-Grant (2010 p.584) building upon Leavitt et al. (2009) took a broader approach by 
limiting initial coding categories to those of, ‘broadcast’, ‘broadcast mention’, ‘reply’ and 
‘retweet’ in an assessment of Australian politicians’ use of Twitter.  In a quantitative study 
focused upon social media use in the Swiss national election of 2011, Klinger (2013 p.724) 
again preferred a limited coding scheme with primary cluster categories restricted to 
‘information’, ‘mobilisation’, ‘participation’ and ‘other’. Secondary coding in the study then 
identified sub-clusters of, ‘information’, ‘mass-media references’ and ‘transparency’.  Golbeck, 
Grimes and Rogers (2010 p.1614-1615) used a slightly more targeted approach in assessing 
Twitter use by US Congress members, with six categories of ‘direct communication’, ‘personal 
message’, ‘activities’, ‘information’, ‘requesting action’, ‘fundraising’ and ‘unknown'. In a later 
study of the Twitter feeds of Scottish MPs between 2008 and 2010, Margaretten and Gaber 
(2012) coded MPs’ tweets as:  
 
Hashtags for evidence of topic diversity; @signs for indications of direct conversations 
with constituents; RT for retweets, ostensibly to offer additional points of view to the 
group; URLs for evidence of promoting engagement and mentions for calling attention 
to another user in the conversation (ibid. p.337). 
 
In a more recent study, again focusing upon politicians in Scotland, though this time analysing 
MSPs’ use of Twitter, Baxter, Marcella, and O’Shea (2016 p.447) took a more granular 
approach by initially using four broad categories similar to those already mentioned, but then 
segmenting data across a further 31 subcategories. 
 
Whilst the works previously mentioned give an insight into broader studies of online political 
communication, more pertinent to this study are those within a growing body of literature that 
is unambiguously focused upon coding schemes which can be utilised to identify online 
deliberation.  As early as 1998, Wilhelm devised deliberative coding categories in a study 
which asked how deliberative online discussion is within Usenet newsgroups. These were 
based around the principles of Habermasian rational argument (see chapter two), which is 
also the theoretical basis of a number of the subsequent models which were developed by 
authors in later studies.  Lincoln Dahlberg’s prominent study (2001) coded deliberation in 
categories of, ‘exchange and critique of reasoned moral-practical validity claims’, ‘reflexivity’, 
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‘ideal role taking’, ‘sincerity’, ‘discursive inclusion and equality’ and ‘autonomy from state and 
economic power’.  Graham and Witschge (2003), were writing at perhaps the peak of 
increased optimism regarding the potential for the internet and social media to foster online 
political deliberation.  Their study sought to ‘develop a method for examining the extent to 
which internet forums meet the normative requirements of rational-critical debate, reciprocity 
and reflexivity’ (ibid. p173).  Trenel (2004) formulated a detailed coding scheme that comprised 
of, ‘equality’, ‘rationality’, ‘respect’, ‘constructiveness’, ‘interactivity’, ‘personal experience’, 
‘emotional balance’ and ‘reflexiveness’.  Janssen and Kies (2005 p.326-330), presented an 
overview of existing research which evaluates the quality of online political discussions with 
which they aimed to operationalise methods of measuring online deliberation.  The coding 
characteristics they identified, followed what was becoming an emerging pattern, including, 
‘reciprocity’, ‘justification’, and ‘reflexivity’.  However, they also included codes of, ‘ideal role 
taking’, ‘sincerity’, ‘inclusion and discursive equality’, and ‘autonomy from state and economic 
power’. 
 
In an inductive study which sought to depart from  deductive notions of deliberation, typically 
taken from theoretical standpoint of authors such as Habermas, as already mentioned, 
Mansbridge et al. (2006 p.18-34) identified coding categories of, ‘reason and emotion’, which 
was a nuanced but important departure from ‘rationality’, alongside ‘common good vs. 
common ground’, ‘free flow’ and also three separate facets of equality, those being, ‘extensive 
and inclusive participation in discussion’, ‘self-facilitation and group control’ and ‘fair 
representation of views’.  Stromer-Galley (2007 p.4-7) devised a coding scheme which was 
designed to measure deliberation in both face-to-face and online settings.  The coding scheme 
consisted of, ‘reasoned opinion expression’, ‘disagreement’, ‘equality’, ‘topic’ and 
‘engagement’. In a significantly more detailed dialogical framework, devised by Graham 
(2008), a three-phase process was formulated and is detailed in the following diagram: 
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Table 6 Coding Scheme Overview (Graham 2008) 
 
The three distinct phases of the coding scheme were designed to firstly identify message 
types, followed by sub-categorisation of ‘reasoned’, ‘non-reasoned’, and ‘non-claim’ replies, 
with the final phase assessing, ‘communicative empathy’, ‘discursive equality’, ‘discursive 
freedom’ and ‘sincerity’.  Most recently, Halpern and Gibbs (2013 p.12-13) focused upon the 
likelihood of both Facebook and YouTube as catalysts for online deliberation.  In doing so, 
they included codes of ‘logic and reasoning’, ‘conversational coherence’, ‘equality of 
participation’, ‘politeness’, ‘civility’ and ‘message length’. 
 
In summary, these different approaches to coding online deliberative democracy tend to be 
based upon Habermasian concepts of rationality, reciprocity, reflexivity and derivations of 
equality.  In contrast, more granular coding schemes which take a more detailed discursive 
approach include numerous further codes which deconstruct types of arguments and 
responses, as well as levels of communicative sincerity.  It is important to note, however, that 
the authors of these studies found some significant difficulties with operationalising such 
coding categories.  For example, a common issue was the difficulty in assessing reflexivity 
within a discussion as reflection, in most cases, probably takes place outside of the discussion 
forum as individuals reflect on the points made by others, which potentially renders reflexivity 
as intangible within the textual data posted in the online forum.  Authors such as Given (2008 
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p.26) sought to overcome this through considering rebuttals and refutes to incorporate a 
certain level of reflection, this, however, could be classed as a tenuous assumption in terms 
of genuine rational reflection upon the issue in question.  The suggested remedies to the issue 
by other authors, such as Wilhelm (1998) were the triangulation of online data with research 
interviews in order to question individuals on their propensity to reflect during such exchanges, 
whilst Jensen (2003, in Janssen and Kies 2005) asked research subjects to document 
reflection in supplementary research surveys (other such coding issues are discussed as part 
of the coding scheme critique in the following section). 
 
On consideration of all of the approaches detailed here, a final decision was made to proceed 
with a comparative model formulated by Deen G. Freelon titled,- Analyzing online political 
discussion using three models of democratic communication (2010):  
 
Model of democratic communication Indicative metric 
Liberal individualist Monologue 
Personal revelation 
Personal showcase 
Flaming 
Communitarian Ideological fragmentation 
Mobilization 
Community language 
Intra-ideological questioning 
Intra-ideological reciprocity 
Deliberative Rational-critical argument 
Public issue focus 
Equality 
Discussion topic focus 
Inter-ideological questioning 
Inter-ideological reciprocity  
  
  
 
 
Table 7 Models of online democratic communication and their indicative metrics (Freelon 2010) 
 
This model was particularly appealing in that it was conducive to the project given that it 
followed the less complex dialogic approaches detailed in this section, which whilst appealing 
in terms of rigour, would have been inappropriate in a relatively longitudinal study of an open 
forum such as Twitter, where the focus upon discussion topics was particularly wide-ranging.  
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Also, the opportunity to assess the data which had been collected during the project against 
the norms of liberal individualism and communitarianism, which are also contained in Freelon’s 
model, offered additional perspectives to which the Twitter debate during the independence 
referendum could be benchmarked against in addition to the central model of deliberative 
democracy.  Freelon’s work sought to introduce a new framework of analysis building on 
existing models proposed by Jürgen Habermas (1996) and Lincoln Dahlberg (2001). The 
framework is based upon three distinct yet overlapping strands of democracy namely, the 
liberal, the communitarian, and the deliberative democratic. In so doing Freelon claims that: 
 
This framework enhances the ability of researchers to contextualise disparate online 
discussion cultures with respect to one another, characterise particular cases in terms 
of distinct scholarly conceptions of democracy, and testing existing theories of online 
political communication in new ways (Freelon 2010 p.1173). 
 
Such a framework, the author suggests, is necessary in response to the proliferation of 
deliberative models (such as those recently discussed) which fail to take into account many of 
the features of online political expression which exist outside of, or in contrast to, the 
deliberative model (the three strands of the model are classified by the indicative units in table 
7).  Freelon’s model was used to code both the Twitter and interview data. This involved taking 
each separate piece of data and considering which, if any, of the units of analysis it applied 
to. If it applied to more than one it was designated to how ever many units were appropriate. 
At the end of this process each unit of analysis contained a distinct body of evidence which is 
then discussed under each unit heading in chapter six. This process then, allowed for 
triangulation of the data in terms of evidence collected from Twitter, tested against the 
accompanying discussions as taken from the interviews which could in turn be compared with 
the theoretical assertions identified in the earlier part of the project. 
  
The structured analysis of the data gave a strong indication of the relevance of Freelon’s units 
of analysis to this particular study. The vast majority of the units of analysis identified recurring 
themes and issues that will be discussed in the following results chapters of the thesis. This 
was not, however, the case with all of the indicative units in the table above. There were 
different reasons for taking these decisions, ranging from the particular nature of the 
referendum debate rendering the units as inappropriate, such as Freelon’s definition of 
equality (see the following section for the redefined metric in this specific context) to the 
absence of evidence of the metric being significant in itself, such as public issue focus, as the 
lack of evidence specifically defined the nature of the debate.  Each metric/unit of analysis is 
given a heading in the results chapter relating to the primary research question and 
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explanations are provided if the unit of analysis is omitted or restricted in the volume of 
evidence which is present.  At the end of chapter 6, a critique of Freelon’s model is presented 
and detail is given as to the positive and negative outcomes of the application of the model to 
the data collected within the study.   The next section further details Freelon’s (2010) model 
and includes a critique of the application of the model to the data analysis during this project, 
which is intended to aid future scholars in terms of replicability of the methodology of this study 
in future projects. 
 
As a recognised, though a generally more contentious model of political communication 
theory, as part of the review of existing models and coding schemes of deliberative 
democracy, similar searches were made to identify and analyse coding schemes focused 
upon agonistic pluralism.  This search, however, failed to find any such models in the 
academic literature.  As a result of this, the final coding scheme (which follows in the next 
section) incorporates the process of considering the current strands of analysis of liberal 
individualism, communitarianism, and deliberation in relation to the norms of agonistic theory.  
Again, in chapter six, which is the first results chapter, the results are further assessed against 
the norms of agonistic pluralism and the conclusions to chapter six includes the suggested 
structural basis of such a model, which it is argued would complement existing strands/models 
of democratic communication. 
 
5.13 Data analysis - final coding scheme 
This section provides a comprehensive overview of the units of analysis which make up 
Freelon’s (2010) model.  It also details how these units were applied to the empirical study 
and reasons are given as to how, and why, individual units were omitted or adapted (as 
encouraged by the author) to fit with this particular task.  Additionally, a critique of the 
application of the model is presented with the intention of informing future scholars of the 
issues, both positive and negative, which were encountered in this study.  Suggestions are 
also given as to potential improvements which could be made when employing a similar coding 
approach to data extracted from social media platforms in campaigns preceding future 
elections and other online political campaigns. 
5.13.1 The liberal individualist strand 
 
Liberal individualism encompasses all characteristics of online conversation involving 
personal expression and the pursuit of self-interest. From various literatures, four 
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features can be placed into this category: monologue, personal revelation, personal 
showcase and flaming (Freelon 2010 p.1178). 
 
Monologue 
Monologues are endemic in broader political communication and fit with Kuhn’s functions of 
the media as basic information provision, the likes of which would be common during offline 
political speechmaking.  Monologues, though ubiquitous, by their textbook definition generally 
defeat the post-internet2.0 capabilities of interaction, whether in real-time or on message 
boards. As Freelon notes ‘monologue is anathema to deliberative democrats because it 
represents a triumph of the individual’s desire to make her or his voice heard over the basic 
deliberative imperative to listen and respond thoughtfully to others’ (ibid. p.1179). Whilst this 
may well be the case, the monologue is the realistic platform for any debate and is almost 
certainly inevitable, though it is the response to a monologue which may or may not result in 
any desired form of deliberation. The monologue would cause no issue for agonists in light of 
the acceptance of passionate political opinion on any given issue, the like of which would be 
the precursor of the majority of political monologues regardless of whether they are on or 
offline (see also Hill and Hughes 1998; Shank and Cunningham 1996). 
 
In practice, the majority of the research data could have been classed as monologues, in 
keeping with Jensen’s (2003 p.357 in Freelon 2010 p.8) assertion that online debate tends to 
be dominated by individuals who seek to dominate discussion from a virtual ‘pulpit’.  However, 
the 140 character limit, which was latterly raised to 280 characters, lends itself to short 
statements which often seek no reply other than perhaps the ‘likes’ or ‘retweets’ of other users 
who had read the tweet in question, as opposed to the possibilities offered by platforms such 
as Facebook where such limits do not apply.  The suggestion being that to quantify users’ 
specific proclivity to indulge in lengthy monologues, the research design should perhaps be 
targeted to platforms other than Twitter.  Alternatively, the use of hyperlinks to monologues on 
other online platforms used by account holders may also be conducive to a more effective 
means of analysis. 
 
Personal revelation 
In differentiating personal revelation from monologue, Freelon states ‘whereas monologue is 
a formal characteristic of forum communication, personal revelation is a content-based 
criterion that embodies the liberal individualist proclivity to focus on oneself’ (Freelon 2010 
p.1179).  Freelon’s definition is relevant, though one sided in failing to acknowledge the 
positive way that personal revelation may be situated.  Freelon acknowledges the argument 
of Fraser (1990) who suggests that Habermas’ unwillingness to encourage personal revelation 
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in the public sphere is a way in which the existing power dynamic is reinforced, the suggestion 
being that the existent hegemony is protected through a uniform establishment persona devoid 
of human characteristics. Personal revelation can be applied to agonistic theory in two of the 
identified components, those of hegemony and identity. The importance of hegemony to 
agonistic theory has been previously stated and overlaps with the role of identity. Mouffe’s 
agonism, as previously detailed, sees identity as a major fuel of the democratic process; 
therefore, the choice to maintain an establishment identity or to adopt a humanised position 
through personal revelation poses an interesting argument for the agonist and this is also 
discussed in the empirical study. 
The coding of data as relating to personal revelation within this study is focused upon the 
manner in which politicians, in particular, do or do not welcome the opportunity to personalise 
their social media accounts.  This is mainly done with reference to the deliberate tactic of 
politicians to humanise themselves with the aim of repairing the fractured trust which has been 
referred to in previous chapters. It would, however, have been possible to extend the 
identification of personal revelation to the other two focus demographics within this study, or 
indeed, any demographic within future studies, if it was seen to be relevant to the overall aims 
of the study. 
Personal showcase 
The link between liberal individualism and personal showcase is suggested by Freelon as the 
act of seeking attention for one’s own material outside of the discussion forum, perhaps on 
the individual’s personal blog or website. As previously stated, Twitter is largely a conduit to 
other websites necessitated by the 140 character limit of each post (at the time of the 
referendum). Individuals and groups within all three of the demographics relevant to the study, 
those of politicians, journalists, and activist groups will routinely use Twitter as a personal 
showcase. It is the lifeblood of grassroots political organisations, the like of which were so 
important in the empirical study as many relied purely upon gaining support for their cause 
through Twitter alone or in tandem with other sites like Facebook to redirect readers to their 
own websites. Personal showcasing does not easily fit with, nor have any demonstrable 
relation to, agonistic pluralism.  
 
In practice, the identification and coding of personal showcase within the dataset of this study 
was a relatively straight-forward process, partly through the restriction of characters within 
each forum post, and also by the tendency of individuals to use hyperlinks to the material 
which the individual was encouraging other users to seek out.  With this in mind, a quantitative 
study aimed at examining levels of personal showcase in perhaps a larger data set may be 
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suited to a research design centred explicitly upon the use of such hyperlinks, in a similar 
manner to Williams et al. (2005), as discussed in the previous section. 
 
Flaming 
The unrestricted manner in which participants conduct themselves online is one of the most 
controversial and pervasive issues as regards social media theory. Flaming, defined by Alonzo 
and Aiken (2004 p205) as ‘hostile intentions characterised by words of profanity, obscenity, 
and insults that inflict harm to a person or an organisation resulting from uninhibited behaviour’ 
(Freelon 2010 p.1179) is a catch all term for the issue at hand. The meaning attributed to the 
term almost always (see Hill and Hughes 1998 and Mitra 1997 in Jones 1997 as notable 
exceptions) invokes negative connotations and is often referred to as trolling. Hardaker (2010) 
makes a distinction between the two terms classifying flaming as, ‘response to perceived 
threat as an end its own right’ (ibid. p.215). Such a nuanced distinction has important agonistic 
connotations. Response to perceived threat may possibly be associated with ineradicable 
antagonism which is central to Mouffe’s agonistic theory. Trolling, on the other hand, would 
almost certainly fall foul of agonistic theory in that it falls outside of the agonistic respect which 
forms the rules of the game. The task at hand then is to solve the dilemma of how and when 
these ineradicable antagonisms can be subsumed into the type of conflictual consensus in 
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism.   
 
With reference to the identification and coding of data relating to trolling/flaming on Twitter, 
the specific definition of the concept being characterised by profanity and obscenity again 
allows for easy identification of such forum posts.  As already detailed, this study followed a 
process of manual data collection over a relatively long timescale of approximately 18 months.  
Future studies focused upon, or including, identification and quantification of flaming in its 
strictest sense, that being the inclusion of profanity, could use a simpler method of a standard 
retrospective search for such use of language via the Twitter homepage, which facilitates the 
inclusion of specific accounts and hashtags over a designated period.  It should, however, be 
noted that ‘hostile intentions’ can also be comprised of dialogue which does not necessarily 
only consist of profane and abusive language. 
 
5.13.2 The communitarian strand 
 
Online public spaces that are predominantly communitarian uphold the cultivation of 
social cohesion and group identity above the fulfilment of individual desires. The five 
measures associated with this [strand] – ideological fragmentation, mobilisation, 
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community identification, in-group reciprocity and in-group questioning – all reflect this 
overarching goal (Freelon 2010 p1180). 
 
 
Ideological fragmentation/homophily 
Ideological homophily is commonly associated with Cass Sunstein (2009) amongst others, 
whereby he conceptualises The Daily Me. This refers to the technological capabilities which 
allow internet users to streamline their media feeds (as well as a multitude of other interests, 
such as television, shopping and music) to be restricted to their own personal interests and 
favourites. Ideological homophily is commonly referred to as fragmentation, a potential result 
of which is a self-marginalised citizenry who exist in their own media bubble through a lack of 
exposure to differing perspectives and points of view. Previously, media users may well have 
chosen their newspapers and other media in line with their own political preferences but never 
to the extent which the internet both enables and encourages. Whilst Sunstein focuses upon 
the negative democratic impact of ideological homophily, others, such as Fraser (1990), take 
a more positive, communitarian view of a citizenry which is enabled politically through 
communication with those sharing the same political preferences. Here then, there is an 
intuitively welcome possibility that individuals who may be put off political participation through 
the fear of intimidation or being shouted down by other more vocal and perhaps more 
knowledgeable participants, find a safer place where this is less likely to be the case. As the 
individual becomes more politically active and emboldened through communication with like-
minded individuals, they may latterly have the confidence to participate in the wider, more 
adversarial, public sphere. Agonism and Ideological homophily as described by Sunstein 
share concerns regarding the impact of an unwillingness (whether deliberate or not) to firstly 
hear the opposing side of view and secondly, to acknowledge the legitimacy of that counter 
position. The communitarian view of ideological fragmentation can be seen as a channel in 
which the passion which is an essential part of the political finds a space to grow and 
eventually emerge into the wider (virtual) public sphere. 
 
Identifying and coding ideological homophily presented a more significant challenge than 
many of the other coding categories within the study. In a similar way to the complexity of 
coding reflexivity (as discussed in the previous section), ideological homophily is not a 
dialogue trait which can be ascertained through the examination of individual tweets, or even 
conversations on Twitter, or blog posts on other platforms.  This led to homophily within this 
study mainly being focused upon the numerous broader discussions of ‘Twitter bubbles’ and 
‘echo chambers’ which were relatively prevalent on Twitter during the campaign. Instead, the 
identification/quantification of abstract concepts such as ideological homophily would require 
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a different approach.  This would likely necessitate any specific attempt to study ideological 
homophily to be done in conjunction with research participants, rather than remote analysis of 
forum posts, through means such as research questionnaires ideally triangulated with 
research interviews exploring the online information consumption habits of those particular 
research subjects.  
 
Mobilisation 
Freelon refers to Mutz (2006) in suggesting that those with communitarian traits that are active 
in online forums are more likely to mobilise politically than the liberal individualist or 
deliberative. In doing so, the resultant political action may remain online in the form of activities 
such as petition signing and financial donation or progress offline to perhaps attending political 
meetings or protesting in organised political rallies. The empirical study addresses the 
difference between political engagement and mobilisation as the two were often 
inappropriately intermingled during the independence referendum.  
 
Political engagement invokes a sense of those referred to as engaging, likely through media, 
with the democratic process, and following the arguments on either side of the debate. 
Whereas mobilisation suggests manifest participation in support of one group or another in 
one of the ways previously referred to. The empirical study is concerned with those that were 
mobilised to participate politically through social media. Two of the core features of Mouffe’s 
agonism are those of conflict and passion which by definition suggest mobilised participation 
and therefore appear to sit comfortably with both respective models. 
 
The fact that this study was centred upon a particularly participative UK vote,  (as 
demonstrated by the final turnout of 84.6%) and included research demographics of activists 
and politicians during the campaign meant that tweets relating to mobilisation were 
unsurprisingly abundant.  The focus, again, however, was upon identifying exemplars of such 
examples of possible mobilisation rather than a quantitative endeavour.  It became apparent 
though that future studies aimed at quantifying such activity would likely be suited to a design 
based upon the targeting of precise terminology.  There was a proliferation of Tweets that 
were prefaced with language such as ‘join us’, ‘come along’ and other such phrases that 
denoted direct calls to mobilise.  Of course, other more subtle language designed to engage 
people through means such as encouragement to watch video clips of speeches and such like 
would be more challenging to incorporate into quantitative research designs.  A carefully 
designed categorisation of such language could, however, be beneficial as a starting point in 
mining for text relating to mobilisation in larger datasets in future campaign studies. 
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Community Identification 
Freelon includes community identification in his model with an emphasis on discourse analysis 
showing how individuals perceive themselves to be part of a distinct group or movement. 
Freelon states that:  
 
Several studies unconnected with the online deliberation literature have used 
community language such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’, as operational measures of 
identification with the online community in question (Cassell et al. 2006; Birchmeier et 
al. 2005) (Freelon 2010 p.1181).  
 
Whilst detailed discourse analysis is not part of this study, identity is central to much of the 
debate which took place, which is perhaps unsurprising in the context of a vote upon the 
constitution of Scotland and the United Kingdom. Identity is another of Mouffe’s theoretical 
bases of agonistic pluralism and similarly to the last unit of analysis of mobilisation, sits 
comfortably with both respective models.   
 
For those wishing to identify the emergence of communities within particular forums, perhaps 
during political debates, or campaigns focused upon research subjects with initial, undecided 
allegiance, the use of community language as defined here could be particularly useful.  Within 
the collection and coding of data within this project, which was not focused upon quantitative 
judgements, whereby the majority of Twitter users seemingly already had ultimate allegiance 
to one side, or the other, prolonged discourse analysis was deemed to be inappropriate.  The 
type of community language detailed above, however, helped to quickly identify numerous 
exemplars of community identification which are presented in the following results chapter. 
 
Intra-ideological questioning and response 
Intra-ideological questioning and response refers to conversation between community 
members and is classified by Steibel and Esteves (2015) as a further indication of individuals 
perceiving themselves to be a member of a broader community. Reciprocation between 
members of the same community, largely without major disagreement, distinguishes 
communitarian response from that of deliberation. Evidence of response between groups from 
the same side of the independence debate but from separate groups or organisations, could 
be seen as evidence of a broader movement rather than simply groups sharing a common 
goal. The capabilities of internet2.0 for conversation, would in democratic terms, be seen as 
a welcome progression from monologue as previously discussed. Moving from basic response 
to actual questioning, Intra-ideological questioning as argued by Stromer-Galley (2007) in 
Freelon (2010) is a subset of reciprocity and again strengthens community ties as a specific 
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response is required, the act of which builds relationships within communities, the absence of 
which may fracture that community. Evidence of Intra-ideological response and questioning 
could be again seen as components of identity building in line with agonistic norms. 
 
In practice, manually identifying and coding intra-ideological questioning on Twitter during the 
referendum campaign presented challenges.  Identifying initial tweets which were an appeal 
to other recognised accounts, including a question, was relatively straightforward.  However, 
identifying if such a tweet had been responded to, is not immediately apparent from the ‘front 
page’ of one’s Twitter feed. This necessitated a fairly lengthy, repetitive process in order to 
assess if messages had been replied to.  This coding category would lend itself to an approach 
such as the method presented by Graham (2008) in order to analyse open questioning and 
the presence, or otherwise, of reciprocation from account holders within the same side of the 
debate.  The process of doing so manually, however, would remain a relatively arduous one. 
 
5.13.3 The deliberative strand 
In contrast with liberal individualist and communitarian forums, the deliberative strand 
is marked by Habermas’ conceptual trio of rational-critical argument, public issue focus 
and putative equality. A relatively high quantity of cross-cutting discussion is usually 
also considered an essential element (Delli Carpini et al. 2004)...six of the most 
commonly utilized [are]: rational-critical argument, public issue focus, equality, 
discussion topic focus, out-group reciprocity and out-group questioning (Freelon 2010 
p.1181). 
 
Rational critical argument 
Rational critical argument suggests logical, structured application of thought to the subject in 
question and Freelon claims that rational critical argument is ‘arguably the lynchpin of the 
Habermasian public sphere’ (ibid. p1182). In line with deliberative democracy, the notion of 
rational critical argument suggests that the individual has applied more than merely his or her 
own personal, emotional response in a way that fits with an expression of Kantian enlarged 
thought, as discussed in previous chapters. In saying such, it ought to be again acknowledged 
that later deliberative theorists such as Mansbridge et al. (2010) allow for self-interest in 
deliberation in a way that Habermas would not. Rational critical argument seems on 
appearance to sit uncomfortably with basic agonistic pluralism which is unashamedly based 
upon conflict and passion. However, there is no specific reason as to why these are mutually 
exclusive elements of political debate. The empirical study examines the possibilities of the 
deliberative and agonistic theories working in tandem and whether they are nuanced aspects 
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of essentially the same theoretical position. The conflict of the desire for a social media 
separate from the mainstream media, perhaps to the detriment of rational critical argument 
associated more with professional journalists than bloggers, is an important debate in terms 
of the future of the democratic communication process. 
 
As noted in the previous section, rational critical argument was a principal component of the 
coding approaches which aimed to specifically recognise online deliberation.  Coding rational 
critical argument involved manually scrolling through tweets which initially portrayed a 
respectful invitation to discuss any given issue. Being able to recognise and quantify rational 
critical argument within any dataset would again be suited to one of the more detailed 
dialogical approaches such as Graham (2008) or Trenel (2004).  Trenel, suggests that there 
are two core components of rational argument, the first being validity claims supported by 
appropriate reasons, and secondly that those reasons must be framed in terms of the common 
good (ibid. p.3).  In total there are eight stages in the process of rational critical argument, in 
Trenel’s model (ibid p.7). These are, ‘equality’, ‘rationality’, ‘respect’, ‘constructiveness’, 
‘interactivity’, ‘testimoniality’, ‘emotional balance’ and finally ‘reflexivity’.  Future coding 
schemes containing such categories ought to ensure a robust means of assessing rationality, 
although the same issues previously discussed regarding reflexivity will continue to be an 
issue with datasets exclusively drawn from online forums. 
 
Public issue focus 
The method by which the data for the empirical study was collected meant that only relevant 
political discourse focused upon the referendum was studied as opposed to studying the 
broader content on a given forum. Therefore, public issue focus is omitted from the study. 
 
Equality 
Equality in Freelon’s model is focused upon ‘the extent to which forum contributions are spread 
evenly among participants’ (ibid.). Freelon goes on to detail this concept of equality as another 
essential component of the Habermasian public sphere. Whilst this kind of assessment may 
have been desirable as it would help answer accusations of social media as politics as usual 
in merely a different setting, such an analysis was beyond the scope of this project due to the 
fact that it was centred on an open forum with a large number of participants.  In light of this, 
equality is re-interpreted in line with Karppinen, Moe and Svensson (2008) in their critique of 
Habermas and Mouffe, whereby they suggest in terms of agonistic norms, equality to 
encompass the opportunity for minorities to express themselves in a way that may contribute 
to challenging the existing hegemony. Evidence of social media as a leveller recalibrating 
democracy away from political elites would give weight to those that suggest the internet and 
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social media has the capacity to achieve such laudable aims. The interplay of hegemony and 
counter hegemony is another basic tenet of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism.  It is, however, 
fundamentally different from the deliberative unit of analysis in Freelon’s original model. 
 
The re-imagined coding of this unit of analysis required a retrospective analysis of tweets 
regarding certain issues and occurrences, which could be classed as having presented a 
challenge to the existing hegemony.  In studies which included the specific goal of measuring 
the level of equality in terms of actual participation, this would be a relatively simple task to 
measure in any closed forum via a simple mathematical breakdown of the number, length and 
authorship of forum posts within the study sample.  Such a study would not particularly lend 
itself to open forums such as Twitter, whereas platforms such as Facebook, which, as noted 
by Halpern and Gibbs (2013) generally has a more ‘egalitarian distribution’ (ibid. p1159) of 
forum messages, would be more suited to such a task.  
 
Discussion topic focus 
Discussion topic focus very simply assesses ‘the extent to which posts within discussion 
threads address the initial thread topic (Stromer-Galley 2007; Herring 2003)’ (Freelon 2010). 
In order to effectively consider discussion topic focus, a concentrated discourse analysis would 
need to have been applied early within the project. This was not within the aims or remit of 
this project so has been excluded from analysis within the results of the empirical study and 
is not considered to have any direct relevance to agonistic theory.  
 
Inter-ideological questioning and response 
The act of responding to, and questioning, those on the other side of the debate, from Yes 
Scotland to Better Together and vice versa within the independence referendum, changes the 
categorisation of the act to deliberative rather than communitarian. Freelon, very importantly, 
suggests that inter-ideological response and questioning that display the indicators associated 
with flaming or trolling should primarily be considered as such as this negates them from being 
considered as deliberative. This type of mature discourse can be seen as an extension of 
rational critical argument as previously documented and would be the preferred discourse of 
the majority of proponents of democracy.   
 
Opponents of agonism would perhaps suggest that a theory which emphasises conflict, 
passion and hegemony, would see inter-ideological response make this unit of analysis 
anathema to the theory. There is, however, no specific reason or theoretical statement put 
forward by Mouffe and other agonists that suggests that this is the case, and it could well be 
seen as an example of Mouffe’s conflictual consensus which has been previously discussed. 
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If that were to be the case, it would give credence to those that suggest agonism and 
deliberation are nuanced variations of the same theory (see Karppinen, Moe and Svensson 
(2008). 
 
In terms of coding, the complexity of identifying and quantifying inter-ideological questioning 
and response is the same as the previously discussed intra-ideological questioning and 
response unit of analysis (see the previous communitarian strand), the only difference being 
the allegiance of the intended/actual responders to the initial tweet or forum post.  For reasons 
already noted, the coding of such messages is suited to the more in-depth approaches such 
as Given (2008), which facilitates the opportunity to analyse streams of dialogue consisting of 
multiple message responses.   
 
5.14 Ethical Considerations  
Online research presents the researcher with numerous challenges as regards ethical 
conduct. According to Kozinets: 
 
Not only is netnography optionally as invasive and personal as ethnography, but in its 
conduct we also make lasting impressions, leaving our own tracks and trails leading to 
other people. We are conducting a type of outreach during which we have the 
opportunity to enlighten, to offend and even to do harm (Kozinets 2015 p.136).  
 
The researcher is further challenged by the fact that many ethical issues are open to 
interpretation and contestation as to what is and what is not ethical. The Association of Internet 
Researchers have formed their own ‘ethics guide’ to assist the researcher in this challenging 
area, while most institutions and disciplines have their own broader codes of practice few have 
comprehensive codes as regards internet research: 
 
Key guiding principles - we find the following principles to be fundamental to an 
ethical approach to internet research: 
 The greater the vulnerability of the community / author / participant, the greater the 
obligation of the researcher to protect the community / author / participant. 
 Because ‘harm’ is defined contextually, ethical principles are more likely to be 
understood inductively rather than applied universally. That is, rather than one-size-
fits-all pronouncements, ethical decision-making is best approached through the 
application of practical judgment attentive to the specific context (what Aristotle 
identified as phronesis). 
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 Because all digital information at some point involves individual persons, consideration 
of principles related to research on human subjects may be necessary even if it is not 
immediately apparent how and where persons are involved in the research data. 
 When making ethical decisions, researchers must balance the rights of subjects (as 
authors, as research participants, as people) with the social benefits of research and 
researchers’ rights to conduct research. In different contexts the rights of subjects may 
outweigh the benefits of research. (Markham and Buchanan 2012) 
 
These guiding principles were referred to throughout the online research process in addition 
to the RGU ethics procedure which was used as a working guide and fully adhered to: 
 
 https://www.rgu.ac.uk/file/research-ethics-policy-pdf-60kb.  
 
As already stated, the individual participants in the interview process were all afforded 
personal anonymity and false names have been used within the thesis. Activist groups have 
been named as interview participants at a group level, though the names of the individual 
participants have been withheld. All interviews were done in person and participants were 
given a comprehensive overview of the project prior to the interview. Participants were asked 
to consent to audio-recording of interviews prior to the interview commencing and consent 
forms were signed face to face on the day of the interview. 
 
5.15 Limitations of the methodology  
The main limitation to the methodology within the study was the limited number of interview 
participants from the activist group demographic. This was purely down to the limited number 
of key activist groups and the unwillingness of the targeted groups to participate. In an attempt 
to overcome this, the date and method (telephone rather than face to face) of interview was 
offered but this was to no avail. This was overcome by rigorously analysing the proliferation of 
detailed data which was available in most circumstances by the nature of the openness of 
activist groups, who largely expressed themselves online in a manner which was manifestly 
apparent when contrasted with the MSPs and journalists in the study. 
 
Confirmation bias can be an issue in any study of this nature as the researcher, usually 
subconsciously, seeks out data to suit their own personal beliefs whilst again perhaps 
subconsciously ignoring data which are detrimental to their own position. This was avoided by 
being aware of the propensity for this to happen from very early in the project and also seeking 
out, and more importantly being receptive when obtaining feedback from supervisors, 
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colleagues, and others, throughout the overall research project. Presenting parts of the 
research to different audiences within my own institution, at conferences, and other outsider 
audiences was particularly helpful in this regard. 
 
Whilst it may have been possible to use data mining techniques during the desk-based data 
collection stage, the immersive nature of doing this manually was seen to be a benefit to the 
overall study when backed up with the press-data, Daily Referendum subscription. Without 
this, however, there may have been a propensity to overlook key issues and events. 
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6  Results to the primary research question – How could you tell if 
the #indyref were characterised by deliberative democracy or 
agonistic pluralism? 
6.1 Introduction to the results chapters 
The previous chapters have set the background to the empirical project by firstly presenting 
the contemporary challenges facing UK democracy, then, the relevant democratic theories of 
deliberative democracy and agonism were detailed. Following that, the forerunner of agonism, 
in the form of political pluralism was explored before explaining the largely uncontested 
importance attributed to media pluralism, as being prerequisite for an effective democratic 
process. The methodology then went on to explain how the research project contrasts and 
combines deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism in its assessment of Twitter activity 
which took place during the campaign which preceded the Scottish Independence referendum 
of 2014.  In this section, the results of the empirical project are presented using the units of 
analysis adapted from Freelon’s Three Models of Democratic Communication (2010) (as 
explained in detail in the previous chapter) in order to provide rich descriptions of the 
categories within that model, which helps answer the primary research question which seeks 
to ascertain the following:  
 
How could you tell if the #indyref were characterised by deliberative democracy or 
agonistic pluralism? 
 
Chapter 7 then addresses the supplementary research question which asks: 
 
How does pluralist group theory aid our understanding or Twitter based activism during 
the Scottish independence referendum of 2014? 
 
 
The units of analysis will follow Freelon’s model by firstly presenting the liberal individualist 
strand, followed by the communitarian and finally the deliberative strand. Each unit is 
presented using the same sequential structure for each subtopic within the broader unit of 
analysis:  
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 Section outline.  
 Sub sections – including cases and examples from empirical online data supported 
by interview data. 
 Relationship to deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism (this is presented 
collectively at the end of the liberal, communitarian and deliberative sections). 
 As detailed in the methodology chapter, each theme was identified during the data 
collection stage of the project and then discussed with the relevant interview 
subjects. 
6.2 Empirical units of analysis  
In terms of the empirical study, there are numerous themes which are presented here for 
purpose of definition, along with academic literature relating to them. The same units are 
included in the results chapter with evidence of their appearance and impact during the 
Scottish independence referendum of 2014. The units are taken from a model of online 
political communication by Dean Freelon (2010) which itself is derived from the work of Jurgen 
Habermas and Lincoln Dahlberg. Some of the categories are addressed in their entirety if they 
fit with data analysed from the empirical study. Each metric is then scrutinised in terms of their 
applicability to the empirical study. Such scrutiny is not necessarily a criticism of Freelon’s 
model, as in some cases it simply has not been viable to apply the given theory due to the 
structure of the study itself. Freelon’s model (as detailed below and discussed in the previous 
chapter) incorporates three distinct, yet overlapping strands of democracy, namely, the liberal, 
the communitarian and the deliberative.  
The following table represents a summary of the use and adaptations of Freelon’s model, as 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter: 
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Strand of Freelon’s model Unit of analysis Implementation 
Liberal individualist Monologue Unaltered 
 Personal revelation Unaltered  
 Personal showcase Unaltered 
 Flaming Unaltered 
Communitarian Ideological fragmentation Unaltered – though applied 
through a retrospective 
approach focusing upon broader 
academic/media discussions of 
fragmentation during the 
#indyref 
 Mobilisation Unaltered 
 Community Language Unaltered 
 Intra-ideological questioning and 
response 
Unaltered 
Deliberative Rational-critical argument Unaltered 
 Public issue focus Excluded 
 Equality Redefined in line with Karppinen, 
Moe and Svensson (2008) to 
encompass the opportunity for 
minorities to express themselves 
through achieving both voice and 
coverage, enabling the challenge 
of existing power structures 
 Discussion topic focus Excluded 
 Inter-ideological questioning and 
response 
Unaltered 
 
 
 
Table 8 Final coding scheme 
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6.3 Results – To what extent was twitter activity characterised by 
elements of deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism in the 
Scottish independence referendum campaign 2014? 
6.3.1 The liberal Individualist strand 
6.3.1.1 Monologue 
The term monologue suggests a lengthy pronouncement on any given issue. However, the 
140 character limit (latterly 280) of Twitter posts means that monologues during the 
referendum campaign were more a case of short, sometimes general though often pithy 
statements: 
 
 
Figure 13 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
As the focus of this study was on activist groups, politicians, and journalists, the overwhelming 
amount of Twitter posts chosen for analysis were linking to other pieces of information. This 
was usually either via their own website or blog, the website or blog of somebody else, or to 
newspaper articles and perhaps studies or surveys. These links would often carry what could 
be classified as monological communication regarding personal showcasing (see following 
subsection). 
 
The quality of Twitter posts was something which was discussed with all of the interviewees. 
The majority were quick to point out that for tweets to engage people they needed to be more 
than basic statements/monologues: 
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I think using it as a means of you know, here's our message, here's our message, 
here's our message, had diminishing returns. I think it was much more used (sic) in an 
interactive fashion which was great, used simply as a propaganda machine? Not so. 
(M3) 
 
A similar opinion was given by another MSP: 
 
[Sometimes people are] just retweeting the party line, tweeting links to their speeches 
in parliament and their latest press release and I kind of think [pauses] well, I’m not 
saying I wouldn't necessarily do that myself but I do think that you should mix it up a 
bit and actually tweet some ordinary comment about things. (M7) 
 
The above statements were made by MSPs but the same sentiment was common with 
activists and journalists. The second comment suggests that tweeting the party line was 
particularly unhelpful within the debate. The MSP concerned went on to state that the, 
‘comment about other things’ could be something completely separate from political 
statements and this was particularly important for politicians so as to meaningfully engage with 
people. 
 
Monologue then, was present during the online debate but in line with deliberative thinking 
was generally perceived as unhelpful in engaging people on social media. Monologue cannot 
though be dismissed as totally unwanted, or unmerited, as making and receiving political 
speeches is an important part of the dialogical process and often a precursor to later, perhaps 
deliberative interactions. 
 
6.3.1.2 Personal showcase 
Personal showcase, as described by Freelon (2010), is part of the liberal individualist strand 
In keeping with some of the other units of analysis such as personal showcase, mobilisation 
and ideological fragmentation, a broader perspective could see these units overlap into more 
than one of the three distinct strands. A further discussion of this and the overall merits of the 
model is provided in the conclusions to this chapter. 
  
In Freelon’s classification personal showcase relates to the act of using online discussion 
forums to advertise other platforms where that user has other content available. That content 
may have been visual such as YouTube, oral such as a podcast or textual such as a personal 
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website or blog. As stated previously the (original) 140 character limit on Twitter means that 
brevity is compulsory, and that brevity has been acknowledged as one of the reasons for its 
success (Kwak et al. 2010; Zhao and Rosson 2009). Subsequently, the structure of Twitter 
makes the act of redirecting one’s followers to a different platform a routine practice for a great 
many users. 
 
6.3.1.2.1 Activists and personal showcasing 
As far as activist groups were concerned, it would be commonplace for the Twitter account of 
the group to be used in tandem with a separate group website or Facebook page or sometimes 
all three and occasionally four or five different platforms in total. The motive for having a 
number of different platforms was different for the three demographics of the study. The motive 
for activists was perhaps less individualist and more deliberative than that of the other two 
groups. Activists would generally refer people onwards with the broad aim of garnering 
engagement/support for their side of the referendum debate. However, in many cases the 
name of the group member/s who had written the article would be displayed and they could 
therefore gain an amount of personal credit for it. The most common action that was observed 
within the activist demographic would be from a Twitter post to the group website, for example: 
 
Figure 14 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
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The activists interviewed displayed different relations to personal showcase theory dependent 
on the group structure. For example, one particular group was run by two persons, one of 
whom required funds raised through the group to support himself financially. This would mean 
selling articles, selling advertising online, and in a print copy of their work. This meant that 
their fundamental motivation for engagement was blurred. In contrast, another activist 
interviewed represented a group which was entirely voluntary, and all members had other jobs 
or means of income with all funds raised going back into the group finances. The fact remained 
however, that showcasing was more pertinent to those with individual material/political gain at 
stake such as MSPs and journalists. 
 
6.3.1.2.2 MSPs and personal showcasing 
In terms of personal showcasing, MSPs would use Twitter in a number of different ways. It is 
important to note that many MSPs had used Twitter prior to the referendum campaign and 
therefore already had established practices in place prior to the referendum. MSPs then, might 
showcase links to publicity photos from personal appearances they had made; speeches they 
had made; articles they had written or had featured in; newspaper, TV or radio appearances. 
For example: 
 
Figure 15 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
The manner in which MSPs showcased themselves was a prominent topic in the interviews, 
though the aim was more about gaining political capital through portraying themselves as in 
tune with constituents/the general public, than for financial gain as was the case with 
journalists. 
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The following MSP, a self-acknowledged techy, took a holistic approach (far beyond that of 
other MSP subjects) to managing social media in a way that showcased his work to the 
greatest advantage: 
 
I’m on Twitter, I’m on Facebook, I’m on Linkedin, Google+ and I have a Kilter account 
that I don’t really use and I also have my own website. (M8) 
 
The MSP went on to describe how he used software such as Blogger to synchronize 
messages posted across multiple platforms. 
 
MSPs, at the time the interviews took place, were acutely aware of the general mood regarding 
the popularity of all politicians which had moved at the time from anger, following scandalous 
occurrences (as noted earlier) to be gradually transformed into a general malaise towards all 
concerned. In almost all cases, subjects saw social media as a way to address this concern 
as well as showcasing themselves to the other groups within this study. The following example 
was typical of many: 
 
It is a good way [social media] of showing people that you are thinking and showing 
people that you are busy…I think on Twitter that you can build up a reputation amongst 
your peers, by showing them, other politicians, journalists and activists, what you are 
doing and what you are thinking. So it can be used that way and constituents are active 
on Facebook so it’s good to show you are on there too. (M2) 
 
The manner in which subjects used Twitter as a conduit to other platforms was also expressed: 
 
I use it as a push for my blogs, so if I post an article on a blog I will tweet links to it to 
try and push people to read them. (M4) 
 
Another MSP had gone to great lengths to portray themselves in a way which she felt brought 
her closer to her constituents, creating a hashtag to emphasise the fact that she used public 
transport: 
 
I also have a hashtag that I invented for myself which is ………[removed to preserve 
anonymity] because in the constituency, I use public transport quite a lot and because 
there is a big thing about politicians and the whole thing about how we live this 
cosseted lifestyle, I try to make a point about [being like them]. One or two folk from 
the constituency have [used the same hashtag] as well, to kind of catch it on (sic) so 
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it’s more about making the gentle point that I am actually [using public transport] 
[Laughs] as opposed to always sitting in the car. (M7) 
 
Whilst cynics might suggest that such premeditated actions to ingratiate an MSP with their 
constituents is uncomfortable, public relations driven exercises have long been part of the role 
of a politician, much in the same way as kissing babies and shaking as many hands as 
possible during election campaigns in order to create the desired public persona. 
 
6.3.1.2.3 Journalists and personal showcasing 
Journalist’s motivation for personal showcasing understandably bore more relation to liberal 
individualism than the other two groups included in the study. Journalists, often working 
freelance, rely on the volume of people consuming their articles in order to secure further work 
and build their career profile. Therefore, with great regularity, journalists would primarily tweet 
links to their own newspaper columns. They would also tweet links to books they had written 
and also to advertise TV appearances prior to the programme, and sometimes link to recorded 
clips of their appearance, for example: 
 
 
Figure 16 Screenshot from Twitter (2013) 
 
Journalists would not restrict links to only their own work but also to the work of other 
journalists and activists, either in praise or in disagreement of the work in question. 
 
As noted above, for journalists, personal showcasing is more typical of the liberal individualism 
in Freelon’s (2010) model and the independence referendum was an opportunity for many to 
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showcase their work and build their reputation. The following quote is from a press journalist 
and TV commentator: 
 
[I use social media] primarily for directing people toward stuff I’ve written or done. It 
directs people towards stuff that they may have seen anyway or maybe not, primarily 
that’s what I think social media is for. [However] I would rather keep my analysis for a 
column or an article or TV or something. My focus, ironically, is still upon things in the 
traditional media, i.e. my column, TV appearances etc, the same things I would have 
done 20 years ago. (J2)  
 
The previous quote gives a perspective of showcasing which was typical of the journalists 
interviewed. Journalists had carefully thought about social media and Twitter, they had 
strategies to use the medium to engage with other account holders but primarily as a vehicle 
for their other works, which would provide the financial remunerations which social media 
would not. The same journalist went on to give a prescient example of the way in which social 
media created work opportunities: 
 
The day that Obama stated that he thinks the UK should stay together, I just tweeted 
something about an interesting parallel with Bill Clinton and Quebec in 1995, and half 
an hour later a producer from Radio 4 called to ask me if I could go on the PM show at 
4pm with Eddie Mair and talk about this, which was on the basis that he had seen my 
tweet. (J2) 
 
The journalist went on to state that though this was a rare occurrence, it was a prime example 
of the power of, ‘that awful buzzword – connectivity’ (ibid.) expediting processes that prior to 
social media were significantly onerous in terms of tracking someone down via a landline 
telephone number. 
 
6.3.1.3 Trolling/Flaming  
The issue of trolling or flaming (Hardaker 2010 as noted, states a nuanced difference in the 
terms, thus they are therefore  referred to as either depending upon the context) is probably 
the most prominent issue regarding online political communication and the Scottish 
independence debate was certainly in keeping with such an assertion. This ranged from 
general low-level concerns about the quality of the debate online, to accusations of targeted, 
vitriolic abuse, particularly upon well-known/celebrity Twitter users.  
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Concerns over the issue of flaming were deemed serious enough for the UK government to 
amend the Criminal Justice and Courts Act in February 2015, the amendment increased 
sentencing powers to a maximum of two years in prison for serious offences. While in Scotland 
the offence is covered in the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening 
Communications (Scotland) Act (2012) (legislation.gov.uk 2012). The issue was regularly 
making headlines in the mainstream press from the early days of the campaign right through 
until and after the vote itself. It was a subject that was spoken about at some length with little 
or no prompting in all of the conducted interviews. However, attitudes towards the subject 
were different depending on the interviewee’s role as an activist, MSP, or journalist. Whether 
an interviewee was a supporter of the Union or of independence also elicited different 
responses on the majority of issues. 
There were three types of flaming which came to light during data collection. The first was 
verified flaming of extremely prominent Twitter users, such as the very highly publicised case 
of J.K. Rowling (which is addressed immanently). Secondly, there were unverified allegations 
by Twitter users as in the case of comedian Susan Calman. Thirdly, there was the type of 
flaming which was low level and generally carried out by the type of people classed as 
cybernats and their Unionist equivalents. These individuals, at the start of the debate were 
unknown but (some) became subsequently known to Twitter users, largely due to the way that 
they conducted themselves online. The best example of this was that of Stuart Campbell in 
the form of activist group Wings Over Scotland 
 
6.3.1.3.1 Celebrity trolling 
The case of J.K. Rowling, the world renowned author of the Harry Potter book series, related 
to a series of online attacks following her public backing of support for Scotland to remain in 
the United Kingdom. Rowling publicly displayed this support with a £1 million pound donation 
to the Better Together campaign. She subsequently received numerous abusive tweets to her 
account, for example: 
If I had a spare few million I’d buy every last copy of Harry Potter, put them in Tory HQ 
and fucking burn both sets of shite (Aitken 2014). 
Rowling explained how receiving such abuse had affected her: 
I found this extremely distressing and aggressive. Language like this makes me feel 
unsafe to voice my opinions online and in the independence referendum as a whole 
(ibid.). 
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The J.K. Rowling incident was widely reported by the majority of other daily newspapers, 
including The Independent and the Guardian. It brought the phenomenon of flaming into the 
public spotlight and was acknowledged as being unacceptable by both sides of the official 
campaign. 
 
The case of Scottish comedian Susan Calman was indicative of the second type of flaming 
which included lesser known people who were still in the public eye, and the incident in 
question became known in referendum circles as Calmangate: 
 
 
Figure 17 Screenshot from The Scotsman (2013) 
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Ms Calman was allegedly subjected to profane abuse and death threats (the death threats 
were never actually substantiated) following an appearance on BBC Radio 4 comedy show 
News Quiz in April of 2014, in which she fairly innocuously mocked the choice of the Yes 
campaign in seeking to retain the pound and not to adopt the euro in the event of becoming 
an independent nation: 
 
Initially Alex Salmond said, it is definitely the euro. It is going to be totally the euro. And 
then Europe said ‘naw’ and then he said, it is totally the pound. It is going to be the 
pound. But this wee Osborne and Danny Alexander – flying in like a ginger Supergran 
– said, Naw, you’re not getting the pound. And Alex was like: Haud on, what if we want 
the pound?  The problem is that whenever Conservative ministers tell us about 
independence, to some Scottish people it sounds like the teacher in Charlie Brown – 
just going wah…wah…wah.  It is really difficult because with things getting a bit closer, 
we kind of need to know what’s happening if people do vote for independence. At the 
moment, it is just two people shouting, ‘Aye, we will have it’ and someone going ‘No, 
we won’t’ (ibid.). 
  
Calman detailed the reaction to these comments on her own blog which included vitriolic, 
expletive laden abuse and alleged death threats, and these were subsequently discussed by 
Logan (2013) in defence of Calman’s comments during the show.  The article describes how 
Calman was accused of betraying her own country, of being racist and also of being a cunt.  
Fellow comics did, however, seek to defend Calman, the most notable of which was Rory 
Bremner.  Douglas Alexander MP was subsequently accused of seizing upon the opportunity 
to accuse independence supporters of lowering the tone of the debate: 
 
This truly appalling episode is just the latest example of the hate-filled outpouring of 
the so-called 'Cybernats', The Telegraph quoted Alexander as saying, whose 
characteristic is general intolerance to everybody and anybody who does not share 
their outlook (ibid.). 
 
This was followed by activist group Wings Over Scotland suggesting that the story was 
invoked by Unionist supporters to blacken the name of online Yes supporters (the subject of 
anonymity and possible agent provocateurs is addressed later in this chapter). This allegation 
was indicative of the third type of flaming which involved everyday Twitter users in distasteful, 
unedifying, antagonistic displays. In this case it led in turn to Wings receiving online abuse 
alleging he was ‘misogynistic’ a ‘poisonous bastard’ and by Calman herself ‘the vilest possible 
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person on Twitter’ (Eaton-Lewis 2013). This in turn, regardless of the veracity of Ms Calman’s 
claims as alleged by Wings Over Scotland and others, became proof positive of the 
phenomenon itself from the ratified tweets which were subsequently sent to the account of 
Wings Over Scotland by Calman herself.  
 
6.3.1.3.2 Activist trolling -involving high profile personalities 
Wings Over Scotland and the way he (Wings is referred to as he as it is a solo account run by 
an ex video game journalist living in Bath, England) conducted his account moves the manner 
in which flaming impacts upon the quality of online debate during the referendum, as opposed 
to the subject of Twitter personalities being anonymously trolled. Wings was in some ways 
one of the democratically heart-warming successes of the independence campaign in terms 
of an individual having a sizeable impact on the democratic process in relative terms (those 
successes will be detailed in later sections see Mobilisation and Equality sections). The fact 
at hand here, however, was the controversial manner in which Wings conducted himself 
online, a fact that led to Wings being the only activist account which either side of the official 
campaign felt it necessary to publicly distance themselves from (Gardham 2014). For 
example, on 1/10/2014, following a speech made by former PM Gordon Brown in which he 
made an impassioned plea to the people of Scotland to vote to remain in the Union, Wings 
tweeted that he had 8000 signatures for the following petition he had initiated on change.org: 
 
 
Figure 18 Screenshot from change.org (2014) 
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The petition was accompanied by the following statement: 
 
Because, Scotland is sick of listening to your wobble faced lies, you useless absentee 
ex-politician shitebag.  
 
Whilst almost certainly offensive to some, particularly to Mr Brown, such a post could be taken 
as perhaps humorous, and the petition itself found support from 13,908 people who were 
willing to put their name to it.  
 
Some of those that were interviewed suggested that humour ought to be understood as a part 
of online communications and that, particularly in certain geographical regions, such humour 
is a cultural norm and was being mistaken for offensive flaming.  On this subject, an MSP 
stated the following: 
 
To be honest a lot of it is that it's a forum for taking the piss, for example this morning 
Keith Brown has put himself forward for deputy leader of the SNP and somebody has 
tweeted something saying 'I can't think of anybody better than Keith Brown as deputy 
leader as SNP' and I've tweeted back saying 'come on think hard there must be 
someone on the planet better’ [laughs]. (M5) 
 
The MSP quoted above went on to make an often repeated remark that the issue with social 
media communications is the lack of tone and/or context, in that as we discussed the 
exchange face to face it was obvious that the comment was made in jest but that it may not 
have come across that way to someone reading it on Twitter.   
 
One activist from Glasgow (noting that I myself have a particular regional accent) made the 
following statement about regionality: 
 
Well you will know then, that if you love somebody you tend to abuse them [without 
genuine malice but in jest] you know there is that, and it's the same in places like 
Belfast and Liverpool, where you slag people off and it doesn't always translate on to 
Twitter [because there is no tone]. (A2) 
 
The prevailing issue then, regards the subjectivity of when a post moves from the borders of 
humour into the realm of genuine abuse.  
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6.3.1.3.3 Low level everyday trolling 
The next example, though regarding football in a tweet after the independence referendum, 
demonstrates the level of some of Wings Over Scotland’s more extreme tweets: 
 
Figure 19 Screenshot from Twitter (2015) 
 
There were also examples of trolling coming from Unionists as detailed in the following article 
which related to events in the months following the referendum: 
 
 
Figure 20 Screenshot from Herald & Times (2015) 
 
The story included allegations relating to Tweets which contained the following text: 
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“Cut her f***ing head off". "Punchable gobshite". Comparisons to Nazis and Hitler and 
fake accounts which portray the SNP MP Natalie McGarry in pornographic adverts 
(Rodger 2015). 
Finally, in a now deleted tweet on the 5th April 2014, Wings stated that: 
I hope there’s a special, extra-bad cancer that only spammers get (Twitter 2014 - now 
deleted, hard copy available).  
The examples presented give a broad representation of the types of social media posts which 
attract so much criticism, to what is generally accepted as a pluralistic democratic tool. It 
should be noted however, that Wings was certainly not the only individual or group regularly 
offending people and drawing negative attention to social media. He was however, the one 
with the most followers which amounted to 23,000 by polling day and currently 43,000 at the 
time of writing. The mobilisation and equality sections detail the achievements of Wings as a 
group and explains why some of his supporters were frustrated with the way he conducted 
himself as it negated many of the positive achievements he is rightly credited with. It should 
also be again noted that Wings was approached numerous times and initially agreed to be 
interviewed, only subsequently to choose not to take part in the study, even with the offer of 
telephone interviews and for myself to travel to conduct an interview in Bath, England where 
he lives and works. 
 
6.3.1.3.4 Was trolling/flaming over reported? 
The most prevalent issue in terms of flaming was around how important or not the issue was 
and whether it was gaining unmerited or genuinely warranted attention, both online and in the 
broader mainstream media. This was a subject that was raised with all of the interviewees in 
the empirical study. There was a fairly even split between those that saw it as being far less 
of an issue than the one focused upon in the broader media and those that felt it was a 
significant issue in the debate and more broadly for the democratic communication process 
as a whole. What was immediately apparent during the interviews was the manner in which 
almost all subjects remained partisan to the narrative which had been previously established, 
dependent upon which side their loyalties or their employer’s loyalties were positioned.  
 
Activist groups, when interviewed, did not deny that flaming was an issue during the campaign. 
They did however, tend to qualify the extent to which the issue was being reported and tended 
to focus upon the unprecedented importance of the referendum and suggested that the size 
of the issue in some way excused some of the behaviour. The following response summed up 
the general feelings of the activist groups which were interviewed: 
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At its worst yes, [it is an issue] I actually think though that the debate is quite good and 
that people are too scared of conflict and conflict is ok, we are in a democracy during 
a period of big change and having an argument is alright, express yourself, [ask 
people] what do you think?...it's all digital and nobody is getting [pauses] it's been said 
before that not a shot has been fired [tails off]. (A1) 
 
A1 went on to elaborate how appeals to ‘dampen down’ the debate were general uncalled for, 
stating that he himself did not want to intentionally exchange insults with those of an opposing 
opinion, but A1 also stated that he accepted (in line with agonistic norms) the reality of heated 
debate relating to the most important political issues such as those relating to sovereignty. 
 
The majority of MSPs and their staff were generally quick (quite understandably) to state that 
they themselves were used to the fact that their profession positioned them as easy targets 
for those that are inclined to offensive online behaviour. They also, unwaveringly, saw the 
argument through a prism of their own party position with the issue accepted as a real one 
though played down by SNP representatives, and seen as being a much bigger issue, largely 
only attributable to nationalists, by those in support of the Union. The lack of control over the 
activist groups by the official campaigns made it convenient for SNP MSPs to distance 
themselves from the controversy of the likes of Wings Over Scotland, whilst still celebrating 
and taking credit for the positive aspects of such groups. A typical overview of the size of the 
issue, as perceived by either side, was for example, firstly a Labour MSP: 
 
My impression was that [trolling] was much more prevalent on the Yes side and I 
thought it was orchestrated. (M2) 
 
Secondly an SNP MSP: 
 
[On Wings Over Scotland]  He does go way over the top, having said that, the work he 
was doing with the research and analysis was absolutely brilliant. (M7) 
 
These Labour and SNP responses reflect what would be expected from those on either side 
of the argument. The following from two journalists when questioned on flaming was also 
typical from those on either side, firstly from a newspaper backing Better Together: 
 
Well the No campaign was much less visible....it was just really the Yessers (sic) and 
that was a bonus and a drawback for the Yes campaign, because one of the things 
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you had was the 'cybernuts' (sic) and they weren't in control of these people, and a lot 
of them were fairly obnoxious and odious. (J1) 
 
Secondly from a publication backing Yes Scotland: 
 
I think the cybernat thing was way exaggerated, I mean out of all proportion, when we 
came out in favour of Yes we got lots of abuse from British nationalists, which some of 
whom wanted the paper to close, and I'm not bleating about that, not holding my hands 
up saying please, please stop! We are big boys and big girls and we can withstand 
that so all of it is fine and I just wouldn't think that some of the so called cybernattery 
(sic) was like that, it wasn't as bad as people say. (J3). 
 
In general, however, those from the journalism profession were more ambivalent to the reality 
of the issue or its negative consequences and perceived damage to the political process. It 
ought to be noted though, that the underlying sentiment intuitively felt as though the 
professional nature of journalism and government, meant both groups were fulfilling an 
expectation that they have to be tough enough to cope with online abuse. The reality over time 
has on occasions contradicted that and some of those interviewed have subsequently been 
highly critical of online flaming and have taken breaks from Twitter, with statements of intent 
to never return, specifically because of the practice and prevalence of trolling.  
 
6.3.1.3.5 Parody/ghost accounts/anonymity 
The primary driver/enabler of online trolling is widely accepted as being the physical absence 
between the troller and the trolled. To quote the vernacular, certain individuals become 
keyboard warriors as they are emboldened by the absence of face to face discussion and 
communicate things online that they perhaps would not dream of stating in a physical setting. 
The fact of physical separation and the possibility of anonymity during online discourse was 
identified as the key factor in terms of enabling trolling, along with use of alcohol which led to 
people tweeting things they may never would have done so if sober. M2 likened the practice 
to that of anonymous letters to newspapers and stated the following: 
 
I have always felt that the anonymity of the internet, like the people who write to the 
papers as well, I think that if I were the editor of the paper that I would insist that they 
have to put their name to letters or they don't get published…I think that social media 
has to a large extent [facilitated] all these people that use pseudonyms, that make you 
think well why don't you just use your real name? (M2) 
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Parody accounts were a regular feature of the online debate in the build up to the 
independence referendum. Such accounts involved prominent political personalities such as 
Alex Salmond, the most notable of which was the account of Angry Salmond: 
 
Figure 21 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
This account would almost certainly fall into the humorous accounts previously mentioned 
which generally avoided falling into the realms of trolling behaviour. The popularity of the 
account is demonstrated by the fact that the account is still in operation and has almost 55,000 
followers at the time of writing. There were other accounts which included parodies of the head 
of Better Together – Alistair Darling. 
 
The manner in which Twitter discourse takes place between people in remote settings, using 
accounts which require no verification, allows for the possibility of not just parody accounts 
but ghost accounts. Ghost accounts (Marwick 2011) are accounts which have been set up by 
individuals to hide their real identity and some may be set up to attempt to take someone 
else’s identity (frequently associated with people looking to take the identity of a famous 
person). The suggestion during the independence referendum was that individuals on either 
side of the debate set up ghost accounts, pretending to be a supporter from the other side and 
then trolled people with the specific aim of shedding that side of the campaign in a negative 
light. 
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Figure 22 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
The number of subjects who believed in the prevalence of such accounts was surprising. 
Generally, the accusation was made by pro-independence supporters stating that they simply 
did not believe that a lot of the online abuse attributed to their side was genuine and that it 
was the work of agent provocateurs. The following statement on the subject was made by an 
SNP MSP: 
 
I don't want this to sound conspiracy theorist in any way but online, it is incredibly easy 
to create an online presence without needing to verify in any way shape or form that 
that online presence is credible. So I think that for example, I could if I wanted, establish 
an anonymous Twitter account with a No campaign Twibbon and use it to throw abuse 
at Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon and just for the record I didn't [laughs] but it 
would have been phenomenally easy to do so. (M3) 
 
The suggestion was from J3 that having done so it would be incredibly easy to make headlines 
about allegedly abusive No campaigners.  The MSP concerned went on to state that they had 
no evidence to support these claims but that they would be utterly shocked if this was not 
happening in certain instances.  It was, however, beyond the remit of this study to be able to 
prove these assertions. Whilst Twitter has its own scheme of verifying accounts which it deems 
to be in the public interest (denoted by a blue tick immediately adjacent to the username) it is 
currently not possible to self-verify or easily verify the accounts of others. Numerous of the 
three interview subject groups did agree with the statement of the MSP, and those interviewed 
did not intuitively present as easily fooled or open to conspiracy theories. Such distrust of 
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social media has an obvious impact on the democratic possibilities of the medium, particularly 
in light of the manner in which social media is seen by many who have lost trust in the 
mainstream media, as a more trustworthy media source. Further studies which have the 
capacity to establish the truth or otherwise regarding ghost political accounts, would be 
welcome to shed more light on the phenomenon so as to gauge its impact upon the democratic 
value of social media communications generally, and more specifically from an academic 
research perspective. 
 
6.3.1.3.6 Faux outrage 
Another recurring theme on the subject of flaming was that of faux outrage. This usually took 
the form of people who were generally not personally trolled (or overly concerned if they were), 
going to great lengths to be outraged on behalf of those that were, for example: 
 
[On trolling] I think a lot of it was manufactured offence. You know if I made a fuss 
about every offensive tweet that was [directed at me] [pauses] a journalist did come to 
me and say that he wanted to do a big piece about it [trolling] and I just thought about 
it and I said no. All you do is make it worse and feed the trolls and I was absolutely 
gobsmacked by some of it [irrelevant events being overstated]. (M2) 
 
Similarly, a Conservative MSP who was obviously from the other side of the debate, when 
asked if the issue was over exaggerated, said: 
 
I think it has. If you don’t want to be bullied on social media then get off it…a good 
example is the other day with SNP councillors who were burning the Smith 
Commission, the level of faux outrage out there about these things is just ridiculous. 
(M4) 
 
What is notable in these examples is that M2 admits to being on the receiving end of online 
flaming, as did every single person interviewed in the study, whilst M4 is suggesting flaming 
has to be accepted. These facts suggest that there is undoubtedly something to be at least 
concerned by if not outraged. Faux outrage it seems is partly an accusation of not being 
prepared to accept the abuse that you are inevitably going to be a recipient of. Whilst also 
being a political opportunity to aim attention at political opponents with accusations of 
wrongdoing that would not actually personally offend the accuser. 
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When questioned upon what action, if any, subjects took when victims of abuse, all were 
aware of the capability to mute, block, and report individual accounts. Most preferred to mute 
as opposed to block, as the person blocked will know you have chosen to do so, whilst muting 
allows you to not see what they have posted without them knowing you have made that 
decision. The choice to mute rather than block was preferable as it avoided any potential 
confrontation (which could still take place within the forum in general posting if not through 
direct communication) or ill will on behalf of the blocked user. Some stated that it gave them 
pleasure that the blocked user was still likely trolling them but that through the blocking 
procedure, they as the intended recipient were blissfully unaware. No subjects said they had 
reported anyone for trolling/flaming. 
 
6.3.1.4 Liberal Individualism section - deliberation and agonism 
The results relating to the liberal individualist section started by briefly touching upon the role 
of monologue during the online debate. This was seen as an inevitable part of political 
communication but was limited by the structure of the Twitter platform. The interview subjects 
generally perceived monologue as particularly unhelpful in terms of engaging with others in a 
thought process which is symptomatic of deliberative theory. Deliberation requires a reciprocal 
exchange of ideas, however, narrow notions of monological streams of facts and opinion, 
though still useful at the beginning part of the process, require additional deliberative 
components to have a constructive impact upon the decision-making process. 
 
As stated in the methodology chapter detailing the definitions of the units of analysis, personal 
showcase has no demonstrable relation to the agonistic/deliberative debate. It does not relate 
to agonism/deliberation as it is descriptive without having any positive or negative mechanistic 
attributes regarding democratic decision making. It does, however, help us to contextualise 
the motives for social media use within certain groups within the democratic process, in this 
case particularly MSPs and journalists.  
 
The public opinion of professional journalism has been detailed in earlier chapters and those 
concerns are addressed in this results chapter. Regardless, however, professional journalism 
is vital to the democratic process in terms of skill, access, and balance. For these reasons 
alone, social media and professional media should be two component parts of the democratic 
process. The balance of professional journalism and citizen contributions contributes to a 
pluralistic democracy in terms of enlightened understanding of the demos. Those benefits as 
such have been detailed in both political and media forms in their own dedicated chapters 
earlier in the thesis. Both groups have a vital role, particularly in holding each other to account, 
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which aids citizens in how they view the information output of each group respectively. 
Professional journalism in some people’s eyes is under threat mainly due to the growth of 
social media, and if the trade-off for professional journalism’s presence on social media is the 
advertisement of paid work on other platforms, then this seems a reasonable reciprocal state 
of affairs. 
 
MSPs had different motivations during the independence referendum and subsequently 
afterwards for showcasing other aspects of their work as described earlier. They were shown 
to be acutely aware of their contemporary unfavourable social standing. This has led them 
(occasionally with slightly cynical undertones) to attempt to utilise social media to bring them 
closer to their constituents and the general public as a whole. Within that context, cynicism 
aside, personal showcasing can be seen as helpful in repairing the democratic disconnect and 
mistrust between the two social groups. 
 
Deliberative democracy, as stated in chapter 2, has evolved from earlier Habermasian theories 
centred upon consensus, most notably in the works of, for example, Mansbridge (2010). 
Mansbridge holds that there are still some explicit conditions required for deliberation – mutual 
respect, equality, reciprocity and mutual justification. Mouffe focuses upon mutual respect in 
her theory of agonism, whereby each party is required to hold the position of their adversary 
as legitimate. This was generally accepted as being absent during the debate and was 
specifically commented upon by many participants and commentators, including many 
interviewed as part of this project. Addressing the quality of the online debate, politician Jim 
Sillars referred to his late wife, SNP MSP Margo MacDonald, when he said: 
 
The Margo MacDonald way is to recognise that you are dealing with opponents not 
enemies, not with ogres but with fellow human beings with whom you can disagree but 
must do so without malice (STV News.com 2014). 
 
Ms MacDonald had expressed such concerns in relation to Holyrood politics, however, the 
general tone of online debate during the referendum as detailed in this section, regularly 
featured more overtly antagonistic episodes than even the most conflictual day of Holyrood 
debating. 
 
Flaming stands contrary to all of these notions. Habermas (2005), upon the evidence shown 
here, was right to question the possibilities of deliberation in online settings. Habermas, in 
terms of online deliberation, foresaw the manner in which a lack of face to face interaction 
between participants, coupled with a lack of reciprocity (which is still held as central to others 
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such as Dryzek) between speakers and addressees as being wholly problematic for online 
deliberation. In line with the evidence presented in this section, it is reasonable to argue that 
flaming raises enormous questions regarding social media as an appropriate environment for 
successful deliberation, certainly when it involves hot (Dryzek 2005) deliberation regarding 
issues such as sovereignty. It should be noted, however, that not all communications during 
the online independence debate fell into the category of flaming and these positive interactions 
are addressed in other sections such as rational critical argument in the deliberative strand of 
the model. 
 
Agonistic theory came into being largely due to early pluralist theory focusing upon consensus 
in a manner which failed to accept the reality of conflict in the democratic process. Flaming, 
though objectionable, is proof positive of the type of conflict which Mouffe would class as 
antagonism. The Scottish Independence referendum, in line with the European Union 
referendum, rightly received great credit for engaging a nation politically, though both were 
dogged by criticisms of the tone and quality of debate (see McColm 2013) particularly online. 
It would again be reasonable to argue, in line with evidence presented here, that Mouffe has 
been proved right in her insistence that passion and conflict are key components of the 
political, however unpalatable that may be. This ought to be qualified though in respecting the 
likelihood of the level of conflict in a referendum regarding sovereign issues to be heightened 
in a way that every day politics may not. 
 
It would seem sensible then to focus upon transforming antagonism into agonism. However, 
it could be reasoned that agonists such as Mouffe would not believe that trolling/flaming is 
acceptable or to be encouraged, though what actually constitutes offensive online behaviour 
will always be subjective to the ideals of the recipient or the person reading the comments 
concerned. Whilst agonists such as Mouffe focus upon antagonism and conflict, they do not 
do so in a manner which legitimises practices which are undeniably contrary to democratic 
values of open expression without the fear of reprisal.  
 
6.3.2 The communitarian strand 
6.3.2.1 Ideological homophily 
Ideological homophily (or the more pejorative term - fragmentation) according to Freelon, 
relates to ‘the proposition that citizens tend to assemble themselves into politically 
homogeneous collectives that rarely if ever engage with outsiders’ (Freelon 2010). Social 
media, it is often suggested (see Sunstein 2009) is encouraging ideological homophily which 
is a growing concern democratically, as the starting premise for an informed electorate is to 
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be exposed to different points of view which in turn enables informed political decision making. 
In this section, a number of different themes are presented which explore why social media, 
with all of its supposed democracy enhancing capabilities, is seen as being a threat to 
democracy in terms of fragmentation and the reasoning behind these claims. Additionally, the 
often overlooked, positive facets of social media and ideological homophily are discussed. 
 
6.3.2.1.1 Twitter bubbles and echo chambers 
Critics of social media and particularly criticisms of the actual reach and impact of Twitter, will 
often speak of the Twitter bubble which is generally followed by a supporting statement 
claiming that social media more broadly is merely a so-called echo chamber. The implied 
narrative of claims of a Twitter bubble is that those who frequent Twitter, mistakenly believe 
that the platform is representative of the political priorities and prevalent opinions of the 
broader population as a whole. The term echo chamber emphasises the notion that people on 
social media forums are indeed limiting themselves to the views they choose to hear, and 
those views tend only to be the ones with which they themselves also hold. The following 
article addresses the concept of the Twitter bubble with particular reference to journalists: 
 
 
 
Figure 23 Screenshot from the Guardian (2016) 
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The article, which is specifically referring to the Twitter bubble as relating to journalists, is one 
which can be applied to all communities of Twitter users but the term does tend to be 
characterised by suggestions that the Twitter bubble is one which is generally inhabited by 
elites (such as journalists, politicians, academics) and the inhabitants of the bubble are failing 
to listen to the largest group within the public sphere, namely the broader electorate or the 
colloquially termed ordinary woman and man. The article makes an important point about the 
reach of different social media platforms: 
 
When I say ‘everyone is talking about Zola’, who is ‘everyone’? And what’s at stake 
when journalists get the answer wrong, or disregard the question altogether? Getting 
to that truth requires taking a more basic step that most of us forget even exists, but is 
nevertheless crucial in dealing with this issue: who uses Twitter? We like to think we 
understand it, but we rarely think of its reach relative to Facebook and more traditional 
platforms (ibid.). 
 
The reason journalists tend to talk about Twitter in terms of public discourse is the same 
reason why the majority of academic social media analysis takes place on Twitter. The reason 
is that it is genuinely public and accessible (not completely, but certainly in comparison to 
other platforms such Facebook). The criticisms, however, remain valid and are ones which 
were accepted as being so by journalists, politicians, and activists alike during data collection 
from interviews during the study. The quote below is from a journalist when asked if he was 
aware of the concept of the Twitter bubble: 
 
Yes and I find myself slipping into it where you become convinced that a certain tweet 
is hugely important from a recent exchange and occasionally people text me asking, 
did you see this tweet from such and such? To which I think no, and nor did four million 
other people…in the grand scheme of things most people will not make up their minds 
[about their voting preference in the independence referendum] based upon it [Twitter]. 
(J2) 
 
The fact that the journalist in question had himself quantified the impact of Twitter and the 
concept of the Twitter bubble, as had others, is particularly important. For the Twitter bubble 
to be taken seriously it necessitates those involved to be unaware of, or, overstate the reach 
and impact of Twitter and that simply was not the case in terms of the journalists interviewed. 
In stark contrast, they had very realistic opinions about the reach and impact of Twitter and if 
anything tended to be more guarded about its impact than others within the study. Similarly, 
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most newspaper articles, in line with the previous Guardian article above, if anything tended 
to err on the side of caution regarding expectations around the importance of Twitter, as a 
proportion of the overall population of concerned parties, particularly with reference to political 
campaigns and debates.  
 
Politicians were also tentative regarding the reach of Twitter and the impact of social media 
more broadly, whilst generally acknowledging the impact of social media on the democratic 
communication process during the Scottish independence referendum. One MSP stated: 
 
I think we forget that it is a pretty small pool of the people that are engaged on social 
media, particularly when it comes to politics because it is an even smaller chunk. I think 
where social media is important though is in terms of opinion forming. So, for example, 
a lot of my followers are journalists or political commentators so there is a way there 
of actually influencing the broader debate, but I don’t think we should kid ourselves 
that social media is taking over in terms of the wider general public. (M4) 
 
The statement above is of particular interest as it shows that the MSP in question believes the 
impact of social media is perhaps overstated whilst also tacitly acknowledging a particular type 
of Twitter bubble, where elites are talking to elites about political issues. In contrast to the 
notion that this is a negative phenomenon, the suggestion seems to be that the facilitation 
which Twitter provides to connect networks of people with high levels of social capital, is a 
positive tool for politicians in terms of impacting upon opinion formation. Another MSP, 
perhaps unintentionally, reiterated the standing of the demographics she engaged with on 
Twitter: 
 
I think on Twitter that you can build up a reputation amongst your peers by showing 
them, other politicians, journalists and activists, what you are doing and what you are 
thinking. So it can be used that way, and constituents are active on Facebook so it’s 
good to show you are on there too. (M2) 
 
The suggestion that politicians were acutely aware of the limitations of Twitter in the context 
of communication with the public at large, was in evidence when another MSP stated the 
following: 
 
I have 60,000 constituents. I have less than 6,000 followers on Twitter and not all of 
my followers are constituents. So if I put something on Twitter, then 1% of my 
constituents will probably see it so I am realistic about that. (M3) 
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M3 then developed this point by suggesting that if anyone were to knock on the door of 
constituents in the area and ask if the resident followed their MSP on Twitter, that the result 
would likely be a blank stare of confusion.  M3 also suggested that the best method of political 
campaigning is out on the doorstep, but that social media was a welcome and useful addition 
in that regard. 
 
Again then, in line with the earlier statements from a journalist, contrary to misjudging or 
overstating the impact of Twitter the politicians interviewed had at least, a very realistic 
understanding of the limited impact of Twitter whilst acknowledging that it probably had some 
influence on proceedings. 
 
Another MSP acknowledged the Twitter bubble but saw it as having positive connotations in 
terms of information provision (in line with Kuhn’s five functions of the media): 
 
The reason I would urge caution is that you can overstate the numbers of people that 
are actually involved. I think there is a 'Twitter bubble' as well as a 'politics bubble' and 
all the rest of it, and what I have found most interesting is that [the] Twitter bubble 
concept is there, but things come out of it now because a lot of the mainstream media 
are actually getting stories from this Twitter bubble. (M7) 
 
This viewpoint was an entirely different take on the matter and saw the Twitter bubble as 
enhancing news provision as opposed to fragmenting exposure to different points of view. 
 
6.3.2.1.2 Activists/general forum participants and homophily 
The evidence presented in the previous subsection suggests that allegations of journalists and 
politicians existing in a Twitter bubble, unaware of the limitations of Twitter and social media 
were largely unfounded in relation to this study. The question remains, however, as to whether 
this was the same for activists and other forum participants. There is of course a fine, intangible 
line between a coming together of likeminded individuals in support of the same cause and 
the equally intangible abstract notions of homophily. To attempt to redress the balance, in a 
following section the positive connotations of homophily are discussed. 
 
A further complication in assessing the presence of homophily during the debate is that the 
vote itself was to decide upon the fragmentation, or not, of the UK political system. This in 
itself perhaps made it almost inevitable that a vote of this nature would lead the supporters of 
fragmentation, namely independence supporters, to be labelled as unthinking and 
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indomitable, particularly if they were certain in their desire for independence. To hold a certain 
position is in itself not contrary to deliberative democracy as long as individuals are willing to 
reflect upon ideas which are contrary to that position. 
 
At times, however, it seemed that perhaps the only people given credit during the debate were 
those that were willing to come out as undecideds. Though of course there was a majority of 
voters who were committed either one way or the other from the start of the debate and would 
likely not be swayed regardless of being exposed to a balanced media or not. An example of 
this kind of attitude towards those committed to one side of the debate was expressed by a 
journalist on discussing the group National Collective: 
 
They used to be much better when they started, they were much more engaging and 
open minded. Their Twitter account now has just lapsed into echoing Yes Scotland in 
a pretty unthinking and tribal way and that for me just isn't interesting. (J2) 
 
The desire of the journalist quoted above was that of many critics of the debate, the desire for 
open-mindedness which is entirely understandable and is more commonly associated with the 
ideals of deliberative democracy. However, the reality of this campaign in particular, was much 
closer to agonistic pluralism whereby the deep-rooted passions and resulting intransigence of 
many, ought not to be mistaken as undemocratic but perhaps simply support of a position 
which they were entirely committed to. 
 
What was in evidence during the debate which it seemed was perhaps mistakenly seen as 
fragmentation enabled by social media, was the general failure of value pluralism throughout 
the debate (see chapter 3 dedicated to literature on political pluralism). On a number of 
occasions, the sentiment of the quote below from another journalist was repeated: 
 
If you disagree with someone on [any] issue you are evil or corrupt [in their mind] or 
mentally insane. There is no recognition that there is just a person with a different point 
of view which I think is one of the problems with political debates being conducted on 
social media and the pervading of social media as the dominant platform (sic). That's 
just not healthy. (J1) 
 
In a similar vein, an MSP stated: 
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I think though that there are people out there who view the world through a prism where 
everybody against you is the enemy and they are horrible individuals and awful people, 
you know, I just don't think that kind of attitude or approach is helpful. (M3) 
 
Such allegations as the ones above were unfortunately entirely legitimate and accurately 
described the prevalent tone, particularly with reference to conversational exchanges between 
individuals throughout the debate. The failure of people to accept the legitimacy of their 
opponents, particularly when combined with repeated trolling/flaming was the genuine 
democratic disappointment of the debate and was far more evident than the allegations of 
widespread homophily, whether from activists, journalists, or politicians.  
 
In the opening sentence of this section, Freelon’s description of ideological homophily is 
quoted, which requires ‘collectives who rarely if ever engage with outsiders’. This was not the 
position during the online Scottish independence referendum campaign, it was more a case 
that the engagement was generally ill tempered and dismissive to the point where productive 
engagement seemed at times to be impossible. It would be logical to conclude then, that social 
media did indeed foster such disdain for political opponents in the same way in which it has 
enabled flaming/trolling, but this behaviour falls outside of definitions of homophily as put 
forward by Freelon in his model of democratic political communication.  
 
6.3.2.1.3 Broader notions of fragmentation inside and outside of the Scottish 
independence referendum 
During the interview process, conversations regarding the broader notion of 
fragmentation/homophily beyond those of the Twitter bubble revealed some important insights 
on the subject. 
 
In terms of ideological fragmentation, it is important to state that the level of exposure to 
differing viewpoints is entirely at the hands of the account holder rather than the platform itself. 
For example, this study, in line with many other Twitter users, deliberately followed accounts 
from both sides and all areas of the debate in order to deliberately be exposed to different 
points of view. Fragmentation is construed as being the result of a lack of exposure to different 
points of view. The allegations of ideological homophily and its propagation by social media 
lie in the assertion that traditional news platforms, such as television news bulletins and some 
newspapers, are either required by statute to provide balance, as is the case with the BBC, or 
take an editorial policy in line with professional journalistic standards, whereby reporting 
counter-positions is generally standard practice (at least to some extent or another). A 
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campaign official pointed out the threats posed by social media if it were to (though he believed 
it would not) establish a significantly greater audience than now: 
 
I think there is a fragmentation of the kind of public discourse we have and these people 
live in a fundamentally different space to me, in which the kind of trusted watchdog role 
I have afforded organisations like the BBC or The Guardian does not exist. That role 
has been devolved to places like Newsnet Scotland and Wings Over Scotland and 
because of that we are now fundamentally incapable of engaging in a discussion. (M6) 
 
The campaign official went on to discuss how rumours regarding tales of newly discovered oil 
fields which had allegedly been kept secret from the general public, due to the way that they 
would support the financial case for an independent Scotland were problematic.  Suggesting 
that small, militant groups such as The 45 and The 45 rising, who made such arguments, were 
examples of a mind-set which made broader debate a futile exercise.  The same campaign 
official when pressed upon the potential of a significant rise in people relying on social media 
for their news provision, explained why he believed that human curiosity overrode ideologically 
homophilic tendencies, using the referendum campaign to explain why:  
 
There is a problem that we have with the internet that we didn't have before in that 
when we allow fragmentation and identify in ever smaller groups and we limit our 
exposure to wider networks of people. I don't think [however] that you can ever defeat 
the innate curiosity of individuals and I think the independence referendum with the 
hashtag indyref demonstrated that. (M6) 
 
M6 elaborated by discussing how there was a certain proportion of people that were served 
by an ever-diminishing circle of information but that in his opinion, the vast majority were 
engaging somewhere else with people on both sides of the debate.  The official here then, 
has based his opinion of the willingness of people to engage with both sides of the debate on 
the prevalence of the use of the #indyref. This hashtag was unquestionably the dominant one 
throughout the course of the referendum campaign with 5.8million tweets of which 2.6 million 
were sent in the month preceding the final vote (Crossley 2014). #indyref was populated by 
both sides of the debate in a way that #YesScotland and #BetterTogether, including 
derivatives thereof, would logically not be. This would tend to provide further evidence of a 
lack of a Twitter bubble or echo chambers within this study which stands contrary to popular 
opinion.  
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The same official emphasised his point regarding a willingness of individuals to seek out a 
balance of viewpoints when asked if legislative action should somehow be taken to ensure the 
presence of a pluralistic media within the UK:  
 
I’m not sure we do. I think there are problems with that model and I don't think it is 
sustainable, and you end up in a position where I can see the BBC, who have a duty 
to be balanced, but on You Tube I can find somebody saying exactly what I want to 
hear, then why will I keep watching [as people indeed currently are] the BBC?  (M6) 
 
The official went on to suggest that plurality of exposure is user driven and that the most 
successful events during the referendum were the ones that were perceived as being 
balanced.  The issue of balance is an issue that is ever present in media discussions in the 
present day. The official here is extolling the benefits of a balanced, pluralistic media whilst 
suggesting that this ought not to be imposed, and that the general appetite for balance will 
see individuals seeking out balanced content on their own terms. This assertion is evident in 
the success of hashtags during the campaign which were populated by both sides of the 
argument. 
 
6.3.2.1.4 Homophily as a democratic positive 
In line with the majority of democratic literature, the lion’s share of this section has focused 
upon the negative connotations of ideological homophily. There are however positive 
connotations of ideological homophily which ought to be acknowledged. The human instinct 
to form communities of homogenous collectives ought not to be seen as overwhelmingly 
negative in democratic terms. Associations are at the heart of political behaviour (as detailed 
at length in the political pluralism chapter) and subsequently, political power and influence is 
derived from such associations. Plurality voting - the party association with the most votes, is 
still at the centre of our parliamentary process whilst majority voting is the way that we decide 
the result of referenda, in line with the democratic process of the Scottish independence 
referendum 2014. 
 
Individuals find political strength and voice through being part of a collective. Much of this 
study is dedicated to the democratic achievements of Yes Scotland supporting activist groups, 
so to dismiss homophily as being entirely negative flies in the face of the general sentiment 
expressed within the project. Mutz (2006) finds that, ‘lower levels of citizen exposure to 
diametrically opposed viewpoints are associated with higher levels of political participation’. 
While Fraser (1990) ‘considers the absence of fundamental disagreement as a necessary 
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condition for the construction of ingroup-specific strategies and narratives’. This is not to 
suggest that insularity in a broader social/political context is preferable to exposure to different 
points of view which challenge pre-conceived views and opinions, rather that strength from 
association has a valid role within the democratic process. 
 
We ought to not then forget that the capacity for social media to connect likeminded people 
ought to be considered as one of its democratic positives rather than negatives. Whilst the 
anonymity and distance of social media is correctly linked to entirely undesirable phenomena 
such as trolling and flaming, it also enables those that are particularly inhibited to find voice 
through the confidence of congregating in online communities, allowing them to express 
political viewpoints where they otherwise may not in traditional political settings (see 
mobilisation section). A campaign official quantified this position when asked about the scale 
of the threat to democracy that social media affords, as held by Sunstein (2007) and others, 
where he felt the long-term reality would see: 
 
A mix of mainstream and new media organisations and individual users, and for some 
people this will lead to a fragmentation [which works against pluralism] and does pose 
a threat to democracy but I think if you imagine a continuum, it will lead to a richer, 
more pluralistic democracy in the centre where largely we are better informed and 
largely we are more engaged and inter-connected. (M6) 
 
To take such a position is to generally stand out from the contemporary take on ideological 
homophily and the perceived threat which it poses to the democratic process. It is however 
more representative of the evidence within this study, if we genuinely consider ideological 
homophily and the notion of Twitter bubbles and echo chambers as separate to the 
disappointing evidence of a failure to conform to ideals and standards of value pluralism and 
reciprocity.  
 
6.3.2.2 Mobilisation 
Mobilisation, according to Freelon’s model, is classed as communitarian, and regards the 
manner in which online political communication both drives and enables individuals and 
groups to take part in political activities. Freelon states that ‘the action thus mobilized can be 
offline, such as protesting or volunteering for a political campaign; or online, such as donating 
to candidates through a web form or emailing one’s state or federal legislators’ (Freelon 2010). 
The manner in which citizens were mobilised during the independence referendum campaign 
was generally accepted as being a major positive in democratic terms. With this in mind, after 
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discussing the nuanced differences between political engagement and mobilisation, the 
evidence of social media mobilising political activity is specifically focused upon  
 
6.3.2.2.1 Engagement or Mobilisation?  
It is important to distinguish political mobilisation from political engagement as much of the 
political discourse during the independence referendum campaign, and indeed during data 
collection from interviews, the two were often conflated as being one in the same. Political 
engagement can be taken as being aware of the matter in question and following issues and 
arguments (generally through the media) over the period of the campaign without specifically 
taking part in political activities which are related to proceedings. Mobilisation necessitates a 
wilful act of participation, for example, from joining a political party or pressure group to 
financial donations to political causes, taking part in a demonstration or simply signing a 
petition. Both are important factors of the democratic process and engagement can be seen 
as a precursor of mobilisation and vice versa. At interview, a newspaper editor spoke of the 
manner in which he sensed a level of engagement which was unprecedented during previous 
campaigns: 
 
I guess social media did engage people and I think you saw the street engage people, 
just walking down the street through George Square and Buchanan Street and seeing 
people demonstrating and meeting and having conversations everywhere you went 
and people were talking about it. I mean, bus stop conversations about the European 
currency or a currency union! When does that happen? And for me that played a huge 
role in making sure that everybody was actually up for this debate. (J3) 
 
Whilst the above quote was one which was similar in nature to numerous others, the 
supposition that social media was the main driver of engagement is contestable. It could 
equally be argued that the enormity of the referendum issue was the real driver of 
engagement. The growth in the use of social media in comparison to prior campaigns and the 
fact that the electorate were more engaged and mobilised, tend to be seen to be dependent 
on one another. However, the correlation between the two does not necessarily assure 
specific causal links, so any such claims ought to be treated with caution.  
 
6.3.2.2.2 How does social media facilitate mobilisation in ways other media cannot? 
If we are to accept predominantly anecdotal claims of the power of social media to mobilise 
where traditional media forms cannot, this requires us to detail the evidence which supports 
or refutes this. This assertion was discussed with all interviewees, and while for some the 
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opinion was that social media is simply a supplement of traditional media, the pertinent points 
can be categorised as the following: 
 
 Connectivity  
 Livestreaming/event sharing 
 Social media as a technical campaign tool 
 
6.3.2.2.2.1 Connectivity  
Social media has the power to connect people and establish networks in a manner that the 
traditional media generally cannot. The following is an example of the way that an activist 
group secured the services of a well-known music artist to come and play at a political event 
during the referendum campaign:  
 
The connectivity you can have (sic) if you have a relationship with somebody online 
[means you can] suddenly get Billy Bragg coming to Edinburgh to play at a festival, 
and that’s because National Collective connected with him through Twitter. Now that 
wouldn’t have happened previously because you would have had to go through an 
agent or something so there is that direct stuff (sic). So I can see somebody’s tweet 
and say, I love that, and ask them to write for us and it all connects up. (A1) 
 
Of course, it would still be possible for National Collective to establish contact with Billy Bragg 
without Twitter but the activist in question, with experience of the process of doing so, 
recognised the way in which Twitter simplifies the process. In this context, then, the ability to 
connect with a popular figure who is willing to participate in a political event may mobilise 
individuals to attend an event that they may not have otherwise. This is no different from 
celebrity endorsement in traditional political campaigns but in the opinion of the interviewee 
this would not have been possible without online communication.  An SNP MSP spoke of 
connectivity and how social media mobilised the general public to attend and participate in 
political events: 
 
What the real social media contribution on the ground in a sense was, was what you 
call mobbing if you like, whereby you say something about an event and suddenly 100 
people turn up. So people like Radical Independence Convention were able, through 
social media, to get 200 people out to Wester Hailes on a Saturday and get people 
signed up [to their campaign]. (M8) 
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Again, the influence of social media is based upon supposition. However, the view from those 
at the centre of the campaign was that social media was mobilising people in ways that the 
traditional media could not. Traditional media perhaps being the act of taking out an 
advertisement in a local newspaper or on local radio prior to an event in an attempt to attract 
people to attend. 
 
6.3.2.2.2.2 Livestreaming/event sharing 
Livestreaming political events simply means the live broadcast of the event in question, 
livestreaming online allows for virtual participation whereby people who could not attend an 
event or simply did not feel motivated enough to attend an event in person, can still take part 
in real time. Event sharing refers to the capacity of event organisers to archive an event which 
has already taken place so as interested parties who could not attend the event, or became 
aware of the event after the fact, could still experience the event in question. The following 
statement by an activist group succinctly described how this manifested itself during the 
independence referendum campaign: 
 
It [social media] has got people to advertise their events and share their events. So for 
example, Tariq Ali came and spoke in Edinburgh and Glasgow and I couldn’t go 
because I was looking after my kids but I was able to watch it live online. That is through 
collaborations of people saying [to themselves], well I have the technical skills to either 
livestream this or capture and broadcast it afterwards, which means thousands more 
people who were unable to attend these events are getting the experience. (A1) 
 
The capacity for livestreaming and event sharing has been adopted by the traditional media 
on TV and radio platforms and digital newspaper formats. It is, though, obviously 
technologically beyond the capabilities of the traditional printed press. In 2014 however, the 
phenomenon was very much in its infancy and it was particularly exploited by the Yes 
movement as they sought to find new channels as opposed to the usual ones which they felt 
were closed to them in the traditional media. In summary of the impact of livestreaming and 
event sharing in combination, an independence activist went so far as to state: 
 
I think the attraction between the two has been the dynamic that has driven the 
independence movement. (A1) 
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6.3.2.2.3 Social Media as a technical campaign tool 
The official campaign groups also used social media as a tool to mobilise people in support 
of, or opposition to, Scottish independence. The complex manner in which polling 
organisations and others exploit the internet and social media in contemporary election 
campaigns, is though, beyond the boundaries of this project. However, an official who worked 
directly in this area during the campaign provided some basic details of the way in which this 
happened, and it is worthwhile to briefly touch upon these in order to understand the various 
ways in which the internet and social media are impacting upon the democratic process from 
a top down perspective.  
 
Certain tactics were employed to attempt to mobilise individuals to participate in actual events 
rather than just the perhaps expected targeted Tweets and advertisements, which were 
commonplace and obvious to anyone who used social media during the campaign. For 
instance, if individuals replied to prospective emails (which were often generated through 
online behaviour which suggested users were favouring one side or the other) asking which 
side of the campaign they were in favour of, the following tactic was used: 
 
If you entered your postcode [when prompted] it would show you where your nearest 
door knocking, canvassing, or debate event was happening within 20 miles of your 
house…we would then send a live email saying, ‘hi this is your nearest event and we 
are inviting you along’. (M6) 
 
M6 went on to describe how technical skills were used to compile a database of 25,000 new 
contacts which had interacted with Better Together during the campaign.  These contacts were 
then targeted with emails which said: 
 
Hi this is polling day and your nearest polling station is X your nearest campaign shop 
is Y and if you would like to spread the message online, do it via these social media 
channels... (M6) 
 
For the more technically minded internet/social media user, these kind of tactics and the 
manner in which online interaction can trigger such events would perhaps be no surprise. For 
others however, when presented with the conversation above it has been obvious that they 
are unaware that their information is being used in this way. 
 
The same campaign official described the differences in the user profiles of those that used 
Twitter opposed to social media platforms such as Facebook during the campaign: 
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Twitter is entirely self-selecting [in who somebody follows and hence the views they 
are exposed to] and political Facebooks, even during the referendum, were largely 
speaking to people who had made up their minds. (M6) 
 
M6 then explained that it was still crucial that the campaign was present on Twitter because a 
significant proportion of those who inhabited the platform were, for example, journalists, 
politicians, or community leaders and therefore carried influence ‘due to their respective ranks 
of social capital’ (ibid.).  This meant that the potential impact of the media outputs of such 
users necessitated that the Better Together campaign serve that interest.  That being said, 
such comments regarding the capacity of Twitter and Facebook to change people’s minds on 
their voting intentions during the referendum are not uncommon, though Facebook is viewed 
as perhaps having more enhanced discursive characteristics than Twitter (Harcup 2015). 
Importantly though, if we accept the opinion of M6 to predominantly be the case, this casts 
doubt on the level of impact of social media during the campaign and suggests that firm opinion 
formation is being influenced by other means.  
 
6.3.2.2.4 Crowdfunding  
Crowdfunding is the act of raising funds through online appeals and is accepted as an 
alternative method of political participation (see Belleflamme, Lambert and Schwienbacher 
2014; Mollick 2014; Hemer 2011). Websites such as Kickstarter.com and Justgiving.com can 
facilitate this or other methods can be used. The phenomenon was very much in its infancy 
during the referendum campaign and was a key demonstrable example of the way in which 
social media empowered the Yes movement in particular. Crowdfunding during the 
independence referendum attracted media attention on several occasions: 
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Figure 24 Screenshot from the Guardian (2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 25 Screenshot from Twitter 2013 
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Figure 26 Screenshot from Twitter (2013) 
 
Although blogging is technically a ‘free’ way of circulating journalism (whether it be citizen 
journalism or otherwise) realistically there are numerous costs incurred in devoting oneself, 
fulltime, to cover a lengthy campaign such as that of the Scottish independence referendum. 
Bloggers still require at the very least, a personal income and this is where crowdfunding can 
be exceptionally useful.  
 
The reason Yes Scotland targeted social media is almost certainly due to the fact that almost 
the entire UK traditional press were editorially against them. Writing in the weeks following the 
referendum result the former head of digital for Yes Scotland summed up the position: 
 
As some of you may have noticed, during the campaign, Scotland’s traditional 
newspapers almost universally backed the No side, supported by 55 per cent of voters. 
Only the Sunday Herald backed Yes Scotland. In stark contrast, blogs, social media 
voices and ‘new media’ news sources were almost universally in favour of Yes 
Scotland, supported by 45 per cent of voters. As the head of digital at Yes Scotland, 
this gave me a great deal of pleasure – and was a key part of our digital strategy. And 
yes, I do know that we lost but we did increase support for our cause by 20 percentage 
points (Kirkpatrick 2014). 
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Kirkpatrick’s quote confirms that Yes Scotland targeted digital platforms such as social media 
and blogs in order to attempt to address the imbalances in the traditional media landscape 
with which they were faced. This still depended upon supporters who were willing to populate 
digital media spaces and self-finance their efforts. The table below details the crowdfunding 
amounts raised by selected Yes Scotland activist groups: 
 
Group Crowdfunding 
Wings Over Scotland £330,000 
Women for Independence £70,000 
Newsnet Scotland £22,000 
Common Weale £25,000 
National Collective £18,000 
 
Table 9 Independence activists’ crowdfunding figures 
 
As we can see, Wings Over Scotland in particular was tremendously successful in terms of 
crowdfunding, raising over £330,000 in crowdfunding during the campaign (a figure officially 
ratified when Wings was fined £750 by the UK Electoral Commission for accounting 
anomalies, post-referendum) (Carrell 2014). Further to this, a booklet titled The Wee Blue 
Book published by Wings had 400,000 downloads in addition to 250,000 self-distributed hard 
copies in a country with approximately 4.4 million eligible voters (ONS 2015).  
 
Wings over Scotland was not the only grass roots campaign to raise substantial amounts of 
money through crowdfunding. Women for Independence raised £30,000 and £40,000 
respectively in two online, pre-referendum campaigns and £15,500 in just 14 days after the 
final vote. When asked if this amount of money could have been raised in the same manner 
in an off-line campaign, an experienced activist representing the group stated:  
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Oh my God that [crowdfunding] is wonderful, it’s amazing. The last two internet 
fundraisers we did, we just tweeted people until they gave us money. I mean the last 
£15,500 which I remember best, was entirely raised via Twitter because although it 
was in our newsletter and things, we didn't want to hit the women who had just got 
involved and had paid for membership. I don't know how you would raise that amount 
of money [so quickly] for a campaigning organisation without Twitter. (A2) 
 
A2 went on to explain that the approach taken was to target those that were sympathetic to 
the ethos and goals of Women For Independence but could never be members because, for 
example, they were male.  The same activist went on to speak of the methods they employed 
in terms of targeting users with social capital in order to quickly achieve funding goals: 
 
The marketing techniques on Twitter are about hitting up the people that have a good 
social reach and asking if they can share our fundraiser. Like PeatWorrior [internet 
activist], a lot of lawyers and that type of people [sic] follow him and they were willing 
to donate, so we would get on to him and ask him to tweet our link and put his own 
endorsement on it. (A2) 
 
A2 then went on to extol the marketing potential of Twitter for political activism, heralding its 
capabilities in reaching out to different populations.  She then explained how in her opinion, 
that many commercial organisations do not understand how to maximise this potential, but 
when they do the rewards are significant. 
 
A former SNP cabinet minister acknowledged the success of crowdfunding during the 
referendum campaign, making the point that they believed that crowdfunding of alternative 
media sources was in itself a protest against the traditional media: 
 
Yes there have been some astonishing fund raising successes during the referendum 
with some of the websites that were doing daily stuff, like Bella and Wings and 
Newsnet, who were raising pretty astonishing sums of money in some cases. So it isn't 
that people aren't prepared to pay. What's happening, is that people aren't prepared 
to pay for the traditional medium and way of doing things. People are not going to put 
money into a newspaper that they are enraged by. (M7) 
 
As detailed in the previous table, the other crowdfunding campaigns alluded to by the former 
minister during the independence campaign, included, Newsnet Scotland with £22,000 over 
two fundraisers; £25,000 was raised by Common Weale; National Collective raised over 
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£18,000 and Bella Caledonia over £13,000 (Carrell 2014). Whilst the amounts raised by Wings 
over Scotland are extremely impressive, and by Women for Independence are significant, we 
should keep them in context by comparing them to the official campaigns which both spent 
£1.5 million approximately (which they were officially limited to) as the official campaigns, and 
a cumulative total figure inclusive of donations of roughly £6,500,000. 
 
The phenomenon of crowdfunding during the independence referendum quite rightly grabbed 
headlines in the press. Crowdfunding is only one way of funding political organisations, 
another is the payment of party membership subscriptions. In the weeks following the 
referendum the SNP saw an unprecedented surge in official membership subscriptions, 
almost doubling in size within one week of the referendum, from 25,642 to 52,034 (Scotsman 
2014). On interview, an SNP MSP who was part of the team taking phone calls to meet the 
demands for new memberships, spoke of the commitment which the £5 membership fee 
meant for some of the prospective members: 
 
It [the demand for membership] was flabbergasting and some of the calls were very 
interesting, in that…some of them were from older folk who could just about scrape 
the five quid together and I heard the phrase more than once - 'I want to be a part of 
this' and in some cases it was people who didn't have the 5 pound that week. So we 
posted the form out to them for when they next had the money. (M8) 
 
M8 went on to reinforce at some length, the point that it seemed that many of these people 
were not previously engaged in political participation and that their backgrounds dictated that 
the outlay of £5 was financially significant for many of them.  A gesture which had made M8, 
a very experienced MSP, very emotional, both at the time of the event and also recounting the 
experience during the interview. 
 
Although the demand for new membership of the SNP falls outside of the way in which social 
media prompted and facilitated mobilisation during the referendum, it is indicative of the 
passionate political engagement which was in evidence. Crowdfunding, however, is 
something which (as stated above) empowered Yes Scotland to take on the traditional press 
which, without overstatement, was truly a David versus Goliath effort due to the overwhelming 
majority of the traditional press being against them. The possibilities afforded by social media 
in this context, are fuel for those who understandably believe the broader mainstream media 
does not represent them in their political views in the present day. 
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6.3.2.2.5 Examples of mobilised participation 
The previous subsection detailed the manner in which social media promotes and facilitates 
mobilisation in three different ways. This subsection presents some examples of mobilised 
participation which saw online activism crossing over into what would generally be classed as 
traditional campaigning. Presented first, are some examples of large scale events and 
participation in the form of Yestival and The Festival of the Common Weale. This is followed 
by evidence of what was termed the rise/revival of the town hall meeting, followed by the story 
of Women for Independence from their Twitter origins to an organisation with the capacity to 
mobilise over 1000 women at a rally in 2014. 
 
6.3.2.2.5.1 Yestival/ The Festival of the Common Weale 
As detailed in earlier chapters, National Collective generally consisted of young people, many 
of whom were students with links to the arts and creative communities. In July 2014 they 
organised a comprehensive, nationwide tour in support of Independence which they titled 
Yestival. The tour visited the Scottish Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, the Central Belt, Argyll, 
Highlands and Islands, Orkney, Shetland, the North East, Angus, Perthshire and Fife as well 
as all of Scotland’s seven cities: 
 
 
Figure 27 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
The commitment required to organise, promote, and stage Yestival would be no mean feat in 
just one town, for one day, but to co-ordinate it in so many locations is testament to the passion 
displayed, not only by National Collective but by many of the pro-independence activist 
groups. The following graphic shows that then Deputy Leader of the SNP and now First 
Chapter 6 – Results to the Primary Research Question 165 
    
Minister Nicola Sturgeon, was a speaker at the Glasgow leg of the Yestival tour. The fact that 
Nicola Sturgeon was a speaker at the event, which anecdotally had around 500 visitors, is 
evidence of how Yes Scotland and pro-independence activist groups worked in tandem to 
mobilise support for the independence cause: 
  
Figure 28 Screenshot from National Collective (2014) 
 
The following day in 2014, A Festival of the Common Weale took place. Both events were 
jointly advertised and there was obviously collaboration between the two groups. Bella 
Caledonia also promoted the event and had worked collaboratively with National Collective 
on several occasions. 
 
Independence activist groups often collaborated in their organisation, staging, and promotion 
of events. As detailed in the poster above, the festival was a comprehensive programme of 
discussion, music, and comedy. It was these types of collaborations, cross campaigning and 
eclectic programmes which brought attention to Yes campaigning and earned them the tag of 
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being ‘vibrant’ in a way which was difficult to in any way attribute to the Better Together 
campaign:  
 
Figure 29 Screenshot from Common Weal (2014) 
 
6.3.2.2.5.2 The rise of the town hall meeting 
Whilst the focus of this study is predominantly the digital campaign of the Scottish 
independence referendum, to get a genuine overview of the broader campaign it is important 
to present other developments in mobilisation and participation. Such events may confirm or 
contradict those that proclaim social media to have had a key role in the relative successes of 
the growth in the Yes Scotland vote, or, more likely, show a more complex picture where the 
internet and new media are interlinked with traditional campaigning. 
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A notable phenomenon in terms of mobilisation during the campaign, were claims of the rebirth 
of the town hall meeting, which was somewhat of a paradox in terms of campaigning in the 
age of digital media. Prior to the campaign the town hall meeting had generally been written 
off as a feature of the political past. 
 
The BBC published the following article on the subject in March 2014: 
 
 
Figure 30 Screenshot from BBC (2014) 
 
The article described how hundreds of people were attending local meetings during the 
campaign and how many of the speakers were people who had never publicly spoken before 
at a political event (somewhat coincidentally however, Yes Scotland Chief Executive Blair 
Jenkins was one of the participants in attendance at the event in question). The article went 
on to state that the meeting was organised by Yes Scotland and that Better Together were 
advertising similar events on its own official website. Professor James Mitchell, from the school 
of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh, was quoted in the article as 
saying: 
 
We all thought that the days of the big public meetings had died. Hundreds of people 
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are turning out in small towns for not necessarily big names. It's certainly generating 
interest among the activists. It's encouraging people to become active. We don't know 
what they do after a public meeting. Do they speak to their friends, their neighbours? 
That's the hope of the 'Yes' side (ibid.). 
 
However, the Professor was also quoted as stating; 
 
We should be very careful here. Even with these large public meetings, it's still a tiny, 
tiny proportion of the electorate which is turning out (ibid.). 
 
The theme of the town hall meeting was one which was raised a number of times during the 
interview process and most were positive affirmations of such meetings, representing a 
positive turn in the attitude of people with regard to participating in political events. On the 
subject of recorded increases in public meeting participation, one political activist stated: 
 
What you have seen in the last year is the rebirth of the public meeting across 
Scotland... I think it was incredible that for most of my adult life I remember reading 
stuff about politics being dead through apathy, mass disinterest generally and people 
just don't care, blah blah blah, and that is really not what we are seeing which is a 
complete revival. (A1) 
 
An SNP MSP was also extremely positive on the subject from the experience of some of the 
public meetings he had personally organised: 
 
We had the miraculous revival of the public meeting which over the years had vanished 
because we just gave up trying to make it happen, but now, suddenly, you found that 
people came along and they were engaged and had questions. (M8) 
 
Others, however, were more cautious regarding the revival of public meetings. The following 
Conservative MSP explained his understanding of the situation: 
 
One of the aspects of the campaign that I thought was quite interesting, was we heard 
about how all these meetings were taking place all across the country, like Radical 
Independence and Tommy Sheridan and Jim Sillars were all having meetings but it 
was all the same people going to the meetings. (M4) 
 
M4 went on to clarify his point by explaining how such meetings in his area such as ones 
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organised by those already mentioned, and also for example Yes Scotland, Christians for 
Independence, and Business for Scotland, would be attended by the same 60 or so people as 
opposed to different groups of individuals.  Some may dismiss this as being the cynical 
perspective of a Better Together supporter, influenced by the broad acceptance that his/her 
side lost the battle in terms of a visible groundswell of mobilised support in comparison to Yes 
Scotland. However, in line with Professor Mitchell’s quotes also, the suggestions of hundreds 
of people turning out to town hall events (regardless of whether this was a repetitive movement 
of the same committed activists) perhaps ought to be treated with caution in terms of a 
genuine, sustainable upsurge in mobilised democratic participation. 
 
6.3.2.3 Community identification 
The question of sovereignty is one which feeds and challenges the concept of personal and 
national identity in a way that possibly no other political debate can. Identity politics poses both 
negative and positive challenges democratically (Gutmann 2009) and identity politics can 
constrain and divide society whilst also enabling the marginalised and oppressed to unite and 
prosper politically. Identity, in line with many democratic theories, is one of the key drivers of 
Mouffe’s theory of agonism and the referendum debate provided a multitude of examples and 
debates by which to test the theory. Freelon’s (2010) model focuses upon discourse analysis 
to identify the manner in which groups form (primarily) in the mind of individuals. This study 
however, does not use discourse analysis per se and in a separate chapter, using content 
analysis, the role of groups and pluralist group theory in the digital age is addressed. Here, 
the focus is upon identity in broader democratic terms in the manner in which Mouffe sees 
identity as a component of the political in her theory of agonism. The political, being taken as 
the emotional drivers of political inclinations and subject perspectives, often displayed as 
antagonism, viscerally fuelled by common identity.  
 
6.3.2.3.1 The emergence of nationalist activist communities online 
The independence referendum campaign saw the emergence of grass roots activist groups 
from various different communities. The relative success that these groups achieved is 
demonstrated by many still being highly active and visible on social media over 2 years after 
the independence referendum. This was seen by many as a major democratic success within 
the campaign. Of the many nationalist activist groups supporting independence there were 
four, with distinctly different identities, that were particularly prominent and became a main 
focus of the study, (figures in brackets denote the number of Twitter followers on the date of 
the referendum. For a more detailed description of the groups see the methodology chapter): 
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 National Collective (19,100)  
 Women for Independence (17,100)  
 Wings Over Scotland (23,300)  
 Bella Caledonia (20,500) 
 Other notable groups – Radical Independence, Newsnet Scotland, Common Weale. 
 
For those that take an interest in democratic communication and innovation, the relative 
success of campaign groups who, like the above, operated mainly on social media has been 
the enduring legacy of the independence referendum campaign. The reason for such optimism 
came from the organic nature of the way these groups formed in what was a relatively short 
timescale. They did so through social media and whilst difficult to quantify, it seems highly 
unlikely that they could have achieved what they did in the offline world. The connectivity and 
the manner in which the internet and social media can expeditiously raise awareness and 
drive campaigns was very much in evidence.  
 
The activist groups studied served those that identified with various demographics, from the 
young artistic members of National Collective to the generally previously inexperienced female 
activists of Women for Independence. An activist from Women for Independence explained 
the process of their group formation: 
 
We officially launched in November 2012 before the official Yes campaign even 
launched, so it was more of womenhood coming together and chatting online more 
than anything else…Our logo is the feminist symbol with a cross on it and I was at the 
meeting when we chose it and it could have been a rainbow I think, but we were 
conscious that we wanted the feminist symbol there…There were two strings to our 
bow, not just Women for Independence but Independence for Women, which from a 
strategic point of view was genius in that if and when we lost the referendum we still 
had a raison detre. (A2) 
 
The manner in which Women for Independence came into being was typical of other groups 
formed upon social or professional identity, including that of National Collective and a number 
of other groups such as, for example, Farmers for Yes and Lawyers for Yes. The evidence 
showed groups generally forming based upon an allegiance with those of a shared 
demographic.  
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Wings Over Scotland appeared to have a broader demographic following, attracting those with 
a hard-line attitude to independence. As has been detailed in the flaming unit of analysis, the 
group was, and still is, the most controversial independence supporting activist group but was 
also the group with the most Twitter followers. It is right to point out that some account 
followers (as was the case with this study) had different motivations for following certain 
accounts, other than being wholly in support of them, this kind of following includes a recently 
termed phenomenon of Twitter hate following. In this context, accounts may be followed as a 
means of keeping an opponent in plain sight, so as to be aware of, and possibly act upon, the 
content of that account or also purely for the sake of general interest. However, as detailed in 
the mobilisation unit of analysis, not only did Wings Over Scotland have the most Twitter 
followers but also comprehensively raised the most money through crowdfunding donations. 
Although unpalatable for some, we must acknowledge that a large number of people identified 
with this account which must be taken as an expression of their solidarity with the views, 
actions, and conduct of what was, and still is, at the very least, an unpleasant campaign which 
the official Yes campaign felt the need to officially distance itself from.  
 
6.3.2.3.2 The absence of Unionist activist communities 
If the emergence of effective grass roots activism on the Yes side of the debate was impressive 
and a cause for democratic optimism, the virtual absence of corresponding groups in support 
of the Union was hugely disappointing. As such, there were no groups to study as was the 
obvious initial intent of this empirical study. The only groups which emerged in support of the 
Union, beyond the official campaign, could not be classed as grass roots upon even the 
loosest definition of the term. Those that did emerge, generally followed a format of, for 
example, Academics Together or Farmers Together. These groups consisted of people from 
the communities in question being willing signatories, and, arguably token members of groups 
with accompanying launch day press releases and photographs. It appeared then, that such 
groups to all intents and purposes, ceased to exist or at least did not actively campaign like 
the aforementioned grass roots independence groups did. 
 
The question of why this was the case was posed to all of the research subjects during the 
individual interviews and there were three prevailing reasons identified. Firstly, it was 
suggested that the initial forecasts for the result of the vote had roughly two thirds supporting 
the Union and only the other third in support of independence. Consequently, there was a 
level of apathy from Unionists which nationalists could ill afford if they were to have any chance 
of winning (it should be remembered that in spite of the nationalists’ successes on social 
media, that the final result was still 55% to 45% in favour of the Union). Secondly, it was 
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suggested that a campaign for change will inspire activism in a way that a (expected landslide) 
campaign to maintain the status quo ever could:  
 
Yes were selling a vision where we were selling the status quo which was much more 
difficult. (M1) 
Selling a vision allowed the Yes camp to make promises and promote an independent 
Scotland that would fit with the aspirations of the electorate, without the hindrance of an actual 
political history which Better Together were encumbered with. The political challenges that 
Scotland within the United Kingdom face today, do so as part of a 300 year old union with the 
rest of the United Kingdom and the evidence is there for all to see. The Yes campaign 
however, were able to say they would fix problems and create a better nation, and that is 
exactly the campaign strategy which they followed.  
 
Thirdly, it was abundantly clear to all interested observers that the mainstream media channels 
were overwhelmingly in support of the Union and the status quo; therefore, the space which 
nationalists could exploit was social media. To put that argument in to context, the only 
national title to proclaim official support for the nationalist movement was The Glasgow 
Sunday Herald, a Scotland only title with a circulation of just 25,000 from a combined total of 
roughly 650,000 newspapers sold in Scotland each Sunday and 600,000 each weekday (Audit 
Bureau of Circulation 2016). The (Daily) Herald proclaimed support for the Union but only on 
the condition of further devolution of powers to Holyrood (Herald 2014), however this still 
meant that around 20 other UK newspapers including all of the other Scottish titles, both sole 
Scottish publications and UK titles with Scottish editions, did not. In combination all three of 
these arguments can be taken as significant contributors to the absence of grass roots 
Unionist activist groups.  
 
6.3.2.3.3 The Better Together campaign strategy and its sacrifice of identity 
There were other important factors in evidence regarding the role that identity played during 
the campaign in the expressed strategy of the Better Together campaign and the practical 
sacrifice of exploiting identity driven politics (Cram 2014). Better Together employed the digital 
strategy and advocacy firm Blue State Digital, the same firm that ran the successful digital 
campaign for President Barak Obama in 2008 and 2012. In simple terms the strategy was to 
target undecided voters only, ignoring those who were already definitely Yes or No and 
focusing upon those that came to be colloquially known as the missing million. A Labour Party 
worker and prospective MSP candidate stated: 
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I think the worst thing was that we thought there was a real focus on the million 
undecided people that they [the official campaign] had identified using this mosaic 
[polling] system. One of the Liberal Democrat guys said to me that Better Together 
don't believe in leafleting? We were doing it anyway by stock-piling everything they 
would give us because we had the network and the capacity to get stuff out as and 
when it suited us, but Better Together weren't interested in us doing that, they were 
focused on the million undecided voters and that was it. (M1) 
 
Then once it was established that the majority of undecided voters were concerned with the 
potential negative economic impact of independence, this became the unrelenting focus of the 
Better Together campaign. The strategy to focus upon the potential negative consequences 
of an independent Scotland, in tandem with the neglect of positive historical examples of the 
UK, built upon common identity, resulted in the prevailing narrative that Better Together had 
resorted to a campaign based upon project fear. The term, project fear, was self-admittedly 
coined by Better Together director Rob Shorthouse (Gordon 2014) and has become 
synonymous with negative political campaigning as shown in the EU referendum of 2016. The 
same party activist of the previous quote explained the frustration of those campaigning on 
the doorstep for Better Together: 
 
There was some stuff coming from Better Together that may have had some truth in 
it, that for example there was a story about mobile phone tariffs [going up if Yes 
Scotland won] which looked like scaremongering. Whether it was true or not, it was 
just lame and I thought this is just not where we want to go and I know that a lot of 
people we were campaigning with felt the same, and it was project fear kind of stuff 
and that's not the arguments we were trying to sell on the doorstep. (M1) 
 
M1 went on to describe how the actual vision which they wanted to sell was one which was 
based upon the UK track record of solidarity and cooperation rather than seemingly frivolous 
tales of an increase in the cost of mobile phone tariffs 
 
The fact that Better Together won would suggest that the campaign was indeed successful. 
However, support for independence by polling day was the highest it had ever been. One poll 
in 2013 had as little as 23% of the population in support of independence (Carrell 2013a) so 
the final vote of 55% to 45% suggested that independence supporters had won the battle if 
not the war, a term which was often used post referendum. Although the Unionists won the 
war, it came at a cost in terms of the manner of the victory and its legacy in Scotland. As one 
political editor for a Scottish national title stated: 
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If you are part of the 48% that believes intrinsically  in the UK, it is going to depress 
you that the emotional argument wasn't made; the social solidarity argument; the joint 
tradition in history. It depresses you [that] those arguments aren't made but if you are 
in that percentile, where they have got your vote, they don’t care about you because 
they are only interested in the 30% that are going to decide the outcome. (J1) 
 
The insight which the internal polling team headed by Blue State Digital had during the 
campaign is striking in that the same journalist was told on the eve of the referendum, by Blue 
State Digital, that the Better Together campaign would win by 56% to 44% (only 1% point out). 
The impact that ignoring the emotional arguments around identity and solidarity had, was a 
recurring theme from those interviewed on the Better Together side of the argument. It was 
apparent that this was a generally deflated group who at times could easily have been 
mistaken for being on the losing side of the vote. Time, of course, can see moods change 
depending upon the circumstances but there remains the possibility that the neglect of 
Unionist identity could hamper further Unionist campaigns in the event of a second 
independence referendum, which is now entirely possible following the Brexit vote of 2016. 
 
6.3.2.3.4 Identity politics – the cost of cross-party allegiances 
It would be rational to suggest that certain arguments such as sovereignty are cross-party 
issues which generate cross party alliances and therefore lead to cross party campaigning, 
but identity is not rational. It is emotional and visceral. The independence referendum 
campaign in Scotland generally consisted of, with some exceptions, Labour, Conservative, 
and Liberal Democrats allied in defence of the Union with the Scottish National Party and 
Scottish Green Party allied in pursuit of achieving Scottish independence. This resulted in 
some uncomfortable shared platforms on TV and radio debates and other public rallies and 
appearances. The most notable and uncomfortable alliance was that of the Labour Party and 
Conservative Party in both their Scottish and UK forms. The reason that this was controversial 
was due to the (previously) generally accepted notion of the Conservative Party in Scotland 
as being highly toxic, for many reasons, though generally associated with the governments of 
the late Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Under Thatcher, the Conservative Party all but 
surrendered its mandate in Scotland which subsequently led to the institution of a devolved 
Scottish Executive, later to become known as the Scottish Government. 
 
For many Labour supporters the sight of their democratic representatives sharing platforms 
with Tory ministers and commentators was inexcusable, and this was readily seized upon by 
Chapter 6 – Results to the Primary Research Question 175 
    
the Yes Scotland campaign and the SNP. The disparaging accusation of the Labour Party 
being in bed with the Tories was commonplace at the time and is still spoken of at the time of 
writing. Many consider the virtual annihilation of Labour seats, and the accompanying 
landslide victory for the SNP in Scotland in the general election of 2015, as partly attributable 
to the notion of Labour being in bed with the Tories during the 2014 referendum campaign. A 
Labour MSP stated the following when asked about the Better Together campaign and cross- 
party cooperation: 
 
The Tories are toxic in Scotland whether we like it or not. People were making it an 
easy target to say oh you [Labour] are in bed with the Tories, which to be quite honest 
was nonsense because it is like saying, Brian Soutar, billionaire homophobe, has the 
same views as Patrick Harvie, it is just nonsense and rubbish. (M5) 
 
M5 reinforced this point by going on to make a further analogy of how the fact that both the 
Conservative Party and the Communist Party of Britain were both campaigning for Better 
Together, but that it would be ridiculous to categorise these parties as political bedfellows.  He 
did however accept that exploitation of the point in question by Yes Scotland put them in an 
advantageous position during the campaign. 
 
Although it is entirely reasonable to point out the lack of fairness in the implied associations 
as stated above, the unfortunate fact for Labour was that the allegations were skilfully targeted 
and tirelessly repeated by the SNP in particular, and this seemed to resonate with the Scottish 
electorate. It was also noticeable that former Scottish Labour leader Kezia Dugdale made a 
point of not sharing a platform with the Tories during the EU referendum campaign, which 
suggests lessons had been learnt during the Scottish independence referendum campaign. 
When asked about the legacy of the referendum on Scottish politics of the in bed with the 
Tories sentiment, a Scottish daily newspaper editor said the following: 
 
You have a surge in SNP membership with people saying that they want to be involved 
in this, and how am I most likely to achieve what I want, and they have decided you 
know [sic] that the way to that is to join the SNP and some have joined the Greens and 
some to the Radical Independence movement. So all those movements are in very 
rude health and the Labour Party, I guess, is paying a heavy price for its involvement 
with Better Together and its lack of an identity in Scottish politics now. (J3) 
 
This was clear evidence of the value attributed to identity as a political mechanism and the 
cost when the identity of a party is in some manner damaged by external events. When asked 
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the question about the effect of cross party campaigning, a Conservative MSP explained why 
the situation was different and therefore less damaging to the Conservative Party: 
 
It wasn't a problem for us because, and the polls confirmed this, the Conservatives 
were the most committed Unionists with 97% of people that voted Tory voting No, and 
therefore in the Conservative Party people were far more inclined to see the bigger 
picture and put the Unionist aspect before party loyalty. (M4) 
 
M4 did, however, concede that it was much more difficult for the Labour Party because there 
was a greater proportion of the membership that were naturally inclined to vote for 
independence, and that: 
 
The SNP were very clever in trying to paint Better Together as a Tory campaign, and 
Labour were in bed with the Tories, and I can see why that made Labour feel more 
uncomfortable. (M4) 
 
It intuitively felt that the MSP quoted above was correct in the way that the Tory Party was 
seemingly unscathed by the platforms shared in the way that the Labour Party was. What was 
remarkable, however, was the manner in which First Minister Nicola Sturgeon shared 
platforms with Conservative Ministers during the campaign to decide the future of UK 
membership of the European Union in the referendum of 2016. The First Minister did this in 
much the same way that she had derided Labour for doing during the independence 
referendum, and this was on TV platforms which had vastly greater exposure across the UK 
than during the Scottish independence referendum. Any suggestion that Ms Sturgeon was 
merely representing her members does not bear scrutiny, as 65% of Labour supporters voted 
to remain in the UK (Guardian 2014) whilst 66% of SNP members voted to remain in the EU 
(Curtice 2016). It would be easy to suggest this as being hypocritical on the part of Ms 
Sturgeon but is also perhaps testament to her popularity across the political spectrum at the 
time, which meant this act was largely unreported with only a few exceptions (see Harris 
2016). This highlights the complexity of the role of identity in politics and in the independence 
referendum campaign, as the act of cross party alliances in the Scottish independence 
referendum is deemed unforgivable, whilst in the EU referendum it passes almost unnoticed. 
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6.3.2.3.5 The launch of the National Newspaper- a response to an under-represented 
community 
A common question that was repeated following the democratically positive debate, fuelled by 
the type of grass roots activism already discussed, was whether there would be a lasting 
legacy or was this merely a one-off display of democratic fervour? A tangible event that 
supports a positive legacy is that of the birth of the Scottish daily newspaper, The National, 
which was created to serve a community whose identity and political focus was hereto ignored 
prior to its existence. The Sunday Herald (part of the Herald & Times Group which also own 
The National) had come out in favour of independence late in the campaign but could hardly 
be classed as having a purely nationalist editorial position, but with its exception, the vast 
majority of other titles were in support of the Union with only a handful taking a neutral stance. 
 
It is common knowledge that newspaper circulation is falling across the UK, the impact of 
which was again demonstrated earlier in 2016 when The Independent ceased to produce a 
print publication and moved its entire operation online. The publishing of a new daily 
newspaper bucks the general trend and although the newspaper only sells around 17000 
copies at the time of writing (BBC 2015c) down from around 50000 at its launch, it is proof of 
the way in which a community which has previously not had its identity served, are willing to 
pay for journalism which represents their views (at least) in the wake of a positive 
independence referendum campaign. 
 
6.3.2.4 Intra-Ideological Questioning and Response 
The later subsection titled inter-ideological questioning and response, which focuses upon 
deliberative notions of reciprocity between individuals and groups on either side of the 
referendum debate, provides disappointing results in terms of evidence of online deliberation 
during the referendum campaign. This section however, suggests that there was evidence of 
a genuine communitarian theme during the referendum campaign, particularly between the 
independence supporting activist groups which are the main focus of the study. This had 
positive implications for the question of how online communications can have a constructive 
impact upon the democratic process in the UK.  
 
This section will firstly provide evidence of solidarity between activist groups and the manner 
in which they collaborated and supported one another. It will then discuss, with one particular 
example, retrospective questioning of the left wing of the independence movement 
immediately following the final vote. Following this, there are examples of how partisan the 
debate was and how the refusal to self-question or criticise any part of the movement led to 
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accusations of an authoritarian movement where any such questioning was scorned upon. 
This leads to a rare but powerful example of intra-ideological questioning which saw a 
prominent campaigner move from the Yes camp to the No camp.  
 
The manner in which social media fostered a communitarian response by like-minded 
supporters of independence, was probably the democratic achievement of the Scottish 
independence referendum of 2014. The manner in which citizens were mobilised during the 
campaign is covered extensively in a separate unit of analysis. This section concentrates more 
specifically on both positive questioning and response, which benefitted support for 
independence and, rare examples of negative questioning and response which perhaps 
caused harm to the cause despite being democratically legitimate. 
 
6.3.2.4.1 Positive communitarian response by independence activist groups 
The later deliberative unit of analysis titled Inter-ideological response and questioning, 
describes a campaign used by independence supporting activist groups such as National 
Collective, Bella Caledonia and Women for independence. The campaign was aimed at 
encouraging undecided voters to submit questions which the afore-mentioned groups would 
answer. An extension of this was the hashtag #IndyReasons. This exercise took the form of 
encouraging individuals from the same side to tweet and share the reasons that they were 
voting for an independent Scotland in the referendum, for example: 
 
Figure 31 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
The above tweet was directly placed by Bella Caledonia but the vast majority of IndyReasons 
tweets were contributed by individuals as opposed to activist groups themselves: 
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Figure 32 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
 
 
Figure 33 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
The word cloud below is a culmination of the reasons that people included in their tweets: 
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Figure 34 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
The above graphic, which itself was included under the IndyReasons hashtag, is an effective 
representation of the hopes and beliefs which many people have for an independent Scotland. 
It is easy to see how many people could be drawn into support independence if the stated 
democratic goals such as fairness and equality were deemed to be realistic outcomes. As 
mentioned elsewhere in the study, the way that independence supporters could sell an image 
of a new and different system, where many of the current issues would be improved upon, 
was a luxury which the Unionist side of the debate struggled to counter as they campaigned 
for the status quo.  
 
The phenomenon of #IndyReasons was an excellent example of the power of social media 
communications going viral, the result was that the campaign was a positive example of social 
media gaining exposure in the mainstream press: 
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Figure 35 Screenshot from The Independent (2016) 
 
#IndyReasons was also indicative of the type of campaign which began with the grass roots 
activist groups and was then acknowledged and supported by the official campaign, in this 
case by the then Deputy Leader of the SNP, Nicola Sturgeon: 
 
 
Figure 36 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
This kind of groundswell of democratic fervour around political issues is the type of 
phenomenon which proponents of the democratic possibilities of the internet and social media 
can draw upon and hope to foster in the future.  
 
The IndyReasons hashtag, as represented above, was indicative of a movement that was 
collaborative and also an example of a movement where people followed, or were members 
of, multiple campaigning activist groups within a broader movement:  
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The kind of people that follow us will follow all of the independence groups. (A2)  
 
There was also evidence of people with conflicting views or different priorities being willing to 
put those to one side for the sake of the broader independence movement: 
 
It might be about convergence because there are different groups, such as we come 
from the left politically but we also engage with people who would define themselves 
as more nationalist and might not see themselves on a left right spectrum…I suppose 
we bring different communities from a green perspective and a left perspective into the 
people who are discussing sovereignty, which is a challenge (A1). 
 
6.3.2.4.2 An independence movement unwilling to question itself? 
Questioning followed by response, in the sense which we are talking of here, is a subset of 
reciprocity. The process of questioning and response (when the response is affable) within a 
community, sends a message that people’s contributions are valued and that others are willing 
to listen to them. The internet, and social media more specifically, is the perfect tool for 
communities to question and challenge in a way which if fostered correctly, may have positive 
implications for the group in terms of democratically bonding communities together. 
 
This study considers at length, in different sections, the democratically heartening way in 
which a community came together in support of independence and more precisely, how social 
media was a major contributory factor which facilitated this. If there was one particular issue 
which reoccurred, and which negatively portrayed the Yes Scotland campaign and its 
supporters, it was allegations of a community where to question was seen as dissent. The 
narrative was one which held that to question any part of the Yes movement was to be seen 
as a traitor to the cause which could very quickly lead to the types of exchanges we have 
discussed in the flaming section of the study. Again, it would be for a different, quantitative 
study to provide statistical analysis of the prevalence of this. It was however, something which 
was regularly evident both on Twitter itself and during the evidence collected from interviews. 
 
The issue of a movement that was perhaps unwilling to listen to its members was raised in the 
following series of articles published online at Bella Caledonia. The author of the first article, 
Ewan Morrison, is an award-winning author and screenwriter and a personal friend of Bella 
Caledonia joint editor Mike Small. His decision to join Yes Scotland in May 2014, following a 
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period where he classed himself as one of the missing million, was applauded by 
independence supporters in the comments section of the following article: 
 
 
Figure 37 Screenshot from Bella Caledonia (2014) 
 
However, only a few days before the date of the referendum, Morrison made a public decision 
to change his allegiances in support of the Union: 
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Figure 38 Screenshot from Wakeup Scotland 2014 
 
The three-page article cited the reason for Morrison’s change of heart as being the result of 
being part of a movement where questioning (with all its deliberative benefits based upon the 
notion of reciprocity) was frowned upon: 
 
Four months ago, I joined the Yes camp out of a desire to take part in the great debate 
that the Yes camp told me was taking place within their ranks. Being a doubter I thought 
maybe I’d failed to find this debate and that it was exclusive to the membership of the 
Yes camp, so I joined hoping I could locate it and take part. But even as I was accepted 
into the ranks – after my ‘Morrison votes Yes’ article in Bella Caledonia, I noted that 5 
out of the meagre 20 comments I received, berated me for either not having decided 
sooner or for having questioned Yes at all. Another said, and I paraphrase: ‘Well if he’s 
had to mull it over he could easily switch to the other side.’ That comment in Bella 
Caledonia worked away at me like a stone in my shoe. Beneath it, I realised, was a 
subconscious message: ‘Now that you’re in with us you have to toe the line – ask 
questions about Yes and you’re out’ (Morrison 2014). 
 
Such an articulation of the issue, from somebody who had rationally considered both sides of 
the argument, had made a decision and then recanted due to an environment where to 
question the movement was frowned upon, was fairly damning. It was an articulation of a 
phenomenon which was present online and which was particular to the Yes Scotland side of 
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the argument. It was more common for Unionist supporters to acknowledge current issues 
within the Union but still maintain the Union as the sovereign entity of choice.  Morrison went 
on to explain how he was troubled by the response to reasonable requests from within the 
Yes movement for economic projections relating to, for example, oil revenues or the balance 
of payments in an independent Scotland, being greeted with a stock answer of: 
 
We’ll sort that out after the referendum, this is not the place or the time for those kinds 
of questions (ibid.). 
 
Additionally, Morrison alleged that those who sought such answers were accused of negativity 
that would play into the hands of the Unionist side of the debate. This general narrative was 
often spoken of during the interviews, though only ever by Unionist supporters and not once 
by supporters of independence. The following quote was made by a Labour Party MSP on the 
subject: 
 
I think it’s a terrific piece [the Morrison article] and very illuminating, it’s as if, and this 
is a bit tongue in cheek, it’s like some dissident coming forward from the old USSR 
[exposing practice] where nobody has told us what it’s really like, where all the time I 
just found the whole thing cult-like. (M5)  
 
M5 also found a lack of critique from outside of the movement regarding Yes Scotland 
campaign publications to be troubling.  He claimed that the independence white paper was 
glossed over in that a supposed left wing movement had no redistributive policy intentions, 
and instead relied upon hackneyed claims of cutting red tape in order to become a competitive 
economy. On this, M5 stated: 
 
Well for working people, competitive means low pay and shit conditions. Yet this went 
by without critique, so I found all of that within the Yes Scotland side very remarkable 
because everything on the No side was critiqued as being a sell out by somebody and 
I just found that really strange. (M5) 
 
Regardless of where observers stood on the position of an apparent lack of scrutiny of the 
Yes Scotland vision of an independent nation, the Morrison piece prompted discussions about 
the apparent unwillingness to accommodate any internal questioning within the Yes 
movement. Others, of course, simply suggested that such views were vastly under-
representative of what was in actuality a united campaign where the reality was that there was 
very little internal dissent to begin with. The question could also be asked as to whether the 
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Better Together campaign was open to internal scrutiny and challenge, or if it suffered with 
the same alleged issues as the Yes Scotland campaign. As is detailed elsewhere in the thesis, 
there were numerous internal criticisms of Better Together which were mainly based upon the 
negative campaign messages that were employed. In light of this, it is perhaps the case that 
a winning campaign can quickly forget its own misdemeanours whilst a losing one will see 
such issues perhaps unfairly focused upon, even in the case of Yes Scotland which increased 
its support from the low 20 percentile to 45% at the conclusion of the campaign. 
 
6.3.2.4.3 Intra-ideological questioning and response as a meaningful critique of the 
broader movement 
The previous subsection detailed events which were based upon a positive (some would argue 
idealistic) vision for the future which was easy for members across the independence 
movement to group together in support of. However, as was stated in the rational critical 
argument section, communications which were self-critical of the independence movement 
were rare. This made the ones that were critical, stand out and appeal to the study in a way 
that blind rhetoric or even positive collaboration, as in the last subsection, did. The following 
article, posted by Bella Caledonia, was an excellent example of a willingness to be self-critical 
in a way that could help the movement prosper in the future: 
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Figure 39 Screenshot from Bella Caledonia (2015) 
 
Although the above article was posted in the aftermath of the referendum when introspection, 
though not the order of the day, eventually became evident to a limited extent, it still represents 
a willingness to be rationally self-critical in a way that very few individuals or activist groups 
did. This was perhaps representative of Bella Caledonia being an activist group with its roots 
in professional journalism, as such self-questioning was not evident in the other targeted 
activist groups. 
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6.3.2.5 Communitarian section – deliberation and agonism 
To begin with ideological homophily, Freelon classifies this as communitarian but it is also 
relevant to debates around deliberative democracy. Certain commentators (Balkin 2004; 
Stromer-Galley 2003) go beyond negative connotations of homophily and detail positive 
communitarianism which unites likeminded individuals. Additionally, they claim that the 
internet is also enabling people from contestable political positions to come together and 
deliberate upon the issues in question (Dahlberg 2007). 
 
More negative theories and current expectations of the prevalence of ideological homophily 
as a result of internet-based communication, would suggest that this study would have 
evidence of groups living within Twitter bubbles and echo chambers, overstating the genuine 
impact and reach of social media. This was not the case. The focus demographics of the study 
were, if anything, perhaps overly pessimistic as to the impact of social media and saw other 
communication channels as significantly more important whilst accepting that social media still 
impacted on the Scottish independence referendum, when placed in conjunction with other 
media platforms. Whilst the evidence shows a willingness on all sides to seek out opposing 
views (at least externally as opposed to within the same campaign), this did not translate into 
positive deliberation. There may be many reasons for this, but the most likely is the adversarial 
nature of the binary independence referendum in the hottest of political settings. 
 
The most damaging aspect of the debate which was in all likelihood fuelled by social media 
with its unique facets of distance and anonymity (though this is difficult to specifically quantify) 
was an unwillingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the position of persons on the other 
side of the argument during the referendum campaign. A failure to do this makes any attempts 
to foster deliberation practically impossible. In contrast to many other norms of deliberation 
and agonistic pluralism, the requirement for such an acceptance of the position of political 
opponents applies to both deliberative and agonistic democratic theories. Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism is based upon, and accepts, the passion and (to a certain extent) the conflict which 
was endemic during proceedings. However, for conflictual consensus, which is essential to 
Mouffe’s theory, the acceptance of the legitimacy of opponents is paramount. This again 
suggests that for social media to be a productive part of the democratic process in the future, 
the priority perhaps ought to be focused upon fostering the legitimacy of political opponents 
ahead of perceived threats to democracy regarding ideological homophily.  
 
Freelon summarises Mutz’s (2006) findings to suggest that communitarian forums are the 
most likely to mobilise politically. The findings of this study fall in line with that hypothesis. 
There was a genuine community dynamic within Yes Scotland which was not in evidence to 
Chapter 6 – Results to the Primary Research Question 189 
    
the same extent within the Better Together campaign, and this was reflected in the types of 
mobilisation documented in this section. These efforts were aided by the utilisation of social 
media capabilities which were not possible until recently, such as livestreaming, event sharing, 
and crowdfunding which perhaps surprisingly, resulted in a two-way effect that fuelled 
traditional political campaign methods such as town hall meetings. 
 
Whilst Freelon restricts mobilisation to communitarianism, there are obvious links between 
mobilisation and deliberative democracy. The discursive properties of social media allowed 
onlookers to observe the online debate and perhaps also contribute to the arguments. This in 
itself is a loose form of deliberation. The crossover into traditional campaigning as documented 
in this chapter in the form of town hall meetings, Yestival, and the Festival of the Common 
Weale, are all to differing extents forums for discussion. Whilst we have little evidence of 
Twitter facilitating deliberation which resulted in individuals moving from Yes to No and vice 
versa, we perhaps ought not to expect so, on a platform where contributors appeared to be 
convinced of their preference at the start of proceedings. The fact, however, that the Yes 
Scotland side of the argument saw such an enormous leap from support in the low twenty 
percentile to 45% in the final result, means that at the very least, many don’t knows made the 
move to Yes. As is proven in other sections of this study, the vast majority of the traditional 
media supported the Unionist position which in itself suggests that the social media campaign 
may have had a role of converting a number of the undecideds to support independence, 
though this remains unquantifiable. 
 
Mouffe’s agonistic theory is fuelled by conflict and passion which were both evident in the Yes 
campaign, and particularly through their supporting activist groups. Antagonism and conflict 
are particularly evident in other sections such as flaming. Quantifying abstract notions such 
as passion is inherently difficult and whilst there was undoubtedly passion in both the 
independence and Unionist camps, the types of innovative mobilised campaigning detailed in 
this section, suggest that Yes Scotland were fuelled by a passion which (at least outwardly) 
surpassed that of their Unionist counterparts. This was evident in the fact that there was a 
complete absence of grass roots Unionist activist groups, although as explained elsewhere, 
the reasons for this are perhaps more complex and relate to the difficulty of motivating from a 
position of the existing hegemony. 
 
Deliberative democracy involves a process which is intended to result in better decisions, 
arrived at through a process which limits the extent of exclusion in contrast to majoritarian 
voting procedures. The concept of identity is communitarian and precedes the decision-
making process. It is concerned with making sense of political motivations and allegiances 
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based upon common values, influenced generally by social and cultural commonalities. Within 
the independence referendum identity was largely a matter of a community, with supporters 
of Scottish independence finding a place on social media due to the fact they were largely 
opposed by traditional media organisations. Identity politics has been seen by some as a 
significant hurdle to deliberative democracy. Dryzek (2005) sees nationalism as being the 
toughest type of political issue where any victory is by definition exclusionary, with regard to 
the suppression of the defeated side(s). He also, however, believes that the installation of 
deliberative institutions, when those institutions are distanced from the state, have the power 
to negate the level of exclusion in such societies divided by identity politics. This study, 
however, was limited to the empirical observation of identity politics in an election context, and 
at that, an election where only one side focused upon the relevance of identity, whilst the other 
chose to practically ignore identity altogether.  
 
Mouffe’s theory of agonism sees identity as one of the key political motivators, although the 
role of identity in the political process is relatively common with pluralists such as Robert Dahl 
(1976) and advocates of deliberative democracy such as Amy Gutmann (2009). The themes 
in this section demonstrate the manner in which identity, both in broad terms of nationalist 
identity and the sub communities within that movement, was indeed evident in the evolution 
of their groups. Two of the four activist groups detailed in this section saw a coming together 
of communities, - the artistic students of National Collective and the female membership of 
Women for Independence. These two groups had memberships which were active online 
whilst also physically mobilised to attend meetings and rallies. The other two, Bella Caledonia 
and Wings Over Scotland, were generally based online, controlled by one or two people. 
These two groups grew their strength and reputation based upon the amount of visitor traffic 
on their websites and the number of Twitter followers that they had, this was aided by 
contributors writing articles which were shared on the sites. 
 
The absence of grass-roots Unionist groups has been detailed and explanations have been 
put forward backed up by the evidence from interview subjects. The resonating evidence in 
terms of agonistic theory is the expressed frustration of the Unionist community when their 
identity was purposefully neglected by the official Better Together campaign and their partners 
Blue State Digital. This could be argued as positive affirmation of the importance placed by 
agonism upon the requirement to recognise and foster identity to formulate a fully functioning 
democratic process. The failure of Better Together to do so, has left a frustrating legacy for 
core Unionist supporters and is a key contributor to the argument that Yes Scotland won the 
battle (certainly on social media) even though they lost the war, which was decided by the 
concluding ballot of the referendum campaign. 
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In a different respect, the damage which can be done to an identity in certain circumstances 
was demonstrated by evidence regarding the impact of cross-party alliances within the Better 
Together campaign. Many people were willing to accept that the referendum was a cross-
party issue of sovereignty and (uncomfortably) accepted their leaders sharing platforms with 
their greatest adversaries. This was not, however, acceptable to many others and the SNP 
recognised the conflict of interest between Labour and Tories and skilfully exploited the issue 
of identity to capitalise upon an already discontented Labour support. The evidence of this is 
in the testimony of the interview subjects and this was perhaps part of the reasons that resulted 
in the landslide election result for the SNP in 2015.  
 
There is evidence that the in bed with the Tories episode perhaps had some role to play in the 
choice of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn to refuse to share a platform with the Tories during 
the European Union referendum 2016. Following the final result, Corbyn was roundly 
condemned for not sharing those platforms suggesting that in that situation he could not win 
either way. The successful launch of the National Newspaper and the fact it is still in operation 
more than three years following the independence referendum, was further confirmation that 
a community which was not having its identity catered for is willing to pay for journalism which 
serves that identity, at a time when other newspapers are in financial turmoil as reader 
numbers continually fall year upon year.  
 
Freelon (2010) notes that communicative response is central to both deliberation and 
communitarianism, with the distinction being the relationship between the two involved parties. 
Intra-ideological questioning can be indicative of a community which is open to challenge its 
established norms and positions, at the same time, this reciprocal process can ensure that 
members of the community feel valued and bond communities together. This was not 
generally evident as detailed previously. The Morrison article was duel faceted in that it was a 
rare example of the Yes movement questioning itself, ironically, upon the issue of the 
propensity of the movement to question itself. It was unfortunately a rare exception which 
proved the established narrative of a movement which was closed to self-questioning. This 
may be argued to be evidence of a united community and this did seem to be the case, but 
the evidence remained that those who did question were generally made to feel inherently 
wrong for doing so. 
 
The Subsection which discusses intra-ideological questioning and response is one that clearly 
illustrates the normative premise of agonistic pluralism and deliberative democracy. Mouffe’s 
agonism is antagonistic and passionate, and this was clearly the case for the broader Yes 
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movement. To suggest so is not meant as a negative criticism. Mouffe’s agonism is not 
necessarily based in what is ideal political discourse, it is simply describing a recurring element 
of the theory. The turbocharged passion for independence amongst its supporters was an 
example of the political in Mouffe’s theory of agonism, a symptom of this, ironically, was shown 
in a movement where internal, classically deliberative questioning was hitherto rare in the 
extreme. If there is a political climate where internal questioning is anathema, there is surely 
little hope of productive deliberative exchanges between opponents of either sides of the 
argument. This is precisely, barring a handful of occurrences, the broad narrative which was 
in evidence during the online campaign which preceded the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014. 
 
6.3.3 The deliberative strand 
6.3.3.1 Rational critical argument and general quality of debate 
Rational critical argument was central to the early versions of the Habermasian public sphere 
(Freelon 2010) and requires a level of debate that goes beyond traditional concepts of rational 
choice - the concept taken from economics which posits that individuals will make choices 
which are in their personal best interest. Dryzek suggests that certain debates, particularly 
those relating to sovereignty, are vulnerable to falling below the standards required for 
successful deliberation, particularly in terms of reciprocity which for Dryzek means ‘arguing in 
terms that others can accept’ (Dryzek 2010 p. 329).  
 
The Scottish independence referendum was by far and away the greatest peacetime 
challenge to date of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom. According to Dryzek, then, this 
study ought to have evidence of a process which failed deliberatively on two grounds, firstly 
because of the hot setting of a contest regarding sovereignty and secondly, because this study 
is situated online, where Habermas believes reciprocity is even more difficult to foster due to 
remote communication which is devoid of face to face interaction. More specifically, reciprocity 
is much more difficult to invoke on platforms such as Twitter as tweets are often generalised 
pronouncements as opposed to part of a process of reciprocal exchanges based on strength 
of reason. 
 
The data collection for this project from the online debate was focused upon collecting positive 
examples of online deliberation as well as negative elements such as flaming. To accurately 
measure successful deliberation and verify the use of rational critical argument is beyond the 
remit of this study. However, a recent quantitative study, which also analysed deliberation 
during the independence referendum campaign, concluded that ‘low levels of discussion 
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intensity, dominance by a few, little knowledge exchange, and high gender inequality illustrate 
that online referendum discussion lacks deliberative characteristics’ (Quinlan, Shephard and 
Paterson 2014 p.192). Instead, data was gathered which displayed the potential for 
deliberation through examples of statements and articles which displayed elements of rational 
critical argument. These were extremely rare in comparison to postings and articles which 
were collected and deemed antagonistic. The limited positive themes and examples which 
were identified will be discussed in this section, followed by thematic analysis of the criticisms 
which were levelled at the quality of the debate and ask how these relate to agonistic pluralism. 
 
The Scottish independence referendum campaign was universally celebrated as vibrant and 
culminated in a turnout of 84.6%, a record for any UK referendum or election (Electoral 
Commission 2015). From the early days of the campaign however, there was consistent 
criticism of the quality of the debate from the media, on blogs, and also from academics (see 
Nicolson 2014; Hassan 2013; Duncan 2013). The criticisms generally concerned issues of 
flaming or trolling, the performance of the broader traditional media (usually accusations of 
bias to either side of the debate), the performance of the BBC in terms of balance and project 
fear, a term that has become ubiquitous in politics following the independence referendum 
and relates to accusations of scaremongering, which stands contrary to notions of rational 
critical argument. Each of these themes are individually explored, with flaming discussed in 
greater detail in the earlier liberal individualism strand of the model. 
 
6.3.3.1.1– Evidence of rational critical argument 
It is important to again note that Twitter (at the time of the referendum) had a 140 character 
limit per post (although the use of pictures of larger amounts of text is now commonly used to 
circumnavigate this limit) which has obvious implications regarding deliberation. This still, 
however, makes deliberation within the Twitter forum itself extremely difficult even with the 
facility of real time posting. Users can, though deliberate by posting tweets which will be seen 
by all of their followers, they can also directly message other users (but only if they both follow 
each other) and also deliberate via hash tags which tends to be most effective in concentrating 
discourse upon a specific subject topic. In practical terms the only communications which 
resembled deliberation took the form of tweets redirecting others to a blog post or article which 
was then discussed further, again on Twitter or more often and more effectively in the 
comments section where the article is situated. This point is an important one for research 
efficacy in that analysis of Twitter alone, will omit any discussions which take place in 
secondary forums and comments sections. 
 
Chapter 6 – Results to the Primary Research Question 194 
    
The referendum debate outcome was a binary choice and this encouraged tribalism on both 
sides of the debate. Comments on Twitter or secondary articles thereof, which were willing to 
question matters relating to their own side of the debate were rarities. Where this was in 
evidence, the articles in question tended to display genuine, rational critical argument which 
elevated discussions and the tone of the debate through appeals to the common good. 
 
 
Figure 40 Screenshot from Bella Caledonia (2014) 
 
The above article was a rare example (Maxwell 2014, see also Burdzeyeview 2013). The 
content was a criticism of the tendency of the SNP, and therefore the wider Yes campaign, to 
overstate the positive possibilities of independence, whilst refusing to accept any potential 
negative consequences. This, as a criticism, if press stories at the time of writing are accurate, 
may have resonated with Yes Scotland as they are rumoured to be considering a warts and 
all approach to campaigning in the event of a second independence referendum (Gardham 
2016). Other examples of approaches which can be associated with rational critical argument 
were those that sought to take the heat out of the tribal, identity based arguments which were 
so prevalent during the debate. National Collective provided some notable examples such as 
the following: 
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Figure 41 Screenshot from National Collective 2014) 
 
The article, (Vevers 2014) encouraged calm in the debate and a more measured approach to 
self-determination without the demonization of the rest of the UK and more specifically 
England. This approach was occasionally used by the official Yes campaign but was largely 
absent from the online debate. Whilst the motives of such articles were still aimed at 
persuading readers to vote for independence, the general appeal to the common good in terms 
of social unity beyond political separation raised the general standard of the online debate. 
 
Some of the most effective campaigning which leant towards rational critical argument was 
the manner in which certain individuals, but mainly Yes activist groups, encouraged followers 
to ask questions as opposed to bombarding them with rhetoric. This practice falls into 
Freelon’s model under the heading of intra/inter ideological questioning and is detailed in a 
separate section. 
 
6.3.3.1.2- Accusations of mainstream media bias 
In the democracy chapter of this study an analysis was presented which detailed the 
challenges facing UK democracy. The performance of the mainstream media, and the growing 
distrust the public has in the media, was highlighted. With this in mind, accusations of 
mainstream media bias from social media users is perhaps unsurprising. Most frequently, 
criticism of the mainstream media came from supporters of independence, but accusations of 
nationalist bias was also occasionally present. Nationalist critique tended to take the form of 
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accusations suggesting the mainstream media was unfit for purpose and part of the elite 
establishment which looked to maintain the existing Unionist hegemony.  The performance of 
the print media, concentrated in the hands of immensely powerful, overwhelmingly right wing 
ownership, coupled with scandals and confirmation of implicit dishonesty over the last decade 
make this distrust a healthy one. However, to tar the entire printed press with the same brush 
is unfair and allegations to this effect require substantiation. 
 
During the independence referendum, these accusations tended to have little or no rational 
critical argument by which to substantiate them but continued to be the prevailing online 
narrative throughout the campaign. The criticisms aimed at the printed press were 
summarised by Richard Walker, the former editor of The Sunday Herald and the consulting 
editor of The National, reporting upon a debate he had hosted on the subject during the 
Edinburgh fringe festival in 2013:  
 
The more intense the independence debate becomes, the more criticism is flung at the 
media - or to be more precise, the much-derided mainstream media. We are clearly in 
the pockets of the Yes camp (take a bow, George Foulkes), or the Better Together 
camp (the so-called CyberNats), sometimes both in the same week, and even in the 
same story. On the one hand, we are dismissed as irrelevant in a debate which has 
moved to the blogosphere; on the other we are poisoning minds with our astonishing 
influence (Walker 2013). 
 
Walker’s comments accurately describe the ‘no win situation’ the mainstream media found 
itself in. The criticism heaped upon it was in all likelihood unfair as the professional media 
certainly provided more opinion based upon rational critical argument than social media did. 
One journalist summed up the situation by highlighting the irony of arguments made by social 
media users who had no professional obligation to adhere to reasoned argument: 
 
Whatever people think of journalists, we are fairly responsible about how we approach 
stories in that we are aware of what we can say and what we can't say with a degree 
of accuracy and fair comment and if that breaks down…the traditional media is still so 
much more concious of that and balance as well, because mainstream outlets will be 
much more scrupulous than a blog will. That's ironic in that what they are attacking is 
a lack of balance with a lack of balance [laughs]. (J2) 
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The fact remains, however, that only one national newspaper supported independence. That 
in itself was reason enough for a sizable proportion of the Scottish electorate to feel aggrieved 
and that they were not just fighting a cause but the entire Scottish and British media industry. 
 
6.3.3.1.3- Accusations of BBC Bias 
If supporters of independence felt generally aggrieved by the broader mainstream media, that 
feeling of grievance was further heightened when it came to the performance of the BBC 
during the campaign. The BBC as an institution is core representation of the UK State and 
that fact alone seemed to influence opinion on the issue of balance in covering the two 
respective positions of the independence debate. The following quote from a pro-
independence activist group when asked if the BBC was biased toward the Union, was 
repeated more than once: 
 
I think I do agree with that because the giveaway is in the title [British]. (A1) 
 
The BBC is undoubtedly a representation of the Union, which immediately made it a target for 
supporters of independence. To glibly dismiss the BBC as inherently biased because of its 
title might be argued to be unfair, and its performance during a debate upon the future of the 
United Kingdom, and the constitutional arrangement it implicitly reflects, was always likely to 
put it in a no win position. At the other end of the spectrum the following tweet was indicative 
of the Unionist position on the BBC bias debate: 
 
 
Figure 42 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
Chapter 6 – Results to the Primary Research Question 198 
    
There was one piece of academic work which came to the attention of the study, published 
specifically on BBC bias during the campaign (Robertson 2014) undertaken by a Professor 
from The University of West Scotland and published online at opendemocracy.net. The author 
is a self-proclaimed supporter of independence and claimed that analysis of BBC reporting 
was indeed found to be biased toward Unionist arguments. The report found little or no support 
from other Scottish academics and this resulted in Professor Robertson criticising both 
Scottish academia and the mainstream press:  
 
I would like to condemn the silence of almost all Scottish academics with an interest in 
this field who might have been expected to challenge censorship of intellectual material 
(Cromwell 2014). 
 
What was inherently concerning were the substantiated allegations of attempted censorship 
by Professor Robertson, that the BBC sought to suppress his report and make representations 
to Professor Robertson’s employers, claiming that the report brought the BBC into ‘corporate 
disrepute’ (Fraser 2014). The BBC refused to report on the work of Professor Robertson or to 
give him airtime to defend his work. Such an approach by the BBC seems unjustifiable and is 
surely fuel for those that bear grievance with the organisation and must also frustrate those 
that seek to defend allegations against it. Whilst acknowledging the seemingly unjustifiable 
actions of the BBC in this regard, the vast majority of allegations of BBC bias from social media 
users, did not bear scrutiny and the vast majority of journalists when questioned on the subject 
were of the same opinion. The following quote from a journalist and TV broadcaster 
acknowledged the imperfections of the BBC whilst defending against accusations of 
institutional bias: 
 
The BBC thing I find frustrating, not because they are perfect, but they are not 
institutionally biased. They get things wrong, absolutely, and they make mistakes but 
that is not the same as institutional bias. (J1) 
 
Of course, the reaction of social media to that statement would understandably be, well they 
would do wouldn’t they? In light of this it was relevant to listen to the reaction of a committed 
independence activist when questioned on the same subject: 
 
I think that is a bit crude… I think the broadcast media is slightly different [to 
newspapers] because I think it’s that they have good journalists but they suffer from 
chronic under-funding and bad management. (A1) 
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In support of the argument regarding underfunding, A1 then explained how the BBC Scotland 
HQ at Pacific Quay appears to have far fewer people on the premises in relation to the size of 
the building, even though it was only very recently constructed.  Suggesting proof of this was 
the fact that a friend of A1 had been in the building recently when there was a fire alarm and 
that there was general shock at the small number of people stood outside, even though the 
building was confirmed as being fully evacuated.  He went on to state that: 
When they were in Glasgow West End there were thousands of people working in that 
building, so it has been reduced and reduced and reduced, so some of that is about 
quality rather than political bias. (A1) 
Such an opinion in itself displayed rational critical argument to the broader debate around the 
performance of the BBC which was extremely rare in an argument which was overwhelmingly 
polarised into positions of BBC good or BBC bad.  
 
There is a general narrative about the BBC which suggests that as long as the BBC is accused 
of being right wing by left wingers and left wing by right wingers, it is probably doing a good 
job, regardless of the facts, and this type of duelling narrative may or may not be applicable to 
BBC performance during the referendum debate. However, the subject of the BBC and bias, 
particularly in the wake of the work of Robertson (2014), is one that deserves to be paid 
appropriate academic attention in the wake of the referendum. The accusations have been 
prominent enough to warrant attention which can add rigour to the performance debate of the 
national public service broadcaster. The BBC charter, as discussed in chapter four relating to 
media pluralism, includes the following obligation which is pertinent to the allegations of bias 
and a London centric media output: 
 
Representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities - BBC viewers, listeners 
and users can rely on the BBC to reflect the many communities that exist in the UK (BBC 
2016). 
 
It is however a fact that the BBC itself, during its latest review ahead of charter renewal in 
2017, found that: 
 
The priority to represent the different nations, regions and communities to the rest of the 
UK (priority 1) is one where audiences see a clear need for improvement, particularly in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and the North of England (ibid.). 
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A commitment to make progress in this area was substantiated by the announcement of a 
new BBC Scotland channel, including a dedicated news programme to be broadcast each 
evening at 9pm. The channel is set to begin broadcasting in 2018 and will have a budget of 
approximately £30 million pound per annum, an equivalent to the amount spent on the running 
of BBC4 (BBC 2017). The announcement was welcomed by the First Minister but also classed 
as disappointing in light of the rejection of a Scottish 6 news programme which had been called 
for (Paton 2017). 
 
What is surely beyond question is that the BBC and the rest of mainstream media is 
undoubtedly more balanced and journalistically responsible than social media is now, or 
probably ever will be. The following quote, which has been already mentioned previously, on 
the mainstream media and the role of public watchdog as opposed to social media, supports 
that assertion:  
 
I think there is a fragmentation of the kind of public discourse we have and these people 
live in a fundamentally different space to me in which the kind of trusted watchdog role 
I have afforded organisations like the BBC or The Guardian does not exist, and that 
role has been devolved to places like Newsnet Scotland and Wings Over Scotland and 
because of that we are now fundamentally incapable of engaging in a [rational] 
discussion. (M6) 
 
There is much to support the above statement in the fact that social media has no obligations 
to professional journalistic standards of balance or even basic journalistic fact. This, in itself, 
is the appeal of the medium for many. There is little doubt that social media is doing an 
important job of holding the mainstream media to account in exposing its shortcomings. 
However, any suggestion that it would be in the interests of a modern pluralistic democracy to 
see the demise of mainstream media institutions, including the BBC, fail to recognise the 
importance of such institutions in the democratic communication process. For the sake of not 
repeating the role they play in such matters, these are explored in detail in chapter four where 
they are concisely summarised by Kuhn (2007). Put very simply, the beauty of social media 
in its free role without any legal or professional journalistic standards is exactly why the 
professional media, which does have professional and legal standards to fulfil, regardless of 
its imperfections and the way it will almost certainly fall short of expectations from time to time, 
is still vital to UK democracy.  
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6.3.3.2 Equality 
As detailed in the methodology chapter, equality in Freelon’s model relates to the even spread 
of contributions between forum participants. Within the broad and prolonged debate leading 
up to the Scottish independence referendum, a quantitative analysis of this kind was both 
beyond the realm of this study and inappropriate in such a broad forum such as Twitter. The 
subject of access is however an important one. So instead, the equality metric has been 
interpreted in line with Karppinen, Moe, and Svennson (2008) in their critique of Habermas 
and Mouffe, whereby they suggest equality to encompass the opportunity for minorities to 
express themselves, through achieving both voice and coverage enabling the challenge of the 
existent hegemony. Here, a number of different themes incorporating a number of key events 
are presented to help judge the equalising impact of Twitter and social media during the 
Scottish Independence referendum campaign. Then, in line with all other units of analysis, the 
topic is concluded by discussing equality in relation to agonistic pluralism 
 
Social media is ubiquitously heralded as being ‘a great leveller’ in democratic terms and this 
was again often heard both during and after the Scottish independence referendum campaign. 
The expression leveller has no specific definition in these terms (see media pluralism chapter 
for a broader discussion) but can be taken to embody three distinct characteristics. Firstly - 
access, in terms of the ability to connect directly with others in a way which was previously 
prohibitive, usually referring to access with politicians in democratic terms. Secondly - voice, 
in terms of providing a communication channel for those who previously had generally been 
under-represented, and finally the ability to hold those in positions of power and authority, 
namely politicians, business, and the traditional media to account. What follows, is an 
assessment of these three areas supported with evidence taken from study data.  
 
6.3.3.2.1 - Access 
Prior to the arrival and rapid growth of social media, access to politicians by their constituents 
was generally restricted to sending letters by post or attending weekly constituency surgeries. 
The former generally meant waiting some time for a written reply and the latter often meant 
queuing for an indeterminate amount of time followed by a brief, time restricted conversation. 
The rapid connectivity of social media obviously has the power to expedite the communication 
process in these matters in the same way it is utilised to do so throughout broader society. All 
the politicians who were interviewed were asked about the use of social media to specifically 
connect with constituents, and as expected, they all did so and generally spoke of this 
progression in glowing terms: 
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I think that’s one of the great things about social media in that it's a complete leveller. 
So I am on Twitter, a constituent is on Twitter, if they want to ask me a question on 
there I will respond. I think that has really opened up the way people engage 
democratically. (M3) 
 
M3 then explained how constituents no longer had to go through the laborious process of 
booking and attending an appointment in person and that issues could now be quickly dealt 
with from initial contact on Twitter.  M3 did however stress that many cases were too sensitive 
to be dealt with on a public platform, but that dealing with the matter could still be expedited 
through initial contact on Twitter and then subsequently the issue could be attended to on a 
secure platform or in person.  The inappropriate nature of public forums for the majority of 
personal constituency business was overwhelmingly agreed upon and most of the MSPs 
interviewed generally repeated the following statement: 
 
I also use it to communicate with constituents, it isn't really a great forum for that but 
often people will tweet you with things, so I will tweet them back and refer them to 
something I've said or answer a question, otherwise I well ask them to move it offline 
and send me an email if it's a more personal matter. (M4) 
 
Another MSP made a statement very similar to the previous one but pointed out the 
sensitivities of perhaps being seen as suspiciously secretive when moving a personal 
constituent matter offline: 
 
You also have to be careful about the language you use so that people don't have the 
impression that, 'oh you don't want this in public?’ So, you try and point out that it's in 
everyone’s interest to deal with this in a private manner. (M3) 
 
In a slightly different vein, one MSP told of the way in which constituents would often complain 
about constituency issues online but decline an invitation to take the matter offline to be dealt 
with personally: 
 
They just want to know, what are you going to do with the number X bus? I will have 
an initial conversation that might say, ‘what's the issue? Who have you spoken to?’ But 
quite quickly what I will do is say what you need to do is to contact my office directly 
and we'll have a proper discussion about this but it's amazing how few then do. (M7) 
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M7 put the lack of follow up on such communication down to individuals simply looking to 
sound off on Twitter in the pursuit of public attention, rather than reaching a constructive 
outcome, but did however say that there were some instances when further communication 
had taken place.   
 
Regardless of those simply wishing to use social media to harangue their MSPs, which in itself 
can be seen as a democratically positive interaction, the general feeling about the access 
which has been afforded by constituents to their parliamentary representatives by social media 
was seen as an overwhelmingly positive one by all MSPs interviewed. 
 
6.3.3.3 Voice – Wings Over Scotland 
In other sections of this study, Wings Over Scotland has received attention in somewhat 
pejorative terms due to his willing conduct in controversial events relating to flaming and 
generally controversial turns of phrase and use of language, which led him to be the only 
activist group which Yes Scotland felt the requirement to officially distance themselves from. 
In others, he has rightly been given huge credit for his ability to crowdfund extraordinary 
amounts of money during the campaign. Here he again must be given credit in terms of other 
examples of the voice and reach which he achieved both online, and a crossing over into 
traditional forms of campaigning. 
 
Wings Over Scotland at the time of writing has 43,000 Twitter followers and raised around 
£330,000 in crowdfunding during the Scottish independence referendum campaign. Part of 
the money raised by Wings was spent on the production and publication of The Wee Blue 
Book: 
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Figure 43 Screenshot from Wings Over Scotland (2014) 
  
The scale of publication and the amount of downloads are again huge for a solo activist, with 
numbers totalling 300,000 printed, distributed copies, and 550,000 internet downloads 
according to The National newspaper (Learmonth 2017) and Vice news (Bryant 2014) 
respectively. The Wee Blue Book also has its own website. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
veracity of some of the claims within the Wee Blue Book, which, as is evident from the previous 
graphic, sells itself on being a source of truth which flies in the face of a sea of Unionist lies, 
are contestable. The following critique is by respected blogger and journalist Kevin Hague: 
 
The Wee Blue Book (of Lies)  
Everybody's favourite Bath based cybernat, the "Reverend Stuart Campbell" - 
erstwhile computer games reviewer and custodian of the separatist cheer-leading site 
"Wings Over Scotland" - has published a document titled the "Wee Blue Book: The 
Facts the Papers Leave Out (Don't vote in the independence referendum until you've 
read this)". He is embarrassingly pleased with himself. It feels a little mean to burst his 
bubble but - well - he deserves a little of his own medicine. The Wee Blue Book is so 
riddled with errors, untruths and logical fallacies that it's honestly hard to know where 
to start a critique. (Hague 2014) 
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To accurately quantify the levels of accuracy in The Wee Blue Book is not specifically relevant 
in the context of this theme. What is relevant, is the reach and impact that the publication had 
during the referendum campaign. The numbers quoted above when taken alone would allow 
for reasonable claims of the publication having a sizable impact on proceedings, even when 
compared to traditional media sources. Beyond that though, there were some remarkable, 
verified stories, of The Wee Blue Book being used by SNP politicians at Yes Scotland events. 
This crossover into the official campaign is even more notable due to the fact (already noted 
previously) that the SNP had judged Wings to be persona non grata for reasons already 
explained. Stories about the distribution of The Wee Blue Book at Yes Scotland events 
emerged part way through the campaign and these claims were put to MSPs on both sides of 
the campaign. Firstly, a former SNP cabinet member told why he had no problem with Yes 
Scotland publicly distributing the publication and that he himself had personally done so: 
 
I think there were a couple of things with the Reverend Campbell early in the campaign 
that were a bit politically inept which haunted him, but the reality is he produced The 
Wee Blue Book which actually was one of the best campaign books and I gave them 
out to people. (M8) 
 
M8 then described how he had been to only one house during the campaign which had a 
Better Together poster in the window, and that he had spoken to the resident and left them 
with a copy of The Wee Blue Book.  On revisiting the street some days later the person had 
removed the poster.  M8 stated that they did not know if this was down to reading Wings’ 
booklet but firmly believed it was a worthy publication that at the very least gave people advice 
on where to find facts on certain matters, even if it perhaps did not contain the facts in the 
booklet itself. 
 
Another SNP MSP was more guarded about the use of the publication by Yes Scotland, 
preferring instead to both qualify and defend the merits of the book: 
 
The Little Blue Book (sic) to me, didn't have anything in it that wasn't researched and 
looked at carefully. I think that some of the conclusions it drew went a little bit far but 
by and large for most people I know who had read it and started from a position of not 
being well informed, it spurred them on to look further. It wasn't a deal sealer…I think 
they read it and thought, 'oh I hadn't thought about it that way’ and had then gone to 
look again, so I don't think I was instinctively worried about it to be honest. (M3) 
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A Labour shadow cabinet minister was less than sanguine about the use of The Wee Blue 
Book by Yes Scotland, mainly based upon the authors’ previous work and controversial 
campaign history: 
 
What they [Yes Scotland] were very effective at, was putting out information or 
disinformation, so you have pretty obnoxious misinformation coming from the likes of 
Wings Over Scotland and Newsnet, some of it really putrid, which then becomes news 
and is taken as fact. So Wings, who laughed at 9/11 and blames the Hillsborough 
disaster on Liverpool fans and spews poison, is actually believed. (M5) 
 
M5 then described how a chance meeting with a Government Minister campaigning within his 
own constituency revealed that senior politicians were personally distributing The Wee Blue 
Book to the general public: 
 
I was just fucking flabbergasted!  An actual government minister was handing out this 
book...I saw this with my own eyes, this is not a tale from someone else. I actually 
tweeted about it at the time if you want to look back over my feed. (M5) 
 
Again, the veracity of the book is not in question here, but the willingness of elected MSPs to 
utilise the resources of extremely controversial social media activists, during an official 
campaign, is perhaps troubling. The SNP distanced themselves from Wings for obvious 
reasons and it is difficult to imagine Wings gaining coverage in the traditional press due to the 
allegations detailed above. Social media however, allows even the most controversial actors 
to continue to have voice and reach. Some like the MSP quoted above, find this extremely 
troubling, while others see no harm in this. Perhaps it would be different if the activist in 
question was supporting the other side or vice versa but the reality is that no matter how 
controversial an individual is, she/he simply cannot be silenced due to the largely 
uncontrollable output of social media. There are no checks and balances on social media and 
little if any formal recourse. This is the major attraction for many but a significant issue for 
others.  
 
Wings did not restrict spending the money raised by crowdfunding from its readers to The 
Wee Blue Book but also undertook his own opinion poll commissioning.  
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Figure 44 Screenshot from What Scotland Thinks (2014) 
 
At the time of writing, What Scotland Thinks had 74 polls on its website which were attributed 
as being commissioned by Wings Over Scotland, and these were polls from both before and 
after the referendum in September 2014. Again then, we have evidence of social media 
activism crossing over into traditional political activities. Small scale, amateur opinion polling 
can of course now be done practically free of charge on social media but these polls were 
commissioned to professional polling organisations. This type of activity gives a somewhat 
professional credence to a generally controversial activist like Wings Over Scotland. The fact 
that the results of these opinion polls are not restricted to being published by Wings itself, or 
other independence activists online, but also by credible independent social research 
institutions such as What Scotland Thinks which is part of the NatCen Social Research 
organisation, is testament to the voice and reach which has, and still is being achieved by 
Wings Over Scotland.  
 
6.3.3.3.1 Holding elites to account - National Collective and Donorgate 
The most strident example of how such a challenge to the current hegemony could be 
achieved by grass roots activist groups and gain national exposure, was the case of National 
Collective and the exposure of Better Together funding which became known as Donorgate: 
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Figure 45 Screenshot from The Herald (2013) 
 
The story which emerged in April 2013 involved donations made to the Better Together 
campaign from the president and chief executive of the firm Vitol, to the tune of £550,000. It 
is important to note that the information surrounding this donation and the background of the 
firm and president were already in the public domain. However, it was a 21 year old student 
reporter from National Collective who pieced the information together and questioned the 
Better Together campaign directly about it. The concerns expressed were ethical rather than 
legal and were about allegations of payments made to the Serbian paramilitary leader Arkan, 
and also to the former Iraqi leader Sadam Hussein, as well as tax avoidance relating to Vitol. 
The outcome of the piece was that following threats of legal action from Mr Taylor’s lawyers, 
the National Collective website was temporarily closed down and the story was then picked 
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up by the mainstream media and received attention from, amongst others, The Herald, The 
Sunday Herald, The Scotsman, The Scotsman on Sunday, Newsnight Scotland and Channel 
4 News. 
 
Donorgate was a genuine example of a social media based activist group challenging powerful 
institutions who could be suitably categorised as constituent of the prevailing hegemony:  
  
 
Figure 46 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
 
Prior to having to close down for a total of seven days, National Collective received 45,000 
visitors to their website in the month of March and after the temporary closure they received 
over 80,000 visitors (this was quite early in the campaign). This helped National Collective to 
become one of the established activist groups of the broader campaign and certainly 
constitutes a democratic success in line with the media’s role as a public watchdog.  
 
It also though, raised the question of the potential damage that can be done by unqualified 
correspondents to the journalism profession. As one journalist and TV commentator stated: 
 
Well there was a story there in the associations he had [Ian Taylor] but they went way 
too far in linking and making leaps about something that took place 10 years ago and 
something else, which was where the danger lay for them. (J2) 
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J2 gave credit to National Collective for flagging the story up, in that it was subsequently picked 
up by the SNP and some traditional press outlets.  However, J2 suggested that they were 
naïve in their lack of awareness of media law regarding the acceptable parameters to make 
serious allegations, and that when J2 had pointed this out to them, their response was: 
 
Well we are standing up against him. (J2) 
 
Such a response, according to J2, was further proof of their naivety in that it was the type of 
response which could have been expected from undergraduate journalists, which in itself was 
perhaps unsurprising given the general demographic of the membership of National 
Collective. 
 
The broader concern of the impact of non-professional social media reporters and the potential 
impact upon democracy particularly in the areas of balance, legality and redress, were 
common place (perhaps expectedly) from journalists mainly, but also the other two groups 
during the interview research process. The overriding concern was the implicit danger if the 
professional media were ever to become supplanted by social media (a hypothetical argument 
but one that is occasionally mooted all the same) and this became the preferred method for 
the public to consume their news at the beginning of the democratic process. For individuals 
and groups to be in a position to challenge the existing hegemony is welcome in agonistic 
theory. However, potentially jeopardising the quality of information required when unqualified 
reporters express positions of fact, without the checks incumbent upon the professional media, 
this alters the rules of the game and has potential negative implications counter to the 
democratic norms required for agonism to be played out. 
 
6.3.3.3.2 Holding elites to account – politicians and traditional media 
The second chapter of this study focuses upon the issues currently facing UK democracy, and 
provides evidence of an electorate which holds politicians and journalists as the two most 
untrustworthy professions respectively, when posed with the question - would you generally 
trust them to tell the truth or not? This is of particular concern in terms of the health of our 
democracy. A distrust of politicians is hardly surprising but a growing distrust of the press, 
when applied to their implicit role as public watchdog holding politicians to account, leaves 
citizens to seek alternative sources of trusted information. This is in all likelihood one of the 
main reasons that a number of people have turned to social media in search of trustworthy 
news sources and political coverage. Further to this, people see social media as a secondary 
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public watchdog who it is hoped will hold the traditional press to account, as trust in their role 
as the primary public watchdog remains fragile and open to question. 
 
A number of politicians were asked if they felt that social media was holding them to account 
in a way they were not previously, which led one MSP to respond as follows: 
 
I think it probably does because if I say something in a press release or in the debating 
chamber, there will be instant reaction to it, and if I was to say something silly the world 
would know about it much more quickly than otherwise would be the case if it weren't 
for social media, because people would pick up on it and tweet it. So yes I think it 
probably does. (M4) 
 
It seemed from other interviews with politicians, that the second part of the above answer was 
their primary concern in terms of being held to account online, i.e. saying something silly online 
(generally on Twitter) as opposed to being held to account directly, by say constituents on 
local matters, or reaction to a speech in parliament. Another MSP seemed to confirm this 
hierarchy of concern by not even referring to any other issues in terms of being held to account 
politically, other than slipping up specifically online: 
 
I look at things and think oh no! He can't say that, take it out of public view. So I've had 
conversations where I have said, you really might want to rethink that tweet, which is 
just more about telling people to be cautious and not fall into the trap of circulating 
unsubstantiated allegations, and you see that a lot on Twitter. (M7) 
 
Throughout the independence referendum campaign, it became apparent that the traditional 
media were held in particularly low regard by the independence movement, even in 
comparison to the general disdain for Westminster politicians. This was perhaps due to the 
ability afforded by social media which allows online activists to take on the traditional media 
by posting their own take on political events. Perhaps the most prominent backlash against 
the traditional media during the referendum campaign was the story detailed below, involving 
former BBC Political Correspondent Nick Robinson and former First Minister Alex Salmond. 
The story arose when Robinson claimed that Salmond avoided a question at a press 
conference when video evidence showed that he did actually respond. Robinson later claimed 
he had made a mistake, but the entire episode was further proof for independence supporters 
that the mainstream media was simply another part of the Westminster hegemony which 
sought to undermine their campaign: 
 
Chapter 6 – Results to the Primary Research Question 212 
    
 
Figure 47 Screenshot from Wings Over Scotland (2014) 
 
There is no suggestion that the breaking of the story was purely down to social media activism 
and its inclusion here is aimed to demonstrate why many feel the need to turn to alternative 
new media sources due to their distrust of institutions such as the BBC. In the days following 
the incident there was an organised rally outside of the BBC in Glasgow where it was claimed 
around 4000 demonstrators (this number was contested) protested at an event which more 
likely was the result of organised efforts on social media. 
 
The same questions regarding being held to account were given to journalists during 
interviews and the following response from J2 confirmed how this was indeed the case: 
 
Yes, I think so. For instance if I write something and I tweet it and someone challenges 
a point I made, or a point of fact, that's holding me more accountable than a column in 
a newspaper ever could. Yes, they could write to the letters page and point it out but it 
would be much more slow [sic] and at the discretion of the newspaper whether they 
print it or not. (J2) 
 
J2 then went on to state that he had been personally reflecting on this matter recently and that 
although he believed he had always been careful in supporting stated claims with evidence, 
that he was even more so nowadays with the advent of social media.  He then cited an 
example regarding a piece he had recently written about the underlying elements of nationalist 
politics. He stated that this had been significantly challenged online, not only from those on 
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the less than reasoned side of the debate but also from more, perhaps credible critics, and 
that this was a reminder of the heightened requirement for rigour relating to his journalistic 
output. 
 
Another journalist confirmed that he knew he would be held to account by social media but felt 
his responsibility as a political correspondent in a traditional newspaper, was to the readers of 
his newspaper and not to inhabitants of social media: 
 
I think it is right that journalists are held to account by their readers but my responsibility 
is to the readers and not to social media users on a computer. So I suppose [thinks 
about it] there is an element that social media has actually done that, but what I think 
is very important and something that I stress to my colleagues, is that what people are 
saying on social media is not what our readers are saying. They are a voice to be 
listened to and it would be wrong to ignore them, but we aren't going to be dictated to 
by a minority on the internet because that would be crazy. (J1) 
 
In summary, the general sentiment shared by politicians regarding being held to account by 
social media was about concerns of saying the wrong thing on social media, rather than in a 
general sense. Whilst journalists were more considered in terms of their relationship with 
social media regarding their journalistic output, and where their obligations lay with regard to 
this.  
 
6.3.3.4 Inter-ideological questioning and response 
A previous section discussed evidence of rational critical argument and its value to 
deliberation. Inter-ideological response and questioning is an extension of rational critical 
argument and more specifically analyses productive reciprocal exchanges between those 
situated on either side of an argument. Ideally, in terms of deliberation, there would be 
evidence in this study of pro-independence supporters and Unionists questioning and 
responding with each other. Not necessarily to reach consensus but to legitimise decision 
making and minimalise post-argument sense of exclusion on the part of the unsuccessful. 
However, as previously detailed, the evidence does not support this and follows Dryzek’s 
hypothesis regarding arguments of sovereignty, and also Habermas’ views on the implications 
of discourse conducted online, which both find severely limit the possibility of productive 
deliberation. 
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As a consequence of this, the best that could be realistically hoped for was appeals to the 
undecided eligible voters, or the missing million as they were often referred to. In this section, 
examples of inter-ideological questioning and response based upon rational critical argument 
are presented. Such exchanges, raised the level of the debate on Twitter from the deluge of 
rhetoric which was the norm during the online debate, from both the official campaign and 
activist groups. A separate section of intra-ideological response and questioning falls into the 
earlier communitarian units of analysis and explores similar exchanges, but importantly 
represents a different dynamic outside of deliberation, between parties on the same side of 
the argument.  
 
6.3.3.4.1- Questioning over rhetoric. 
The key development of the internet revolution in terms of political discourse, was the 
possibility of real-time exchanges on API’s such as Twitter. This saw the move from political 
speechmaking simply available on a new medium, to one where interaction was possible 
between audience members and/or the speechmaker. As the online debate progressed, it was 
clear to see that activists in particular were searching for strategies by which to get their point 
across beyond the inevitable one-way political rhetoric.  
 
National Collective, in March of 2014, first employed the tactic of initiating questions from 
people who were undecided as to which way to vote, this was something they repeated up 
until the date of the referendum: 
 
Figure 48 Screenshot from Twitter (2014) 
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This approach was also used by other activist groups including Women for Independence and 
Bella Caledonia and was also used by the official Yes Scotland campaign. It may seem 
remarkable that a basic invitation for question and answer interaction would be highlighted, 
however, such was the prevalence of heated rhetoric during the online debate, that this 
genuinely stood out as notable and innovative at the time. During interviews, some 
respondents spoke of the benefit of questioning over rhetoric, such as the following: 
 
I think asking questions is good rather than just broadcasting so you are having a 
conversation, If I am in the right zone, that is what I should be doing rather than just 
telling people stuff. (A1) 
 
A different mode of inter-ideological response and question was again used by National 
Collective and other activist groups: 
 
 
Figure 49 Screenshot from National Collective (2014) 
 
Articles such as this one were well mannered and largely drew upon rational critical argument. 
They are not strictly deliberative but are positive in terms of allowing respondents such as this 
one, and their supporters, to feel they have the important power of redress. Whist this has 
always been available via letters to the editor in newspapers, in the event of being lucky 
enough to have the response published, there was an obvious delay which can be expedited 
by instead utilising social media. 
Chapter 6 – Results to the Primary Research Question 216 
    
6.3.3.5 Deliberative strand - deliberation and agonism 
Rational critical argument is central to deliberation and is classified by Freelon as the 
cornerstone of the Habermasian public sphere. Additionally, Dryzek (2005) classifies hot 
settings exemplified by sovereign issues as the most doubtful to be successful in deliberative 
terms, and Habermas states that online forums are doubtful arenas for successful deliberation. 
Taken as a whole then, it is perhaps unremarkable that there is a paucity of evidence of 
rational critical argument in this section. We can then suggest, that the evidence in this project 
backs up the assertions made by Dryzek and Habermas both in terms of sovereign arguments 
and online deliberation.  
 
That is not to say that all online deliberation is impossible, but it appears highly unlikely when 
it involves the type of emotive, binary choices which were central to the independence 
referendum. Such settings are far more representative of agonistic pluralism which is 
embodied by antagonism and passion. Again, the focus in such areas may well be better spent 
upon creating arenas of conflictual consensus as espoused by Mouffe. This is no simple task 
and still requires parties to come together with a more rational approach than the one 
displayed during the independence referendum campaign of 2014.  
 
The ongoing challenge and counter challenge of the existent hegemony and counter 
hegemony is a central feature of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. This section has focused upon 
three ways in which social media can, and indeed does, contribute to the challenge of the 
prevailing hegemony through both day to day constituency politics in the first theme of access, 
and through the lens of the Scottish independence referendum with challenges to Better 
Together and Vitol, in the case of National Collective, and to the traditional press in the final 
section.  
 
In order to challenge the performance of politicians and the government, citizens and groups 
require the means of direct access to their representatives. Social media’s power to connect, 
facilitates this in an expeditious manner which previously was laborious and at odds with the 
busy lives of citizens in the present day. Not only does this aid democracy in the connection it 
affords to citizens but also allows constituency politicians to connect with those they are 
employed to serve in a manner which they previously could not. Connectivity and access in 
this form, simply serves to enhance the democratic process in an entirely uncontroversial 
manner that it seems is overwhelmingly welcomed by citizens and their representatives alike.  
 
Social media easily facilitates any willing person or group to post their support for, or challenge 
to, the existent hegemony in forums that are open to the public at large. However, for this to 
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be meaningful we require evidence to show that this voice is having an impact. Earlier, an 
example was provided of a small, in comparative media terms, activist group in the form of 
National Collective, gaining sizeable media exposure in their challenge to the ethical 
standpoint of donations made by Vitol to the official Better Together campaign. The fact that 
Vitol took legal action to temporarily close down the National Collective website could be taken 
merely as a large multinational corporation defending its position in a way in which it would to 
the smallest or largest threats to its organisation. Indeed, if no action had been taken, the story 
would likely have remained below the radar of the broader population. However, they did 
choose to take action, and this propelled the story into the mainstream media and gave the 
group sizeable impact in their desire to highlight the ethical issues in question. It should 
however be noted that at this stage in the development of social media, we only generally 
classify such episodes as having impact if they are picked up by the traditional media as 
opposed to remaining online. Regardless of this fact, the desired outcome to highlight an issue 
which otherwise may not have come to prominence was duly achieved. 
 
The impact that Wings Over Scotland had with its publication of The Wee Blue Book and the 
commissioning of opinion polls which were made possible by crowdfunding, also must surely 
be judged as having meaningful impact during the Scottish Independence referendum 
campaign. The numbers involved alone are testament to a small activist group having 
meaningful influence on the debate. This assertion was only strengthened by the somewhat 
controversial decision by independence supporting politicians to distribute the publication at 
official events, and also by the documentation and publication of the aforementioned 
commissioned polls by prominent research institutes such as NatCen. 
 
Politicians provided evidence in their own words of the way that they felt they are now held to 
account by social media, but this was generally based upon the fear of saying something that 
could be construed as embarrassing to themselves or to their party, rather than their wider 
political performance record. The mainstream media are seen contemporarily by many as a 
constituent part of the prevailing hegemony, as opposed to their traditionally held role as the 
watchdogs over those in power. The journalists interviewed were well aware of this and 
seemed to be understandably reticent to be regarded in this way. Whether this is justified or 
not is up for debate. What seems less questionable is the way that social media as detailed in 
this section appears to have, at least on some occasions, evidently worked as a leveller in 
democratic terms in line with agonistic goals of enabling a counter force on the existent political 
hegemony.  
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As is evident from the paucity of material in the earlier subsection regarding inter-ideological 
response and questioning, there is further confirmation of the lack of deliberation that came to 
the attention of the study. Genuine, respectful exchanges based upon rational critical 
argument were the exception as opposed to the norm. The data shows that typical online 
exchanges between Unionists and independence supporters were generally antagonistic in 
nature. The type of invitations to submit questions via Twitter were positive examples of 
interaction at the starting point of potential deliberation, and would likely be useful to those 
who entered the debate as undecideds. This does not mean, however, that online deliberating 
on political matters is impossible, but does further indicate that hot topics such as those of 
sovereignty are extremely unlikely to be productive.  
 
This suggests that concentrating on a more realistic goal of converting antagonisms into 
agonisms in line with Mouffian theory is something that ought to be considered in the future. 
In terms of agonistic theory, there ought to be a sense that participants recognise another 
person’s right to their point of view in a spirit of Mouffian conflictual consensus. This again was 
entirely lacking. The separate section of intra-ideological response and questioning, which 
falls into the communitarian section of Freelon’s model, was far more positive in terms of how 
social media can have a genuine, positive impact on political communication. However, this 
was restricted to reciprocation between those on the same side of the argument. For 
meaningful deliberation there would be a minimal requirement for those exchanges to be 
replicated between opposing sides of the argument. This requirement seemed fanciful during 
the online debate surrounding the Scottish independence referendum 2014. 
 
6.3.4 Critique of Freelon’s model – Analysing online political discussion using three 
models of democratic communication 
 
Freelon’s model has been utilised to assess the empirical reality taken from the research data 
sample of political communication on Twitter during the Scottish independence referendum 
2014, in the areas of liberal individualism, communitarianism, and deliberative democracy.  
The manner in which it was applied is detailed in the methodology chapter covered earlier in 
the thesis. The model was used to guide data analysis in order to present and critically assess 
exemplars of Freelon’s distinct units of analysis.   
 
Though the aim of the project was to present exemplars which would provide rich descriptions 
of the units within Freelon’s model, as opposed to provide quantitative assessments of the 
prevalence of each model/unit, the paucity of material relating to each category signified a 
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campaign which did not sit comfortably enough within the existing strands of Freelon’s model 
to suggest the campaign could be described as liberal individualistic, communitarian, or 
deliberative. This was symptomatic of a debate, particularly when it came to activist groups, 
which was regrettably situated in an arena populated by only one side of the argument due to 
the absence of grassroots Unionist groups. Most notably, the paucity of material which fitted 
with Freelon’s deliberative strand was largely expected to be the case from initial assessments 
of the data in the early days of the project. Although there was a partial resonance with the 
communitarian strand, this was largely based upon data relating to the two units of mobilisation 
and community identification on the Yes campaign side only. It was not reflective of the cross 
cutting antagonistic nature of the debate which, even when situated in a debate in which the 
Better Together side was not represented by grassroots activist groups, in terms of normative 
explanations of proceedings, was much more representative of agonistic pluralism. The model 
was still useful in this respect, however, as the fact that much of the data was not a comfortable 
fit with Freelon’s original three strands, prompted the move for seeking out other explanations 
which led to agonism. 
 
There were, however, certain issues with the model, in terms of segmentation of messages or 
forum data to the individual units of analysis. There were a number of themes which were not 
purely representative of the parent classification. For example, themes such as mobilisation 
or ideological fragmentation could both be classified as being deliberative as opposed to 
singularly communitarian, as they are in the original model. Freelon (2010) does however state 
that his model incorporates three distinct yet overlapping strands of democracy which signifies 
that the classifications ought to be accepted on general terms as opposed to rigid 
segmentation.  
 
Freelon also accepts that not all forums will fit neatly into one individual strand of the model, 
a fact which was always likely to be the case in this study due to its application to a debate as 
wide-ranging as the Scottish independence referendum, over a relatively lengthy timescale of 
approximately 18 months. It should also be noted that Freelon urges users to customise the 
model. As noted earlier in the methodology chapter, it quickly became apparent that whilst the 
majority of data could be appropriated to one or more of the units of analysis within the model, 
that these did not fully reflect the agonistic nature of the online debate during the campaign 
which preceded the Scottish independence referendum 2014. It was for this reason that a dual 
approach was applied in line with Karppinen, Moe and Svensson (2008) which meant that in 
addition to applying the data to ascertain how it corresponded to Freelon’s model, it was also 
classified in relation to agonistic norms.  In summary, the outwardly negative aspect of 
Freelon’s model - the loose overlapping nature of some of the units of analysis, is offset by 
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the fact that Freelon accepts the limitations of the model in that respect. The fact that Freelon 
invites others to alter and develop the model is welcome and this ought to make the model 
applicable to analyse a variety of different discussion forums to ascertain how they fit with 
different aspects of democratic communication.   
 
With this in mind, the evidence from this study suggests that a useful addition to the model 
would be a further strand of agonistic pluralism.  An appropriate starting point for this could be 
the consideration of the analysis within this study relating to the components of, particularly 
Mouffe’s (2014; 2013; 2005) version of the theory.  The methodology of a new strand would 
require, in line with Freelon’s existing strands, detailed consideration of accepted aspects of 
each component to be included, whereby different existing perspectives are taken into 
contemplation (see Freelon 2010 p.180 explanation of the unit of ‘community identification’ as 
a useful example).  As detailed in chapter two, where Mouffe’s version of agonistic theory is 
deconstructed and critiqued at length, there are a number of essential components which 
embody Mouffe’s version of the theory.  For example, antagonism is the starting point for 
Mouffe’s agonism with hegemonic struggle being another essential premise of the theory.  
Some of the units within Freelon’s existing model, which have been covered in this thesis, 
may be considered as partially fulfilling agonistic norms.  For instance, flaming could be taken 
as a representation of antagonism which is the basis of Mouffe’s agonism, and community 
identification could be seen as representative of Mouffe’s requirement for the role of identity 
in agonistic theory, which Mouffe suggests deliberative theory fails to recognise and 
accommodate. However, there are other parts of the theory which are not represented. 
 
Hegemonic struggle is certainly a component which is not represented in Freelon’s model and 
would require careful consideration for a testable, hypothesised explanation, as would also be 
the case for passion (as a representation of identity in the political) as another essential 
element of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism.  The role of identity is further acknowledged in 
Mouffe’s theory through her reference to the we/they friend/enemy relation as attributable to 
Carl Schmitt, though re-imagined in a manner which is compatible with democratic pluralism 
(ibid.) so this should also be included in the new strand of the model.  Agonistic respect, 
whereby exchanges exist in an arena where the rights of opponents to hold contrasting views 
is in evidence, is another part of Mouffe’s theory, as is conflictual consensus – the manner in 
which disagreements are characterised by a level of agreement at the macro discussion level, 
alongside often, perhaps significant disagreement at the micro level of the issue in question.  
The absence of activist groups on the Better Together side of the argument, aligned with the 
debate being focused upon the hot topic of sovereignty, may well be reasons which led to the 
conspicuous absence of agonistic respect and conflictual consensus in this study.  This should 
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not, however, preclude their inclusion in the new agonistic strand of the model whereby these 
two vital, though disputed components of Mouffe’s version of agonistic pluralism, may perhaps 
be found in a range of different discussion settings in which the new strand of the model could 
be tested.   
 
Equally as importantly, the empirical testing of the new strand of the model on Twitter, in a 
similarly hot topic in a referendum or election setting, could also shed light as to whether, as 
was the case with this study, agonistic pluralism provides a more representative explanation 
of online political communication than the other existing strands of Freelon’s (2010) model. 
 
6.4 Conclusions to chapter 6 – How could you tell if the #indyref were 
characterised by deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? 
 
In its aim to assess how you could tell if the #indyref were characterised by deliberative 
democracy or agonistic pluralism, this thesis first sought to determine how existing models of 
democracy related to the overall online debate.  Hopes expressed that the internet and social 
media could perhaps help realise the normative goals of deliberative democracy, were also of 
interest. The relatively new phenomenon of social media has impacted upon traditional 
conceptions of at least the possibilities for future media plurality so this was also important to 
the study. Once it became apparent that agonistic pluralism was representative of the debate, 
it was appropriate to explore the roots of political pluralist theory. Here, conclusions are 
presented regarding deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism in relation to the 
campaign which preceded the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. 
 
6.4.1 Deliberative democracy  
With regard to deliberation, the early chapters of this thesis explored the concept through the 
works of its primary proponents such as Rawls, Habermas, Dryzek, Cohen and Benhabib. The 
theory seeks to address the exclusory nature of the ballot box in democracies, whereby 
although the result is clear, the process is often unsatisfactory in the manner in which the issue 
is far from solved. The discourse theory of deliberative democracy, as strongly associated with 
Habermas amongst others, is the apparent derivation of the theory which is relevant to political 
debates around social media. Habermas’ work is also the basis of many of the existing coding 
schemes that have been constructed to identify online deliberation. 
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The theory has some generally accepted norms, which include a process of giving reasons in 
justification of supporting a particular position, in a reciprocal manner whereby the argument 
is constructed and given in terms that others can accept. This egalitarian exchange of reasons, 
it is hoped, may see either side change their view based upon on the strength of the opposing 
argument. Earlier Habermasian versions of the theory were rooted in consensus as the 
expected/desired outcome, whilst later versions accepted that consensus was largely 
idealistic. It was still argued, however, that even without consensus, the process still leads to 
more effective participation and satisfactory outcomes which limit exclusion due to the 
rationality of the practice. 
 
Later generations of deliberative theory turned attention to the institutionalisation of 
deliberative democracy. These included forums such as citizen assemblies, citizen juries, 
planning cells and consensus conferences. It is likely that these were all conceived with 
physical face to face settings in mind, as opposed to online communication, although there 
have been limited attempts at online deliberation such as Luskin, Fishkin and Iyengar (2004) 
and Iyengar, Luskin and Fishkin (2003). However, the manifest differences of online 
communication led theorists such as Dryzek and Habermas to dispute the possibilities of 
productive online deliberation. The absence of a face to face setting is seen as damaging to 
the required reciprocal process of deliberation according to Habermas (2006). Dryzek’s work 
(2005) also made distinctions between hot and cold political issues whereby hot settings, such 
as issues of sovereignty, were less likely to allow for productive deliberation than cold issues 
which are perhaps less emotive. 
 
From early on in the project it became apparent that the evidence within the sample that was 
generated during the study supported both Habermas and Dryzek’s concerns regarding online 
deliberation. Twitter in particular, is constructed in a way that makes deliberation extremely 
unlikely. The original 140 and later 280 character limit promotes short assertions on the topic 
in question rather than reasoned arguments. Users have, however, come up with ways to 
circumvent the limit through posting pictures containing larger chunks of texts and also 
replying to their own posts, which produces a list of tweets which can form a longer narrative. 
Regardless of this, however, the site does not lend itself to nuanced political debate, instead 
the site lends itself to short, often pithy statements, rather than conversations. There were 
some very rare examples of effective deliberation within the study sample but these tended to 
take place in secondary forums, on blogs and websites following initial exchanges on Twitter 
itself.  
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As mentioned, Dryzek argued some time ago that issues of sovereignty are hot political issues 
that intrinsically divide people and this makes any reciprocal concession of a personal political 
position extremely unlikely though not impossible. This hypothesis was highly indicative of 
how the Scottish independence referendum debate was evidenced within the study, both in 
terms of the tweets which were sampled and the supporting statements of the interview 
subjects. The online debate was deeply tribalistic, antagonistic, and conflictual. We have a 
body of evidence which demonstrated this, as exemplified in the manner in which 
flaming/trolling was highly evident as participants overstepped the metaphorical lines of 
decent debate. We know, however, that there were around a million undecided voters during 
the campaign, so a large percentage of the electorate were positioned in between the two 
points of Union and independence. There was little if any evidence within this study, however, 
that those undecideds were actively deliberating on Twitter as they sought to make a decision 
on their final voting preference. 
 
Taking the manner in which the study resonated with the hypothesis of Dryzek into 
consideration, the question is raised as to how much we can read into the lack of deliberative 
democracy during the online referendum debate.  In this regard, it seems apparent that 
seeking examples of deliberation during the independence referendum only confirms Dryzek’s 
position, but this should not mean that online deliberation in a less hot political debate, on 
perhaps a platform more conducive to reasoned political argument, is impossible.  With this in 
mind, the normative pursuit of online deliberation ought not to be perceived as futile on the 
basis of findings such as those within this study. It is, though, perhaps fanciful to expect 
productive online deliberation to flourish organically, bearing in mind the limitations raised by 
both Habermas, Dryzek, and the results of this study.  If, however, deliberation is taking place, 
there are a number of existing coding schemes (as discussed at length in the methodology 
chapter), including Freelon’s (2010) that could be tailored to measure deliberation 
quantitatively. However, this process presents challenges, and there are specific deliberative 
traits, such as ‘reflexivity’, which is a common component in many deliberative coding 
schemes, which pose significant issues if attempting to measure deliberation from textual data 
alone.  
 
6.4.2 Agonistic pluralism  
As previously discussed, in the earliest assessments of the evidence gathered within the study 
regarding the nature of the debate which preceded the Scottish independence referendum, it 
became apparent that the debate resonated as agonistic in nature as opposed to classically 
pluralistic or deliberative. Agonistic pluralism is a theory which is sometimes linked with the 
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work of Hannah Arendt and is contemporarily associated with Mouffe, Connolly, and Honig.  
Agonistic theory evolved from dissatisfaction with theories of pluralism and deliberation, 
primarily based upon the lack of recognition of the inevitability of conflict amongst individuals 
and groups in society and the suggestion that conflict is in certain instances a positive 
component of a functioning democracy.  
 
Mouffe’s theoretical framework is comprised of two distinct notions of politics and the political. 
Politics for Mouffe is procedural and mechanistic embodying political practices and institutions, 
whilst the political embodies the social and that social is driven by antagonism. Other 
normative aspects of Mouffe’s theory include the notion of ineradicable pluralism based upon 
the impossibility of consensus without exclusion, and also the ever-present cycle of hegemonic 
and counter hegemonic struggle. Further components are the role of passion in the political 
process and also identity as a key driver of political participation. Mouffe’s theory, however, is 
not without its critics, particularly in relation to agonistic respect and conflictual consensus 
which has been discussed earlier in this chapter.  In light of these normative agonistic traits, 
there are many reasons why we can say that agonistic theory was more representative of the 
evidence gathered during the Scottish independence referendum campaign debate which took 
place on Twitter.  
 
The online Twitter debate was antagonistic in nature from its very beginnings. The UK 
parliamentary political is distinctly adversarial in comparison to other consensus-based 
decision making governmental systems in Europe and elsewhere. This has perhaps 
influenced a generally antagonistic body politic, where it is sought to defeat opponents as 
opposed to seeking agreement or persuasion through reciprocal exchanges which appeal to 
the common good, as embodies deliberative democracy. With this, perhaps ingrained nature 
of our political being in mind, social media has a tendency to exacerbate this general state as 
it removes the key inter-personal aspects of the communication process, namely, remote 
settings where consequences of behaviour are limited in comparison to face to face 
discussion, where as a consequence antagonism can fester. The subject of trolling or flaming 
is testament to this. We must, however, remember that such incidents are not the norm but 
accept that most would agree, as evidenced in this study, that the general undertone of the 
online debate was antagonistic. We also should acknowledge that forums which provide a 
place whereby political frustrations can be vented, may help prevent those frustrations from 
evolving into the possibility of more troubling, perhaps physical confrontation. 
 
The notion of hegemonic struggle was also representative of the nature of the online debate 
which was observed during the study, as unsurprisingly was a we/they argument as would be 
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expected in a referendum campaign which embodies the purest of binary political arguments, 
with a yes or no choice at the ballot box. Better Together played the role of the existing 
hegemony as a campaign which generally represented the existing Unionist culture, with a 
campaign which was largely based upon instilling fear into the minds of the electorate and 
hence coercing them based upon the proposition that the alternative would be catastrophically 
worse. Yes Scotland played the counter hegemonic role, demonising Westminster as the 
establishment to overthrow, while promising a brave new Scotland where the wrongs of the 
existing Westminster hegemony could be set right. The binary nature of a referendum on such 
an emotive sovereign decision was the perfect debate for the hegemonic struggle to manifest 
itself. The Twitter debate as evidenced in the Tweets sampled, supported by evidence 
gathered during the interviews, reflected this position entirely whereby the nature of social 
media exacerbated the argument into two extremes of the evil hegemonic domination of 
Scotland by Westminster, and Yes Scotland as a campaign representing an idealistic, 
impractical vision which could perhaps never be fulfilled. 
 
We should, however, remind ourselves that this hegemonic struggle was not representative 
of UK politics in recent times. The UK which preceded the economic crash of 2008 was 
criticised as a political system devoid of choice, with no realistic alternative as all parties fought 
over the centre ground, whilst notions of Scottish independence were still looked upon as 
fanciful. That said, this study was based in a specific time and place in Scottish and UK political 
history and the hegemonic struggle that is a component of agonistic theory seemed entirely 
real based upon the evidence collected within the study.  
 
The agonistic norm of passion was certainly present in the on and offline debate in a way that 
was perhaps thought of as impossible in contemporary politics, with the turnout of 84.6% being 
testament to this. Social media certainly had a role to play as an outlet for those passions but 
also had a role in connecting and mobilising those passions into participation.  A key 
representation being the number of activist groups which began on Twitter and harnessed the 
passions of likeminded others. Again, this level of passion was an extreme that although 
replicated to some extent in the EU referendum which followed, is doubtful to be replicated in 
any consistent nature in every day UK politics. It was instead, perhaps the passion generated 
by the issue of the day rather than by social media, although social media was an important 
conduit in the process in between passion and participation. 
 
Agonistic notions of Identity were also very much in evidence throughout the campaign, as 
would be expected in a debate which would decide whether Scotland would remain part of the 
Union and the resulting implications of how citizens could officially self-identify. Regardless of 
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what was promised, or rather sold as a vision of an independent Scotland, the identity of the 
electorate was for some seen as the key defining question of the debate. This again needs to 
be kept in context, however, as there was evidence within the study that of those that self-
identified as Scottish and not British, only 53% intended to vote for independence (Park, 
Bryson and Curtice 2014). This statistic alone is representative of the complexity of identity in 
politics, with national identity perhaps only being relevant to those who had entrenched 
positions at the beginning of the debate.  
 
Blue State Digital, who coordinated the remain campaign, made a conscious decision to reject 
an identity driven stance as this was only relevant to decided voters. Instead, they focused 
upon a campaign based upon the potential negative economic consequences of 
independence, as it was these which the undecided voters were believed to be more 
concerned with. In terms of Twitter discourse, the level of importance placed upon identity was 
perhaps misleading as it was mainly inhabited, certainly in terms of regular tweeters, by those 
convinced of where their loyalties lay. This does not mean, however, that the absence of an 
appeal to the cultural identity of committed Unionists was not conceived of as disappointing, 
as this appeared to be the case for many. This was most evident in the way that a victorious 
campaign had some supporters who appeared outwardly disheartened upon the result, the 
suggestion being that the neglect of a positive British identity was in part responsible for this.  
 
With regard to the primary research question – How could you tell if the #indyref were 
characterised by elements of deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism- this could be 
done by applying the types of models included in this study to data captured during the 
campaign.  As discussed in the thesis, there are a number of existing models designed to help 
identify and capture deliberative democracy, however, their variances ought to dictate their 
appropriateness in different study settings.  There are, however, no existing corresponding 
models of agnostic pluralism.  This study has considered the necessary normative 
components of Chantal Mouffe’s interpretation of agonism in relation to the indyref, and the 
results suggest that there was evidence that the debate was somewhat agonistic in nature 
during the campaign. However, as discussed previously, the notions of agonistic respect as 
part of a conflictual consensus were largely missing, and this is where the theory lays itself 
open to most criticism. Contrary to the criticisms of agonism which suggest the model is overly 
pessimistic, in this manner it appears to be overly optimistic, and even unrealistic, particularly 
in ‘hot’ online debate settings.  Karppinen, Moe and Svensson (2008) were quoted in the 
methodology chapter of this thesis, suggesting that a joint approach including both deliberation 
and agonism could have positive implications for research in the subject field of political 
communication.  In order to produce a robust, joint approach, a quantitative study containing 
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a newly formalised strand of agonistic pluralism applied in conjunction with one (or a 
combination/adaptation) of the more rigorous existing dialogic deliberative approaches, aided 
by a focus upon the type of exemplars discussed throughout this chapter, ought to perhaps 
be the preferred method in future assessments. 
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7 Results to the supplementary research question – How does 
pluralist group theory aid our understanding of Twitter based 
activism during the Scottish independence referendum 2014?  
7.1 Overview of chapter 7  
Earlier chapters of the thesis focus upon theoretical political pluralism and the manner in which 
it embodies the principles of media pluralism in the present day. This set the scene for 
answering the first research question - To what extent was Twitter activity characterised by 
elements of deliberative democracy and agonistic pluralism during the Scottish independence 
referendum 2014? This chapter focuses specifically on exploring the impact of social media 
upon pluralist group theory in response to the second research question, which asks - How 
does pluralist group theory aid our understanding of Twitter based activism during the Scottish 
independence referendum 2014? The basis of group theory itself can be traced back to the 
philosophical pluralism of early writers such as William James with his belief in theoretical, 
political plurality over monistic singularity. In democratic terms, this can be applied to both the 
benefit of internal plurality within groups, and the external plurality of groups within society and 
the broader political spectrum.  
 
The role of the group within democratic systems is succinctly described by Mary Parker-Follet: 
 
The group process contains the secret of collective life, it is the key to democracy, it is 
the master lesson for each individual to learn, it is our chief hope for the political, the 
social, the international life of the future (Parker–Follett p.97 1918). 
  
Although the above was written in 1918, the continued role of groups within democracies has 
generally persisted in much the same way as Parker-Follet describes. The main caveat to 
such assertions has been the decline of political party membership until recent times: 
 
Membership of the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats has increased 
to around 1.6% of the electorate in 2016, compared to a historic low of 0.8% in 2013. 
Across the UK, Labour Party membership increased from 0.6% in 2013 to 1.1% in 
2016.  Membership of ‘other’ parties has changed markedly in recent years. In July 
2016 SNP membership was around 120,000, compared to 25,000 in December 2013. 
In July 2016 Green Party (England and Wales) membership was around 55,000, 
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compared to 13,800 in December 2013. UKIP’s membership increased from 32,000 in 
December 2013 to around 47,000 in May 2015, though has since fallen to 39,000 in 
July 2016 (parliament.co.uk 2016). 
 
The unforeseen rise in party membership was contrary to general expectation as the trend 
had been a steady decline over a prolonged period, culminating in record low points in party 
membership as detailed above. Until very recently, UK politics was largely a two-party system 
of Conservative and Labour support, with a handful of other minority parties (excepting 
fluctuating, meaningful support for the Liberal Democrats). The prevailing hegemony has been 
markedly challenged in recent times by the rapid rise (and in certain instances fall) in popularity 
of parties such as the SNP, UKIP and the Green Party (again, as detailed above). The increase 
in party membership has in all likelihood been a reaction to the two major sovereign issues of 
recent times, in the form of the Scottish independence referendum and the UK/EU referendum, 
as well as a sudden move to the left within the Labour Party with the unexpected success of 
Jeremy Corbyn in becoming party leader. 
 
Political party membership is, however, only one form of group politics and the focus of this 
study is the rise in group activism and the impact of social media in this regard. Here then the 
main focus, in keeping with the rest of the study, is the performance of Yes Scotland activist 
groups during the Scottish independence referendum. More specifically, the emergence and 
relative success of these groups provides us with an insight into the impact of social media 
upon contemporary group politics, as it was social media where they were mainly situated.  
 
The technological capabilities of the internet have changed the definition of a political group 
from times preceding the digital age.  Previously, official group support, whether it be for an 
official political party organisation or an interest group necessitated individuals to become 
official members through subscription and being an active member generally meant physical 
mobilisation through attending meetings and other activities in person. Social media allows 
individuals to become active through various online means without ever attending events in 
person, or actually becoming subscribed members of the group in question. To aid 
understanding of the impact of social media activism in relation to group theory, it would help 
to document the evidence in relation to five distinct political effects of social/interest groups, 
developed from theories put forward by Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom: 
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1. They are more effective than individuals. 
2. They facilitate healthy political competition. 
3. The group bargaining process creates a barrier to extremism. 
4. Overlapping memberships of social groups discourages unilateral thought and 
action. 
5. Extensive pluralist networks help to ensure the spread of information (Dahl and 
Lindblom 1976 p.302-305). 
 
The fact that the text is from the 1970s facilitates a comparison between group theory then, 
and the contemporary digital age. Dahl and Lindblom discuss the above factors with a general 
focus upon leadership, but the categories can equally be applied to the general impact of 
interest groups on the democratic process.  In order to do so, each of these assertions are 
individually addressed and contrasted with the reality of evidence collected during the Scottish 
independence referendum campaign of 2014. 
 
7.2 Were activist groups more effective than individuals during the 
Scottish independence referendum campaign 2014? 
‘In union there is strength’ according to Dahl and Lindblom (ibid.). This is the basis of our 
democracy: whereby the importance of political issues and the key driver of whether such 
issues make it onto the political agenda, is generally judged by the level of popular interest. 
This is the foundation of political interest groups. When Dahl and Lindblom suggest that groups 
are more effective than individuals, they are referring to the manner in which groups have a 
greater propensity to influence public opinion which in turn influences political outcomes. As 
groups form and find voice in communities and perhaps the media, they improve their chances 
of having an impact upon the political issue in question. The story of Women for Independence 
gives an insight into the manner in which social media can play a key role in group formation 
and development in the technological era. 
 
The following are excerpts from an interview with a Women for Independence activist, which 
begins with a response to a question about how the group initially formed, following a private 
dinner party consisting of women who had largely met through reading each other’s posts on 
Twitter: 
 
We officially launched in November 2012, before the official Yes campaign even 
launched, so it was more of womanhood coming together and chatting online more 
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than anything else. Some, like Natalie McGarry and Shona McAlpine, knew each other 
and Rosie Kane and Caroline Leckie had been MSPs together, but nobody really knew 
each other of that group [personally] they really came together in that way [online]. 
(A2) 
 
We have then, evidence of a group which genuinely formed through a coming together of 
likeminded people online. On being asked about the relevance of Twitter in the early days of 
the group, the activist responded: 
 
Twitter was central and the key place they did their work initially, as the impetus was 
from issues concerning TV panels and the predominance of men on them, and the 
failure to balance them (sic). (A2) 
 
A2 then explained how the common perception of a lack of gender balance as expressed by 
other female Twitter users, was the main driver behind the concept of Women for 
Independence.  Individuals such as Natalie McGarry, who were deemed to be ‘Twitter 
personalities’, mainly on the rationale that they had a comparatively high number of followers, 
began to discuss the idea of the group and as the idea gained traction the Women For 
Independence Twitter account was created.  The activist then went on to discuss how the 
surge in numbers of women following the account meant that the group decided to adopt a 
formal structure and decided upon geographical units led by volunteers in each location. At 
the time of the interview (13/11/2014) the activist described how the group had grown: 
 
Well we have 56 contacts for local groups and these are everywhere in Scotland 
except from Orkney for some reason, with six now in Fife and most of the groups have 
met at least once, but the groups are meeting and if you look at our website for the 
forthcoming meetings [you will see this] like tonight, I am going to Bellshill for the 
inaugural meeting there. So we are trying to support them. (A2) 
 
The capability of the group to mobilise an online movement into traditional political activity 
(without suggesting that one is necessarily superior to the other) is demonstrated in that the 
group had over 1000 women present at a meeting in Perth in 2014. The activist went on to 
describe how the group consisted of many women who had not had a political voice previously 
and the effect that this had on them: 
 
We have had a couple of massive meetings post referendum, like one in Perth where 
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there was 1000 women, which was described by one of my cynical Glasgow pals as, 
'a bit hallelujah'. (A2) 
 
By this, A2 explained how she was referring to the way that the group was formed by women 
who had, until that moment, never had a political voice.   A2 went on to stress how this gave 
way to genuine emotion, in that the women concerned wanted to express the magnitude of 
speaking publicly on political issues for the very first time, something the majority of women 
had expressed as being something that previously they would never have even contemplated 
doing. 
 
The way in which women who were politically mobilised through association with, or 
membership of, Women for Independence was verified by an MSP in a separate interview, 
recalling his dealings with the group: 
 
I think they had a very positive impact. I did some campaigning with Women for 
Independence, funnily enough when they asked me to speak at an event and there 
were people getting engaged in these things. People I knew, who if you said to them 
when we were at school together, 'you will be politically active and politically engaged 
and attending public meetings', they would have laughed in your face. (M3) 
 
Finally, with a growing membership and 56 local groups, the activist told of the pressure to 
formalise the group structure further and the tensions which this created in terms of the original 
ethos of the group: 
 
[The growth of the group] is a source of immense credibility for us as a feminist 
campaigning organisation and it’s important that we don't become a political party, 
though some people want us to, because then we are just recreating an existing 
structure and it's about doing a new way of politics, and though it’s a cliché saying a 
new way, when we don't yet know what it is, we just know it's new and different. (A1) 
 
We have evidence then of the way that the group was formed online and grew into a notable 
activist group during the campaign. As the group grew in size they then begun to employ more 
traditional political group activities and continue to campaign at the time of writing, with a 
Twitter following of roughly 23,500.  
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There was further evidence of grassroots groups which formed primarily online during the 
independence referendum campaign, and then became involved in more traditional political 
campaigning. National Collective’s formation and evolution shared many commonalities with 
that of Women for Independence. National Collective, who are now disbanded, had their 
beginnings in a small group of like-minded friends who wanted to get together to support the 
independence campaign. In something of a postscript to the efforts of the group, National 
Collective posted the following on their website, which gives an insight into their collective 
structure: 
 
The public’s perception of what National Collective was, and the reality of our 
determined efforts, are starkly different. Contrary to what some might believe, National 
Collective was never a huge organisation or institution with a full or even part-time 
staff…Some of us are freelancers, some of us students, some of us teachers. Some 
of us are members of political parties. Many of us are not (McFadyen 2015). 
 
The article went on to describe the reality of a small group of people who had become friends 
and were desperately attempting to make the group work, spurred on by their backgrounds as 
passionate artists and facilitators attempting to achieve what they believed would make the 
world a better place.  The article then goes on to state that they were explicitly removed from 
SNP influence and how, in a similar light as Women for Independence, wanted to be seen as 
different, as something which could not be considered as part of the establishment. They state 
that the thing that brought them together was shared values and that their biggest success 
was creating a platform for others to come together and participate. They had other shared 
similarities with Women for Independence, in the way that an online platform grew into 
something more recognisable as traditional political campaigning: 
 
Our big success was as a platform for a huge number of people during the campaign 
– online, in dozens of events [likely referring to the Yestival tour mentioned in chapter 
six], in a book we published and a zine (ibid.). 
 
They again, in line with Women for Independence, experienced tensions when as a group with 
momentum and growing support there was perhaps an inevitable pressure, to move toward a 
more formalised campaign structure: 
 
Of course, there were conflicts between short and long-term goals; between different 
voices with different views on how things should be done, and of course there were 
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contradictions – the foremost of these between the need for a directed campaign and 
the desire to be an open artists’ collective (ibid.). 
 
In later excerpts the author talks of the organisational shortcomings of the group and the 
pressure to become fully constitutionalised in structure. They also, in keeping with Women for 
Independence, began to organise themselves into loose networks headed by a pool of 
organisers and spoke of the way that their appeal to many was the lack of formal processes 
which some members may have found intimidating. 
 
There are then, striking similarities in the formulation and evolution of both groups and 
particularly the way that groups who set out with intentions to be different, and not fall into 
traditional power structures, seem perhaps inevitably fated to do so. There is also perhaps, as 
evidenced with both groups, an inevitable movement from online activism to traditional forms 
of activism. In terms of groups being more effective than individuals, it is interesting that 
National Collective allude to the illusory nature of online groups, whereby small groups of 
individuals can become to be perceived as huge organisations. This notion lends itself to the 
argument that the perceived size of a group is important with regard to how successful it is 
deemed to be. Dahl and Lindblom’s group theory posits that the groups are more effective 
than individuals and indeed the effective Twitter accounts during the Scottish independence 
referendum were groups rather than individuals (Wings Over Scotland is discussed in this 
context presently) and social media, at the very least, facilitated and expedited the group 
formation process in a way that was hitherto extremely unlikely. 
 
Whilst the connectivity of social media can help interest groups form, grow, and move into 
more traditional forms of political participation, it also lends itself to individuals gaining political 
voice and impact and challenges the way that we define groups in the era of social media. 
The most pertinent example of this in terms of the groups focused upon within this study is 
that of Wings Over Scotland: 
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Figure 50 Screenshot from Twitter (2016) 
 
Wings Over Scotland is discussed in numerous sections within the results chapter relating to 
the first research question addressed within the project (see Mobilisation section, Access and 
Equality section, Flaming section and Community Identification section in chapter six so for 
purposes of brevity the back story of Wings is not repeated again here. 
 
In terms of assertions of groups being more effective than individuals, Wings Over Scotland 
raises some important issues. The screen grab above shows that at the time of writing, which 
is almost 14 months after the Scottish independence referendum, Wings has 49,200 followers 
on Twitter, and that number continues to grow. It has been stated a number of times in this 
thesis that Wings stands out from other groups due to the fact that Wings is one person, Stuart 
Campbell. One person, that is, in that he runs Wings as a solo project. Certainly, Twitter posts 
(all 241,000 and counting) are his own doing and the vast majority of written articles on the 
Wings website are attributed to him (lately there have been some which are attributed to others 
though this was not the case until very recently).  
 
Again, however, much of the credit given to Wings is driven by the number of followers he 
has, so do we class Wings as a solo venture or do we class followers as part of the group? 
Social media has blurred the lines between individuals and groups in the traditional political 
sense. Much of the content on Wings’ Twitter feed is the comments of others in reply to his 
posts, in the same way that much of the content on the Wings website is the comments section 
which follows each article posted. For example, following this featured article:  
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Figure 51 Screenshot from Wings Over Scotland (2014) 
 
The above article was published on Wings in February of 2014 and as always, a link to the 
article was posted on Twitter. The comments section for this article ran to over 90 pages (when 
printed on A4 in a standard font size) comprising of 394 separate comments. These were 
generally in support of the argument put forward by Wings (and contained a high volume of 
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discussions that could be classed as Intra-ideological questioning) with Campbell himself 
contributing to the discussion at times. This amount of comments was sizeable for posts on 
the site but certainly not without comparison. This type of group communication has only been 
possible since the introduction of ‘Web 2’ technology at the turn of the century, and Wings is 
far from being the only site to have this type of regular discourse posted on political forums, 
blogs, and websites.  
 
Dictionary definitions of a group refer to ‘a number of people or things that are located, 
gathered, or classed together’ and ‘a number of people that work together or share certain 
beliefs’ (Oxford Dictionary 2017). Political interest groups in the traditional sense invoke 
thoughts of a core institutional body at the head of perhaps a top down hierarchical structure. 
Whilst the remainder of the group membership may have their role limited to discussing and 
perhaps voting upon issues put forward by the leadership, with official publications usually the 
sole responsibility of the leadership. In the age of social media, a group like Wings Over 
Scotland, still has the agenda set by its sole core proprietor. The inclusion of contributions will 
still remain the choice of the leader/ship but the comments section, as discussed above, is 
now memorialised online in a manner which was beyond the scope of traditional offline political 
organisations. It is in these sections that often the most interesting detail is found, and it is 
where there is much more chance of finding deliberation in action (though usually limited to 
internal deliberation/intra-ideological questioning and response) than in the core material 
posted by the leader(s). The democratic nature of this progression is an important, positive 
innovation.  
 
We should then classify activist organisations such as Wings Over Scotland as a group. They 
promoted and facilitated political engagement and discourse during the independence 
referendum, in what was a positive democratic progression, which has been a direct result of 
social media. Wings may theoretically appear to be a solo activist at work, but it is the plurality 
of followers and their contribution which gives veracity and meaning to the overall democratic 
thought and action of the group, and more importantly a greater power to influence political 
opinion than that of individuals, which supports Dahl and Lindblom’s theory on the issue. 
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7.3 Did activist groups facilitate healthy political competition during the 
Scottish independence referendum and did Twitter impact upon 
this? 
Democratic political systems such as that of the United Kingdom, benefit from a plurality of 
representative views and the interest/activist group is vital in facilitating this aim. Again, as 
previously noted, for various reasons, the Scottish independence referendum saw multiple 
grass roots activist groups in support of independence with a practical, complete absence as 
such, in support of the Unionist campaign. 
 
Healthy competition in any political campaign would ideally see a plurality of groups on either 
side, coupled with a balanced media both reporting and analysing the campaign as it unfolds. 
From the beginning of the campaign independence supporters were extremely vocal in their 
distrust of the mainstream media. In terms of the written press, it is very difficult to argue 
against this assertion, though allegations of a broader under-representation within broadcast 
media is more contentious. The vast majority of the UK and Scottish traditional press, with the 
exception of The Sunday Herald, all declared support for the preservation of the United 
Kingdom with The Daily Record, Sunday Mail, The Independent on Sunday, The Observer 
and The Scottish Sun officially taking a neutral editorial position, while The Herald supported 
the preservation of the Union dependent upon the devolution of further powers to Holyrood 
(Herald 2014). This imbalance cannot be seen as representative of the will of the Scottish 
electorate, as even at the start of the campaign there was roughly a third of eligible voters with 
a preference for independence.  
 
With the under-representation of the printed press in support of independence and an absence 
of grass roots activism in support of Better Together, any question of whether interest groups 
facilitated healthy competition during the campaign ought to be focused upon the role of Yes 
Scotland activist groups competing with the printed press. The printed press is specifically 
referred to rather than news broadcasters, as the UK news broadcasters’ official position 
would have been neutral, though this is contentious for many, particularly in terms of the BBC 
as focused upon elsewhere in this thesis. There is then, a general consensus around the view 
that social media did indeed facilitate a more balanced debate than would have been in its 
absence: 
 
Where Scotland’s print and broadcast media were in the main pro-Union or ‘impartial’ 
(given that their impartiality has been contested), social media provided space for 
subjectivity, opinion, and overt ideological bias to be expressed. In this campaign, as 
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never before in the UK, social media emerged not merely as a tool of communication, 
but as a weapon in a political campaign of huge constitutional significance 
(theconversation.com 2015). 
 
There is further empirical evidence which backs claims of the impact of social media during 
the referendum campaign, indeed, a YouGov poll commissioned by News UK in the weeks 
following the referendum result, found that 39% of respondents had their decisions influenced 
by social media and other websites, as opposed to 34% being influenced by the traditional 
press (Haggerty 2014). However, in keeping with the majority of the empirical evidence in the 
results relating to the first research question, TV and radio were found to have the highest 
impact in this regard, with 42% stating that it was the major influence upon decision making 
relating to the independence referendum (ibid.). 
 
The expressed influence of social media detailed above, could of course manifest itself in 
many forms, and may not be related to activist group activity and we simply do not have 
accurate data to quantify this.  An interesting insight into the difference between the activities 
of volunteer Yes Scotland supporters and Better Together supporters, and their respective 
activity on social media, was discussed during an interview with an official Better Together 
campaigner who also worked in the Labour Party office at Holyrood: 
 
What I found really frustrating during the campaign was that we would stand on a street 
corner at 8.30 at night, where there would be maybe ten of us standing putting the 
world to rights and the difference betwen us and the nats (sic), would be that our 
opposite 10, standing putting the world to rights, would go home and post things on 
Twitter, post things on Face Book, post on their blog, and Newsnet and Bella, where 
our guys were going home to have their tea. (M1) 
 
M1 went on to suggest that this was a key difference, in that people of all ages within the Yes 
Scotland campaign, whether it be young or old, were embracing social media in a way that 
the Better Together campaign was not.  This viewpoint seemed all the more significant due to 
the fact that it came from an active Better Together campaigner, rather than someone in 
support of Yes Scotland. Yes Scotland fully understood the media position in relation to the 
lack of traditional media support on its side of the argument. A Glasgow University study 
explained the role of Yes Scotland groups and social media during the campaign: 
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The Yes campaign was much more permissive. Its primary goal was securing a Yes 
vote and there was a similar focus on undecided voters. However, Yes Scotland 
believed that it had to build momentum from the ground up, harness the energies of 
supporters, enthuse new recruits and bring together lots of disparate groups in the 
attempt to create a national movement rather than fight a traditional election campaign.  
The more loosely organised and grassroots orientated structure of the Yes Scotland 
campaign encouraged more people to channel their energies into a variety of activities 
including the use of social media (Langer, Commerford and McNulty 2015).  
 
In respect of the question regarding social media contributing to healthier competition during 
the referendum, we can state with some confidence that Yes Scotland supporting activist 
groups contributed to helping Yes Scotland compete with the Better Together campaign. 
Better Together had the broader support of the traditional press and without the social media 
domination of the online campaign, it is doubtful that Yes Scotland would have achieved the 
quite remarkable 22 point increase from Early 2013 to September 2014. It is, however, 
impossible to quantify how many of those points were added by Twitter and in a media 
landscape which is still dominated by traditional media sources, care must be taken not to 
overstate the real impact that Twitter and social media more broadly could have had upon 
proceedings. 
 
7.4 Did group bargaining create barriers to extremism during the 
independence referendum and did Twitter impact upon this? 
Dahl and Lindblom see pluralism as giving rise to political leaders whose ‘main skill is 
negotiating settlements amongst conflicting social organisations’ (Dahl and Lindblom 1976 
p.304). Their theory in this regard focuses upon the negotiation skills of leaders. The groups 
in focus during the Scottish independence referendum were very much a loose coalition with 
the same aim in a relatively short, time-limited campaign, in comparison to some other political 
cause groups.  
 
There were a few limited examples of what were generally individual Twitter users which 
perhaps bordered on the extreme, and when these occurred the official campaign groups and 
the more socially conscious activists would generally voice their disagreement through both 
traditional and online platforms. This bears little relation to the context in which it was situated 
by Dahl and Lindblom (1976) which refers to focused collective bargaining rather than voicing 
general disapproval. However, the motivation to speak out upon such matters is in all 
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likelihood a product of the normative pluralist commitment, still held by many, though 
challenged by contemporary populism, which seems intent on pushing at the borders of what 
was, relatively previously, seen as unacceptable. This challenge to pluralism is one which 
deserves attention but is beyond the scope of this project and due to the fact that Dahl and 
Linblom’s theory relates to active collective bargaining, which was largely absent from the 
Scottish Independence referendum, this part of theory does not apply to the context of this 
thesis. 
 
7.5 Did overlapping group membership on Twitter require moderation 
and compromise by group leaders? 
Dahl and Lindblom contextualise overlapping membership in their theory as relating to multiple 
membership bringing conflicting values in to play. In this context, leaders need to be wary of 
alienating their group member(s) by dismissing or opposing the values and interests held by 
the members’ other group interests.  
 
A report commissioned by Common Weale (Black and Marsden 2016) gives an insight into 
the activity of 993 Yes Scotland volunteers who responded to an online survey. Of the 
respondents, 66.2% of volunteers were active in more than one Yes Scotland activist group, 
30.8% were active with National Collective and 67.7% of the women surveyed were active 
with Women for Independence. No mention was made of any of the other groups focused 
upon in this thesis. As those surveyed were all official Yes Scotland volunteers, logic would 
suggest that the broader Yes Scotland supporting population would have had significantly less 
affiliation with the activist groups in question. 
 
The prevalence of multiple group membership suggests two prevailing characteristics of the 
Yes Scotland campaign. Firstly, a group that was overwhelmingly united in its goal of 
independence, where the activist groups under the umbrella of Yes Scotland fully supported 
the official organisation and their broader campaign positions and strategy. This certainly 
appeared to be the case from the evidence in many of the sections answering the primary 
research question of this study. The feeling during the campaign, was that the independence 
movement was more than Yes Scotland and more than a political campaign focused on 
Election Day. It was a social movement within itself. The following blog article describes a 
movement which had positively grown into something bigger than its parent group - Yes 
Scotland: 
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Rather than consisting of activists manning jumble sales, the Yes movement was on 
its way to creating 300 local community groups, 50 sectoral organisations and dozens 
of other spin-offs that would flood the country with pro-independence activity. Tens of 
thousands of people across the country were now involved: from self-generated local 
Yes groups, to National Collective and the left-wing Radical Independence Campaign 
(RIC); from individuals manning Yes cafes, to new recruits running drop in centres 
(Davidson 2014). 
 
 
The article goes on to describe how the official Yes Scotland campaign knew that the grass-
roots campaign was gaining traction from learning about community debates which had been 
ran in the name of Yes Scotland by groups that they themselves never even knew existed.  
The suggestion was that the official Yes Scotland campaign was by that point almost 
redundant, with its main role now being to support the grass-roots movement with campaign 
materials and email updates. In summarising the magnitude of the grass-roots movement the 
article states that: 
 
By May 30 this year, the formal starting point of the referendum campaign, Yes was 
the biggest grass-roots political movement Scotland had seen (ibid.). 
 
The overlapping memberships of Yes supporting activists, adds somewhat to assertions of a 
movement (a movement which should be remembered lost the final vote but a movement all 
the same) rather than a political campaign, in that it suggests a united coalition of groups 
forming a broader group personality than that of the individual groups within it. 
 
Secondly, the unity within Yes Scotland groups, perhaps suggested a willingness to sacrifice 
certain political principles in the pursuit of the overall goal of independence. The reality of this 
was discussed with an activist group member during the interview process. When asked what 
his group had brought to the debate, he explained the challenges arising from the implied 
narrative that everything would be ok once Scottish sovereignty was realised: 
 
We bring culturally left politics into a domain that disrupts some people’s simplicity…we 
have some interesting challenges about things, where we come from more of an 
ecological perspective as well (sic). So, classically there is the oil debate and our 
perspective which we push gently, is actually we don't just want to be using that 
argument for other reasons [laughs, implying ecological] and introduce issues about 
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climate change and things like that. So what do we bring to it? I suppose we bring 
different communities from a green perspective and a left perspective into the people 
who are discussing sovereignty, which is a challenge. (A1) 
 
The conversation related to the fact that the economic case for an independent Scotland was 
largely based upon North Sea oil revenues, whilst the group had a long-standing commitment 
to ecological principles which are somewhat at odds with fossil fuel energy production. This 
situation exactly replicates the theory of Dahl and Lindblom regarding overlapping interests. 
The quote above leans towards deliberative democratic ideals whereby the group in question 
is (at least temporarily) willing to sacrifice a key political standpoint in pursuit of on overall goal.  
 
Dahl and Lindblom’s theory, however, is focused upon the required awareness of leaders to 
be aware of plural membership of organisations whereby, ‘action by a leader against what 
seems to be an enemy organisation may in fact strike against his own alliance’ (Dahl and 
Lindblom 1976 p.305). The evidence presented here, however, suggests a different situation 
altogether. Instead, the evidence shows that groups were willing to compromise their own 
principles and allegiance to causes which in all likelihood saw them have overlapping 
membership, which was at odds with the ideals of the overall Yes campaign, in this specific 
case an oil-based economy and ecological ideals. Therefore, it was the group members were 
compromising. Whilst it may have been that the Yes Scotland leadership also did, this study 
has no explicit evidence of this. 
 
This does not mean that Yes Scotland were not aware of the potential political conflicts 
regarding independence supporters. This was not however particularly detrimental to the 
independence cause, as the arguments put forward in the case for independence were often 
general rather than specific. They tended to focus upon the notion that decisions about 
Scotland ought to be made in Scotland and supporters often stated that the detail was not 
particularly important, and could be dealt with following a victory. The Better Together 
campaign focused upon this approach as being entirely unrealistic and that a failure to answer 
basic questions, for instance about the currency and the place of an independent Scotland in 
Europe, should move the electorate to vote No in the referendum. 
 
In terms of social media, overlapping group membership and a requirement for moderation 
and compromise, there are two main points which can be drawn from the evidence presented. 
Twitter and social media more broadly it seemed, facilitated awareness, engagement, 
interaction and membership of multiple groups, simply due to the connectivity which social 
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media affords the user. Pre-internet and social media, membership of interest groups would 
demand a far greater commitment on the part of the individual if they were to meaningfully 
participate with one group, let alone multiple groups. There was also, in a positive sense, 
evidence of social media creating a unified Yes Scotland group, with supporters willing to 
compromise in order to ensure a strong unified voice from Yes supporters. Contrary to Dahl 
and Lindblom’s assertions, however, it was their supporters who had to be aware of the need 
to compromise in the interests of maximising the independence vote, rather than the 
leadership, in a campaign which was light in specific detail. With perhaps the prospect of a 
second independence referendum on the horizon there will be demands for these generalised 
issues to be answered. There then will be a better opportunity to assess the extent to which 
the independence movement can moderate and compromise to satisfy conflicting ideals and 
perhaps group memberships of the electorate.  
 
7.6 Did Twitter aid pluralist networks in helping to spread information 
during the campaign? 
Information provision and dispersal through connected networks of individuals is the obvious, 
democracy enhancing capability of the internet and social media. 5.8million tweets were 
shared under the #indyref in 2014 with 2.6 million of those sent in the month preceding the 
final vote (Crossley 2014). The internet facilitates the spread of information through interest 
groups in a manner in which Dahl and Lindblom could likely never have imagined during the 
formation of their original group hypothesis in the 1950s (later revised in the 1970s).  
 
There is currently much debate about the concept of fake news which jeopardises the value 
of online information. These arguments were not present during the Scottish independence 
referendum, where veracity of information was still brought into question, though this was 
primarily focused upon perceived bias and misappropriation of statistics to arguments rather 
than out and out attempts to deceive. Whilst it could be argued that these social media 
occurrences were a precursor of the fake news phenomenon, the term and specific subject 
itself was not present at that time. For these reasons the subject is not focused upon in detail 
here. Social media’s role in the spread of information is discussed at length throughout the 
thesis and therefore is also not further detailed here.  
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7.7 Was the ‘personality of the State’ enhanced by their use of Twitter 
during the referendum campaign? 
This section does not relate to the theories of Dahl and Lindblom (1976) as the previous 
sections have. It instead relates to the theories of the English pluralists, Maitland, Laski, Cole, 
Barker and Figgis at the turn of the 20th Century (see chapter 3). These authors focused, to 
differing extents, upon the personality of the state and the relationship between the state and 
its citizens. Contemporary theories of the democratising potential of the internet and social 
media are that they have the potential to, for example, ‘open up new channels of 
communication between MPs and the public and could widen/deepen participation in 
parliamentary politics’ (Gibson, Lusoli and Ward 2005). The Scottish independence 
referendum campaign presented an opportunity to assess if politicians were engaging with the 
public in a different manner which could improve the tarnished relationship between 
themselves and the public, as detailed in chapter two. 
 
The relationship between the state and citizens is a common theme in democratic and pluralist 
political literature (see chapter three). The pluralist narrative in this respect, has been that the 
state is one of the many competing groups within society (particularly in the earlier works of 
Robert Dahl) and that it can as such, have its own personality in the same way that groups 
can. The English pluralists were heavily involved in the development of this theory in the early 
20th century. Pluralism also suggests that there are inherent democratic benefits of limiting the 
state by dispersing power, where possible and appropriate, to civic society, this can be formal 
decentralisation or informal through democratic participation in the political process. The end 
goal is a more coherent body politic and a closer democratic bond between the state and its 
citizens. 
 
The internet and social media with its capacity for connectivity between individuals and groups, 
certainly has the technological capabilities to assist in this goal. The Scottish independence 
referendum campaign saw a distinct difference between the performance of UK government, 
represented by the Better Together campaign, and those outside of the government. On 
examination this was evident in the general manner in which UK government actors and the 
opposing Yes Scotland campaign conducted themselves on Twitter. Yes Scotland were 
largely a manifestation of the SNP, with the SNP being the present Scottish government and 
therefore one of the institutions which make up the overall state in the UK.  However, In terms 
of social media use, they exhibited democracy enhancing behaviours which surpassed those 
on the other side of the campaign.  
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An insight into probable engagement between Twitter users is to see how many followers they 
have and how many they choose to follow. A Twitter user can still interact with those they do 
not follow, by replying to the other user’s posts, but it would usually be the case that users 
would follow those that they interact with on a regular basis. For example, the week prior to 
the referendum vote, the then First Minister Alex Salmond had approximately 90,200 Twitter 
followers and the head of Better Together, Alistair Darling, had 20,300. The disparity ratio 
between the two was in general keeping with overall social media activity within the two 
campaigns. Similarly, the then First Minister had tweeted 1725 times compared with 391 from 
Mr Darling. The striking difference however was between the amounts of accounts followed 
by the two, Mr Salmond followed 419 other Twitter users and Mr Darling followed only 1, whilst 
the 419 accounts followed by Mr Salmond was significantly fewer than those that followed 
him, it is still a significant number if any meaningful democratic activity was to take place 
between himself and those he followed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the weeks following the 
independence referendum vote, Mr Darling deleted his Twitter account altogether and has not 
reopened it since.   
 
The lack of interaction on Mr Darling’s account was aligned to a repeated narrative during the 
interviews whereby the suggestion was that the UK Government representatives campaigning 
for Better Together would have preferred not to have been there, and when they were, the 
metaphorical barriers between the state and its citizens remained firmly in place.  Evidence 
such as this suggests that the opportunity to positively alter state personality and connect to 
an ever-growing (though still relatively small) demographic of citizens which inhabit platforms 
such as Twitter, was wilfully neglected by the Westminster component of the UK state at the 
time of the referendum in 2014. It ought to be acknowledged, however, that this may have 
been influenced by the campaign tactics employed by Blue State Digital as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Though at the time of writing in 2018 some progress would perhaps have 
been expected to have been made, research shows that Conservative MPs are still far less 
likely to have a Twitter account than SNP MPs – all 35 SNP MPs have a Twitter account while 
261 of the 316 Tory MPs at Westminster are on Twitter, of whom only 43% identify themselves 
as Conservatives on their account whilst 88% of SNP MPs display their party allegiance 
(Durso and Doherty 2018).  Other reports further emphasise the manner in which the current 
main party of UK government are still struggling to come to terms with how to use social media, 
such as Ellicott (2018) who documents, via a leaked internal memo, how Conservative MPs 
are being coached on how to come across as ‘real people’ on other platforms such as 
Instagram, by posting photographs of themselves posing with pet animals. 
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The genuine personality of activist/interest groups during the independence referendum 
campaign was at times questionable and it is for this reason that this study has been focused 
upon genuine, grass roots activism during the debate. Searching Twitter using #indyref during 
the campaign would deliver many accounts that to the perhaps less discerning eye would 
appear to be genuine interest groups. The following are some of the groups that campaigned 
in support of the preservation of the Union: 
 
 Business Together  
 Academics Together  
 NHS Together  
 Lawyers Together 
 LGBT Together  
 Women Together 
 Rural Together 
 Work Together 
 
Closer examination of these groups showed that these organisations were directly affiliated to 
the Better Together campaign: 
 
 
Figure 52 Screenshot from Twitter (2016) 
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As the graphic above shows, there was no attempt to hide the fact that LGBT Together were 
a part of Better Together, by the fact that they make this clear on their Twitter page. As has 
been stated numerous times, the democratic significance of Yes Scotland was the prevalence 
of grass roots activist groups but there were also suggestions that Business for Scotland, one 
of the main independence campaign groups, was itself directly affiliated to Yes Scotland: 
 
 
 
Figure 53 Screenshot from Twitter (2016) 
 
The suggestion that this was the case was brought up by an MSP during the interview process: 
 
I think what the Yes Scotland side were able to do with all these different groups, was 
to present the Yes Scotland campaign group as being much more widespread and 
much more disparate, with all these different voices which give you all these different 
registered participants. That meant they were able to benefit from the spending limits, 
[imposed by referendum regulations] whereas Better Together was one umbrella 
group. (M4) 
 
He went on to state that it was his belief that in this regard Better Together had made a mistake 
in not attempting to foster the growth of equivalent ‘grass roots’ activist groups before explicitly 
questioning their grass-roots credentials:   
 
A lot of them [Yes activist groups] like Business for Scotland was effectively an arm of 
the SNP… I mean some of them, I think, like Christians For Independence, that I did a 
few debates with, in terms of membership, which wasn't very big at all, were funded 
through a cheque from Brian Soutar for £100,000. That was set up by an SNP MSP 
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who was the chair, so it was quite clearly an SNP front organisation funded by an SNP 
donor, so it didn't have anything really grass roots [in its] presence or network. (M4) 
 
The nuanced differences of relationships between activist groups to the official campaigns is 
important due to the manner in which we attribute democratic legitimacy to genuine grassroots 
activism. The plurality of our democracy depends, for some, upon the reality or otherwise of 
independent thought and action as opposed to subsidiaries of parent organisations, 
particularly when the parent group is a component of the state. The reality is that these 
relationships are complex and interwoven and the search for absolutely genuine grassroots 
activism, may satisfy our ideals in this respect, but may also needlessly detract from the 
positive impact of groups with quasi-links to official political organisations. The importance 
however, is dependent upon the transparency in the links between such groups and that did 
not seem to be the case in certain respects as those above. This particularly ought to detract 
from Yes Scotland, as they nurtured and revelled in the grassroots factor and the reality was 
that this was needless, as there was still a sizeable genuine grassroots presence in the activist 
groups on whom this study focuses upon. 
 
7.8 Conclusions to chapter 7 - Who governs?  
In perhaps the most important work (certainly of its time) regarding procedural pluralism and 
the role of the interest group in the democratic process, Robert Dahl (2005) asks Who 
Governs? The answer for Dahl was that the United States of America at the time of which he 
was writing, consisted of the state as an impartial arbiter between competing groups on a level 
playing field. Dahl’s study was primarily an empirical work situated in the state of New 
Hampshire, aimed at testing his group theory hypothesis. This position was much derided at 
the time and Dahl later conceded that the playing field was not so level after all and that the 
power of business and government self-interest, were key elements which had been 
disproportionately overlooked in his earlier theory. Contemporarily, the state, particularly in 
the case of governmental institutions, can only be seen to be neutral in the fewest of cases in 
its perceived role as arbiter, and instead aligns itself to other competing groups in society with 
which it shares similar values and interests.  
 
The technological capabilities of the internet and the social and political impact of social media 
have been heralded as perhaps re-invigorating and empowering interest groups to enable a 
society closer to the one originally hypothesised by Dahl. As one political website/blog states: 
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Recent years have witnessed a growth in the number and impact of single-interest 
groups, advancing narrowly defined, self-regarding causes. A number of factors have 
helped their development (Grant 2011). 
 
Such factors, according to the article, include the growth of 24-hour multi-channel media 
having a key role in the increased demand for news output with emotional/visual appeal.  
Additionally, the internet is said to have had a key role in the manner that new groups can 
form relatively cheaply and more easily attract and mobilise new members, as exemplified by 
the number of groups in existence on Facebook and the proliferation of electronic petitions 
which are active on the UK Government’s website (ibid.).  The manner in which the internet 
makes it easier and less expensive to form, attract members, and mobilise for action is largely 
beyond question, and is ratified by the findings in chapter six and seven of this thesis. 
 
Dahl and Lindblom’s group theory states that interest groups are more effective than 
individuals in relation to influencing political proceedings. This theory is supported and 
compounded by social media, as demonstrated by the way that groups like Women for 
Independence formed and thrived online, in a matter which would be much more onerous 
without social media. Additionally, we have evidence of the way in which social media has 
redefined the way in which we ought to define groups, as exemplified by  Wings Over Scotland 
who typifies the manner in which healthy political participation, ought now to include the 
comments sections of online activist groups, blogs, and digital newspaper editions. 
 
Dahl and Lindblom also point to interest groups as facilitating healthy political competition. 
The media play a vital role in facilitating the spread of information in elections, but the plurality 
of our written press has been called into question as certain groups within our democracy are 
under-represented by its generally right wing, Unionist composition. Social media, through a 
combination of a skilful Yes Scotland strategy and an unlikely democratic backlash to the 
perceived injustices of the traditional media, helped independence support grow from around 
23% in January 2013 (Carrell 2013a) to 45% at the final referendum vote in September 2014.  
 
With regard to the final parts of Dahl and Lindblom’s group theory, the manner in which the 
internet and social media facilitates the spread of information is significant and requires little 
explanation. This is apparent in the fact that 5.8 million tweets were shared under the #indyref 
in 2014 alone (Crossley 2014).  
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In terms of group and state personality, which was theorised by the English pluralists in the 
early 20th century, the evidence within the project suggests that the UK state missed out on 
the opportunity to bring itself closer to its citizens during the independence referendum. This 
was metaphorically symbolised by the head of Better Together, Alistair Darling, following just 
one person on Twitter whilst his Yes Scotland equivalents, followed and successfully 
interacted with many hundreds. Followed then by Mr Darling closing down his account all 
together in the days following the referendum. The veracity of group personality within the 
activist groups aligned to both Yes Scotland and Better Together, was brought into question 
by apparent links to the official campaigns. This suggests that caution should be urged in 
celebrating grassroots activism until the true personality of online groups is substantiated.  
 
In conclusion, the evidence within this study suggests that pluralist group theory is still relevant 
in the present day, and social media has proven to be an important and influential tool in the 
continual quest for fairer representation of groups in the political sphere of the United Kingdom. 
 
7.9 Original contribution to knowledge 
Social media, in relative terms, has an extremely short history, it is therefore unsurprising that 
there is a paucity of empirical studies focusing upon its impact upon democracy. Comparative 
work at the beginning of the project in 2013 was generally restricted to considerations of social 
media and elections, its impact upon participation, and the impact of new media upon 
traditional media formats. Empirical studies were, almost without exception, quantitative in 
nature, generally consisting of comparisons between nation states. This study makes a 
contribution to knowledge in being qualitative, focused specifically upon the United Kingdom, 
and going beyond purely attending to activism and participation by taking a broader approach 
in also focusing upon journalists and politicians.  
 
The study has enhanced the understanding of the empirical reality of three strands of political 
communication, including democratic deliberation on Twitter, by uniquely providing rich 
descriptions of each category of activity within Freelon’s (2010) model.  Additionally, it has 
provided justification for the consideration of the development of a new strand of the model, 
(as well as presenting the core components which ought to be considered as a basis for that 
model) which focuses upon agonistic pluralism as another democratically valuable strand of 
democratic communication with significant relevance in today’s political climate, particularly 
online, which is increasingly awash with antagonistic political discourse. 
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This project has also offered new perspectives stemming from a critical theory research 
philosophy and accompanying methodology, with the aim of furthering the tradition of critical 
theory research to analyse developments in new technologies, the media, and politics within 
capitalist societies, as called for by Kellner (1990).   
 
The study has made a further contribution to knowledge by taking a pertinent model from Dahl 
and Lindblom’s theoretical works relating to interest groups in the form of Politics, Economics 
and Welfare (1976) and rigorously evaluating their relevance in the present era of computer-
mediated communication.  In this respect, the study has demonstrated the enduring relevance 
of Dahl and Lindblom’s work in the subject area, some 60 years after its initial publication (as 
the latest reissue of their work in 2017 would also suggest). 
 
7.10 Suggestions for future research 
As noted at various points throughout the thesis, this study has been conceptualised in a 
similar way to that of Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez (2011) in terms of its potential use in 
future quantitative studies.  The study has sought to explain and present, in some detail, 
empirical examples of accepted categories of activity in established strands of political 
communication taken from Freelon (2010).  In this regard, it was envisaged that quantitative 
scholars could build upon the foundations laid in this thesis to operationalise these findings in 
future studies.  This would, perhaps, be particularly useful in research seeking to quantify 
broader notions of how Twitter and other social media platforms are impacting upon the 
democratic process in the UK and further afield. 
 
Another suggestion for future research may be to again build upon the findings of this project 
to formulate and test a specific strand of agonistic pluralism to complement existing strands 
within models such as Freelon (2010). Such a model could again be jointly applied, with 
deliberative strands and others, to different political debates, particularly election campaigns, 
either inside or outside of the political cauldron concerning issues of sovereignty, to assess 
the presence of agonistic pluralism and whether online deliberation is more plausible in 
perhaps less emotive campaign settings.  Using this approach in a ‘cold’ (or at least ‘colder') 
campaign may be particularly useful in contrasting the appropriateness of agonism as a 
normative explanatory theory against the findings of this particular study. 
 
A final possibility which has been prompted by the study in terms of pluralist group theory, 
would be a future consideration of the manner in which governments may or may not pursue 
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the use of social media platforms such as Twitter, in terms of enhancing the personality of the 
State by utilising its potential to address the often questionable relationship it contemporarily 
shares with its citizens. 
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Appendix 1 – Followed Twitter accounts 
 
In support of Better Together 
 
Scottish Labour Party @scottishlabour 
UK Labour Party @UKLabour 
Conservative Party @Conservatives 
Scottish Conservative Party @ScotTories 
Liberal Democrats @LibDems 
Scottish Liberal Democrats @scotlibdems  
Communist Party of Britain @CPBritain 
UKIP @UKIP 
Better Together @UK_Together 
Daily Mirror @DailyMirror 
Scottish Express @ScotExpress 
The Herald @heraldscotland 
Daily Mail @MailOnline 
Scotland on Sunday @scotonsunday 
Sunday Post @Sunday_Post 
The Daily Telegraph @TelegraphNews 
The Independent @Independent 
The Guardian @guardian 
The Scottish Daily Express @ScotExpress 
The Scotsman @TheScotsman 
The Times @thetimes 
The Economist @TheEconomist 
The Spectator @spectator 
Academics Together @AcademicsTog 
Business Together @Biz_Together 
Lawyers Together @LawyersTogether 
LGBT Together @LGBTTogetherUK 
NHS Together @NHSTogetherUK 
No to Independence @NTSI_VoteNo 
Gordon & Sarah Brown @OfficeGSBrown 
David Cameron @David_Cameron 
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Alistair Carmichael @amcarmichaelMP 
Alistair Darling – account removed 
Ruth Davidson @RuthDavidsonMSP 
Kezia Dugdale @kezdugdale 
Neil Findlay @NeilFindlay_MSP 
Murdo Fraser @murdo_fraser 
Johann Lamont @JohannLamont 
Jenny Marra @Jennymarra 
Michael Moore – account removed 
David Mundell @DavidMundellDCT 
J.K. Rowling @jk_rowling 
Oliver Milne @OliverMilne 
Duncan Hothersall @dhothersall 
Blair Heary @Blair Heary 
 
 
In support of Yes Scotland 
 
SNP @the SNP 
SNP Youth – account removed 
Scottish Green Party @scotgp 
Scottish Socialist Party @The_SSP_ 
Yes Scotland @YesScotland 
Business for Scotland @BizforScotland 
Farming for Yes @Farming4Yes 
Generation Yes – account removed 
National Collective @WeAreNational 
Radical Independence @Radical_indy 
Scottish Independence Convention @ScotConvention 
Spirit of Independence @Spiritofindy 
The Common Weal @CommonWeal 
Wings Over Scotland @WingsScotland 
Women for Independence @WomenForIndy 
Independent Voices @celebs4indy 
Sunday Herald @newssundayherald 
Academics for Yes @AcademicsForYes 
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Lawyers For Yes @Lawyersforyes 
Alex Salmond @AlexSalmond 
Nicola Sturgeon @NicolaSturgeon 
Dennis Canavan @DennisCanavan 
Patrick Harvie @patrickharvie 
Stewart Stevenson @zsstevens 
Stewart Hosie @StewartHosieSNP 
Roseanna Cunningham @strathearnrose 
Joan McAlpine @JoanMcalpine 
Mark McDonald @markmcdsnp 
Shona Robison @Shona Robison 
Jim Sillars @NaeFear 
Aamer Anwar @Aamer Anwar 
Lesley Riddoch @LesleyRiddoch 
Alan Cumming @Alancumming 
Billy Bragg @billybragg 
 
Neutral/journalists 
 
The Daily Record @Daily_Record 
Sunday Mail @Sunday Mail 
The Scottish Sun @ScottishSun 
David Torrance @davidtorrance 
David Clegg @davieclegg 
David Leask @LeaskyHT 
Jennifer Mckiernan @JMcKiernnanPJ 
Richard Walker @richardwalker5 
Andrew Nicholl @AndrewSNicoll 
Hamish MacDonnell @Hamish Macdonell 
Tom Gordon @HTScotpol 
Andrew Picken @andrewpicken1 
Alan Cochrane @AlanCochraneSez 
Kenny Farquharson @KennyFarq 
Simon Johnson @simon_telegraph 
BBC Scotland News @BBCScotlandNews 
Policy Scotland @policyscotland 
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5 Million Questions @Fivemillionqs 
Press Data Politics @PD_Politics  
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Appendix 2 – Interview Prompts 
 
N.B. These questions were the basis for all of the interviews, however, additional questions 
and alterations to the questions noted here, were tailored accordingly dependent upon the 
individual in question, and other topical issues unfolding during the time-period of the interview 
process. 
 
Activist groups 
 
Your organisation: 
 Origins 
 Membership 
 Structure 
 Finances 
 Followers 
 Platforms used 
 Decision making process (How democratic is the org) 
 Do they measure impact i.e. Hootsuite 
 Strategy 
 What does your day look like 
 previous campaigning experience 
 
Twitter: 
 Which groups have impact? 
 What impact does yours have? 
 Thoughts on BT campaign. 
 Thoughts on YS campaign. 
 Tone of twitter debate. 
 Is Twitter a space for deliberation? 
 Bullying/intimidation. 
 Landmark events. (can you identify) 
 Is the online debate as you would have expected? 
 Perceived positive/negative impact of twitter. 
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 Blogs followed/bloggers within group. 
 Pluralism-how inclusive, diverse, access, voice, reach 
 
Traditional Press: 
 Establish if engaged at all with. 
 Which newspapers/journalists have impact? 
 Differences between campaign on twitter and print. 
 Opinion on allegations of bias. 
 Has your group been reported on by the traditional press? 
 Broadcast media 
 Pluralism-how inclusive, diverse, access, voice, reach 
 
Democracy: 
 Impact of Twitter on democratic process. (unpack more relating to democracy) 
 
Journalist 
 
You/Your newspaper: 
 How do you/your paper manage twitter/social media? 
 Do you/why do you blog independently of your newspaper? 
 What is your/your newspapers strategy for covering indyref offline? 
 What is you/your newspapers strategy for covering indyref in print? 
 How much freedom do you have as an individual? 
 
The Referendum 
 What is your opinion of YS campaign generally? 
 What is your opinion of BT campaign generally? 
 What is your opinion of YS utilisation of social media/twitter? 
 What is your opinion of BT utilisation of social media/Twitter? 
 Which activist groups do you believe have had an impact and why? 
 Which bloggers do you believe have had an impact and why? 
 Can you point to any landmark events online? 
 Is the online debate as you would have expected? 
 Thoughts on bullying/intimidation online? 
 Thoughts of allegations of bias from traditional print media? 
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 Pluralism (is diversity being achieved) 
 Strategy of swarming 
 
Democracy 
 What do you see your role as within a democracy? 
 How do you think Twitter has impacted upon the debate journalistically? 
 How do you think Twitter has impacted upon the debate democratically? 
 Is Twitter a space for deliberation? 
 What are your thoughts on the long term impact of the internet/social media/Twitter on 
the printed press as we know it? 
 
MSP 
 
You/Your office/party 
 
 How do you/your office use social media? 
 How is social media managed by your party? 
 Which platforms used? 
 How much freedom as an individual? 
 
The referendum 
 Yes campaign generally 
 BT generally 
 YS Twitter 
 BT Twitter 
 Is the online debate as you would have expected? 
 Who has an impact 
 Landmark events 
 Bullying 
 Bias in traditional media 
 Pluralism 
 
Democracy 
 Accountability by social media 
 Is Twitter a space for deliberation? 
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 Impact of new media democratically 
 Impressions of future developments 
 
